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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to show that Rule 14a-9' of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)2 , unlike Rule lOb-5 3 of
the Exchange Act, does not require scienter. In order to clearly under-
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 14(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1982).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
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stand the intended applications of the two different rules, it is necessary
to recapitulate the history of proxies, the thinking of major authors that
lead to reform, and the thinking on fraud, which culminated in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Moreover, an examination of the leg-
islative history of the two rules and their subsequent application by
courts will show that each rule serves a different purpose. In particular,
the United States Supreme Court rulings in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder4 and the recently decided Aaron v. SEC,5 confirm that sci-
enter is necessary for a violation Section 10b of Rule lOb-5. On the
other hand neither Congress nor the courts have decided whether sci-
enter is necessary for a Rule 14a-9 violation.
The central core of this Article was originally intended to be the
negligence standard and its relation to Section 14(a)6 and Rule 14a-97
of the Exchange Act. And indeed, it remains a major part. The negli-
gence standard and its relation to Section 10(b)8 and Rule lOb-5,9 on
the other hand, were intended to be the subsidiary part which would
face off against Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 and act as a catalyst, as it
were, to make the central thesis meaningful and comprehensive. As it
turns out, however, the negligence standard as it relates to Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is subsidiary to negligence as it relates to Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9. But Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 do indeed act
as a catalyst in the argument. The material dealing with early authors,
their fears, and, most important, their forceful analyses of the problems
and evils besetting society, is clearly essential to establish the central
importance of the proxy in corporate society as it has developed.
A key concept which haunts everything discussed in this Article is
that five-letter word-fraud. It is not the thesis, nor was it intended to
be, yet it underscores all that is said. More spectacularly, it may be said
that the issue of fraud underlies all societies in varying degrees, and
how it is treated and understood influences, nay, supports or destroys
the very pillars on which the society rests. A legal system can only be
meaningful if the people in the society believe in and support it. In
order for the legal system to survive, an underlying honesty that shuns
fraud must be sewn into the fabric of the society.
4. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
5. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
[Vol. 19:491
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PROXIES AND THE MODERN CORPORATION
A simile will serve to introduce the paradigm of this Article. It is
shaped like an ellipse, beginning with a small but important starting
point of the introduction and thesis which zeroes in on Section 14(a)
and Rule 14a-9 and the negligence standard.'0 For the thesis to have
the fundamental meaning at the end that it should have, the more ex-
panded part of the ellipse gives the historical background of the corpo-
ration, the proxy, the individual, and the new managerial
corporation." The ideas of most of the period's authors move up the
ellipse at a thicker or more expanded part since these ideas, although
somewhat redundant, are basic to the actions later taken by Congress
and the courts, and more importantly, the assumptions later made in
this Article. 2
Next, a very short overview of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securi-
ties Act) 13 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193414 is presented. At
this point, the thought crosses one's mind that it should hardly be far-
ther up the ellipse, but it in fact is, because, brief or not, both Acts are
based on the beliefs of the reform authors and both were written in
order to put those beliefs into action.'" At the widest part or apex of
the ellipse is the analysis of fraud giving the entire thesis an
underpinning.' 6
As this Article moves along the ellipse, Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 are very high up because much law has been developed from
these two important areas. First, legislative intent is covered since it is
the most widely discussed aspect of this area.1 7 The next most impor-
tant area concerns case law developed before Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.'8 Because the Hochfelder case is the most important one
discussed in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it is examined next.' 9 Fol-
lowing this, the cases that arose after Hochfelder are analyzed to give
credence to Hochfelder.2 ° Aaron v. SEC2 is further down the ellipse,
10. See infra Chapter I: Introduction.
11. See infra Chapter II: Historical Background.
12. See infra Chapter III: Principal Authors Contributing to Reform.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
15. See infra Chapter IV: Historical Overview of Federal Securities Acts.
16. See infra Chapter V: Scienter and Its Evolution to Include Negligence.
17. See infra Chapter VI: Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Legislative Intent as a Broad
Standard.
18. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See infra Chapter VII: Case Law Before Hochfelder: Primarily a
Negligence Standard.
19. See infra Chapter VIII: Hochfelder: A Partial Scienter Standard.
20. See infra Chapter IX: Articles and Cases After Hochfelder: A Denial of Scienter.
21. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
19841
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but equally important because the Supreme Court ruled quite distinctly
and established its position regarding scienter.22
Continuing down the ellipse, the essential material concerning
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 is discussed. Although this material is
important to prove the thesis, there is little of it available and it there-
fore belongs in the lesser part of the ellipse.
The first discussion of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 material con-
cerns legislative intent23 Next, the discussion focuses on important case
law, especially Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc. ,24 the leading case in
this area.25
Finally, the conclusion is at the end of the ellipse, not because it is
unimportant, but because it pulls everything together at the final
point.26 Thus, the ellipse is finished and the geometric pattern of logi-
cal analysis "concluded" and proven."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Shareholder and Corporation
The business corporation 27 is made up of many different relations:
between those who manage and those who contribute capital, between
management and creditors, between management and employees, be-
tween the corporation and its customers, between the corporation and
the community, and so on.28 Some of these relationships, of course, are
more basic and therefore more important than others.
The concept of the corporation as the property of the shareholder
is a fundamental notion of the legal and economic tradition that
evolved after the decline of the medieval period. During the medieval
22. See infra Chapter X: Aaron: A Scienter Decision.
23. See infra Chapter XI: Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9: Legislative Intent as a Broad
Standard.
24. 478 F.2d 1281 (1973).
25. See infra Chapter XII: Case Law Supporting a Negligence Standard.
26. See infra Chapter XIII: Conclusion.
27. There is a substantial amount of writing on the nature of a corporation and authority to
act as a corporation. See, e.g., GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1927);
Dewey, The Historic Background of CorporateLegal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Geldert,
LegalPersonality, 27 L.Q. REv. 90 (1911); Laski, The Early History ofthe Corporation in England,
30 HARv. L. REV. 561 (1917); Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916);
Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347 (1911); Radin, The Endless Problem of
Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932).
28. J.P. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT
BusINESs COMBINATIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 190 (1905);
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period, the concept of property was basically ethical and the society an
organic one, which discouraged egocentric individual ownership of
property.29 But with the rise of the classical economic model and the
liberal economic theme of the eighteenth century, the concept of the
right to property ownership became thoroughly embedded in legal and
economic thought.3° As might be expected, the early development of
the corporation mirrored the thinking of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. This is clearly illustrated by the definition of the corporation
by the great legal scholar James Kent, who wrote:
A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more
individuals, who subsist, as a body politic, under a special de-
nomination, and are vested, by the policy of the law, with the
capacity of perpetual succession, and of acting in several re-
spects, however numerous the association may be, as a single
individual.
The object of the institution is to enable the members to
act by one united will, and to continue their joint powers and
property in the same body, undisturbed by the change of
members, and without the necessity of perpetual conveyances,
as the rights of members pass from one individual to
another.3
The key idea is the one pertaining to property. The shareholders "act
by one united will" and thus for themselves and for their own profit.
Woven into the definition was the power of the state, which gave the
"franchise"32 and protected, through law, the third party involved-the
creditors. Thus the corporation was created to benefit three groups:
the shareholders, the general public (state), and the creditors.
As the corporation developed, state legislators were determined to
protect those three parties in various ways:33
(1) The corporation was required to be clearly defined and lim-
ited in scope. Thus it could carry on only the business authorized by
the state, and managers could do no more than follow the mandate
29. See, e.g., TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A HISTORICAL STUDY 20-
39 (1954); TeUy, The Classical Economic Model and the Nature of Property in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, 13 TULSA L.J. 406, 434-36 (1978).
30. Id at 160-63; Telly, supra note 29, at 436-42.
31. 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 267 (3d ed. 1836).
32. See, KYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 14-15 (1793).
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given by the state. As a result, the stockholders knew quite clearly in
what business their capital was invested.
(2) Capital contributions were rigidly supervised. The corpora-
tion could not commence business until a designated amount of shares
had been paid for. Also, it was expected that additional issues of shares
would be paid for at a specified minimum, called the par value. If
shares were sold for less than par value, the shareholders would be re-
quired to make up the difference to creditors for the balance, if the
corporation became insolvent. This ruling was designed to protect
creditors, assuring them that bills would be paid from contributed cash.
Not only was the creditor protected, but the stockholder was also pro-
tected from dilution of his interest, since each shareholder's percentage
of ownership would relate to his percentage of payment.34
(3) The state also carefully scrutinized and controlled the capital
structure of each corporation according to a charter approved by the
legislature. Usually the charter specified only one kind of stock, but
sometimes there was a division into both preferred and common stock.
The common law courts added three more protections:
(4) Major decisions of the corporation had to be approved or
voted on by the shareholders. Everyday decisions about the operation
of the organization were to be made by the delegated representatives,
the board of directors. But major changes in such areas as the capital
structure, the purpose of the enterprise, dissolution, or merger had to be
submitted to the shareholders, and if a proposed change was funda-
mental, the vote had to be unanimous.
(5) The common law also protected the relation of the stock-
holder to the corporation by providing that new monies could be in-
vested only by the original shareholders. This law of "preemptive
right" allowed the shareholder the privilege of subscribing to any addi-
tional stock issued by the corporation in accordance with his previous
percentage of interest so that he always had the opportunity to main-
tain this percentage of interest.
(6) Dividends could be paid only out of surplus profits from the
operation of the business. This rule was developed to protect creditors
by disallowing the shareholder payment of dividends from capital that
34. If the corporate charter did not state that all of the capital had to be subscribed to the
corporation before business could begin, it was held that it was implied in share subscriptions that
payment could not be called for until all of the capital had been subscribed. See, e.g., Cabot &
West Springfield Bridge v. Chapin, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 50, 52 (1856); Salem Mill Dam Corp. v.
Ropes, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 23, 40 (1827).
[Vol. 19:491
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was reserved primarily for payment of debts. The rule also forced the
corporation to maintain a sound financial position which, in the long
run, helped it operate successfully in the business environment and ul-
timately make more profits to pay the shareholder.
Thus, the corporation described above is that of an entity having
many relationships, but with a primary one in which the shareholders
possessed strong personal control over the corporation. The corpora-
tion was thus a property right of the shareholders derived from the
money they expended for that right. The shareholders were a group of
owners, who delegated certain powers of management, but who were
clearly protected in their property rights by carefully fixed rules. Man-
agement, as a group of agents who operated a business for a group of
owners, was clearly confined in its actions by the legal property rights
of shareholders. Although they had more general powers than most
agents, the managers were accountable and were jealously governed in
all general policy matters by the shareholders. The position of the
shareholders could be considered analogous to that of a captain and his
officers at sea in relation to the owners in port. The captain and his
officers navigated the ship, but the destination, ship repairs, the nature
of the cargo, and decisions about profits and losses were determined
before the voyage and could only be changed by the property owners.
B. The Nature of Proxies
1. Common Law Rule
The concept of a proxy is extremely important in understanding
the nature of the change in control from the shareholder to the corpo-
rate managers. We have seen that control rested with the shareholder,
whose direct relation to those who managed for him was undeniable.
The shareholder owned a share and had a vote that directly influenced
the actions of the manager, who was simply an agent of the
shareholder.
A proxy is a person appointed to exercise a right or privilege that
pertains to the appointor; usually this is the right to vote at sharehold-
ers' meetings.35 The expression comes to Anglo-American law from
the civil law of the continent and is apparently related to "procuracy,"
which denotes the profession of a "proctor" or "procurator," an officer
35. W. COOK, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 335 (1925); 14 C.J. Corporations 907
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of the civil courts system, corresponding to an attorney in common law.
In addition, the word "proxy" describes the instrument or power under
which the appointed person acts.36
At common law, however, the right to vote by proxy was un-
known.3 7 The rule arose from the nature of the earlier forms of corpo-
rations, the municipal and charitable corporations. There was no
pecuniary interest associated with membership in these particular cor-
porations. Voting was a privilege based on a personal trust which the
individual had at his discretion, and therefore, by its very nature, it
could not be delegated. The trust translated into an obligation for the
members to attend meetings in person and execute the trust. Although
it was not necessarily stated, the individual trust relationship was im-
plied and formed part of the fundamental nature of all corporate char-
ters. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that,
"The voting privilege [in the early corporations] was in the nature of a
personal trust, committed to the discretion of the members as an indi-
vidual, and hence not susceptible of exercise through delegation." 38
Generally, the early English corporations were analogous to the
political organizations that were developing. In accordance with the
prevailing political theory of the corporation, corporate rights arose
only when the charter was issued from the Crown, which gave the com-
munity, or group of individuals, sovereign power to exercise the special
privileges granted by the crown.39 Each individual, as a holder of such
sovereign power, had one vote. This right to vote was an extremely
important trust expected of rational men who wished to be members of
the corporation (analogous to government) to vote for the betterment
36. Id at 343.
37. See, e.g., Perry v. Tuskaloosa Cotton-Seed Oil Mill Co., 93 Ala. 364, 9 So. 217 (1891);
People v. Twaddell 25 Hun 427, 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899); Commonwealth v. Bringhurst 103 Pa.
134 (1883); 14 C.J. Corporations 907 (1919); 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRI-
VATE CORPORATIONS § 2050 (rev. perm. ed. 1976); TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS HAVING CAPITAL STOCK 438 (1884); Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38
(1942); Maupin, supra note 35, at 344; Voting by Proxy at Company Meeting 5 NAT'L CORP. REP.
465 (1893); Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV.
105, 158 (1888).
38. Walter v. Johnson, 17 App D.C. 144 (1900).
39. This has been well documented throughout the definitive books on the subject. See, e.g.,
DAVIS, supra note 28, at 92-129; 1 J.S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS (1917); DODD, AMERICAN CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 (1954); DuBoIs, THE EN-
GLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT, 1720-1800 (1938); LIVERMORE, EARLY
AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES, THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT (1939); Axe,
supra note 37, at 38; Bergerman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock, 37 YALE L.J. 445, 447
(1928); Williston, supra note 37, at 108-14.
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of all.4° Fundamental to this thinking was the concept of an inaliena-
ble property right. Although this organization was created by the state,
a person who was part of the corporation gained a right in the corpora-
tion that could be interpreted only as a property right during this pe-
riod in England.4' There was one exception to this common law rule.
Voting by proxy was allowed for the peers of England, but this custom
had originated from grants from the Crown.42
2. Common Law Rule as Applied to Corporations
Once the common law rule had been formulated for eleemosynary
and public corporations, it was natural to apply it to corporations for
profit.43 Holdsworth, 4 one of the finest common law historians, and J.
S. Davis,45 a corporate historian, agree that the modem business corpo-
ration developed from the guild organization which regulated trade in
the city or village.4 6 In the same manner, huge, well-known commer-
cial corporations, such as The Russian Company (founded in 1555 as
the first joint stock company), The East India Company, and the Hud-
son's Bay Company, were given power to regulate trade in foreign
lands. The next step in the development of the modem business corpo-
ration was an organization without monopoly powers which was cre-
ated for the single purpose of earning profit for its members.47 Thus,
the law that had been evolving in regard to the older eleemosynary and
public corporations was applied to the new, for profit corporations.
One author emphatically concluded that no distinction existed "in the
early law between any of the four very different kinds of corpora-
tions-guild, town, church and business."48
3. Express Authority to Vote by Proxy
Consistent with the doctrine of common law, it was later held that
an express corporate charter authority or an express bylaw was invalid
40. Telly, supra note 29, at 440.
41. Id at 438.
42. Maupin, supra note 36, at 344; see, e.g., Phillips v. Wickham, 1 Paige Ch. 590, 598
(N.Y.Ch. 1829); 14 C.J. Corporations 907 n.56 (1919); Proxies in Parliament, 4 L. Rev. (Engl.) 253.
43. See Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 232-36 (1834); see e.g., Maupin, supra note 35, at
343.
44. W. HOLDSWORTH, 8 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 199 n.5 (1925).
45. J.S. DAVIS, supra note 39, at I10.
46. See also, Bergerman, supra note 39, at 447 (stating that modem business corporations
developed from the guild organization).
47. Id
48. Id at 446-47.
1984]
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unless some statutory authority could be found. The following two
examples will suffice to illustrate this point. First, an Illinois-Wabash
agreement of 1774 explicitly allowed the use of proxies at corporate
meetings.49 Second, the articles of association of the Ohio Company
organized in 1786 specifically provided for proxy voting.50 However,
most corporations did not place this right in their charters until the
middle or latter part of the nineteenth century.51 Several courts that
addressed the issue of express authority to vote by proxy approved cor-
porate bylaws that provided for proxy voting. 52 For instance, in State
ex rel. Kilbourn v. Tudor, the judge felt strongly that after the corpora-
tion passed a bylaw permitting proxies, they should be allowed.53
4. Analysis
This brief presentation on the common law concerning proxies
thus shows the underlying philosophy of the early corporation and the
central place and power of the stockholder, who had an inherent right
to vote and thus control the corporation that could not be diluted or
lost by a proxy. States strongly protected this right. In New York, for
example, the laws of 1880 did not allow the buying and selling of rail-
road proxies.5 4 In an Ohio case,55 the court ruled that a stockholder
who sold his right to vote was analogous to selling his right to vote at
the polls. Therefore, such a sale was illegal as a violation of duty and
trust.
Furthermore, several cases56 made it very clear that the corpora-
tion could not acquire the right to vote the shares of its stockholders by
proxy or otherwise. In 1896, one commentator stated that: "In view of
this rule, it may be seriously doubted whether proxies given to the of-
ficers of a corporation are valid, since such officers would thereby be
placed in a position to pass upon their own conduct in the administra-
tion of the corporate affairs."57
49. LIVERMORE, supra note 39, at 229.
50. Id at 138.
51. Axe, supra note 37, at 42.
52. See People ex rel Christzman v. Crossley, 69 I11. 195 (1873); Wilson v. American Acad-
emy of Music, 43 Leg. Int. 86 (Pa. 1886). But see Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222 (1834).
53. 5 Day 329, 331-36 (Conn. 1812) cited with approval in People ex rel Christzman v.
Crossley, 69 I11. 195, 197 (1873).
54. Maupin, supra note 35, at 345.
55. Hafer v. Railway Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 470, 477 (Sup. Ct. of Cincinnati 1885).
56. M'Neeley v. Woodruff, 13 N.J.L. 352, 360-61 (1833); Ex Parle Holmes, 5 Cow. 425, 436
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
57. Maupin, supra note 35, at 345.
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C. The New Managerial Corporation
1. Introduction: Industrial Revolution in the United States
After the Civil War, this nation achieved what had never been ac-
complished before in the history of the world. In a short span of fifty
years, it went through a metamorphosis from a modest agricultural na-
tion to the largest industrial nation in the world." It had been assumed
that it would take many years to settle the vast domain that was
America. History shows us that this assumption was wrong. Granted,
the expansion westward had been an ongoing occurrence since Daniel
Boone crossed over the Alleghenies and Lewis and Clark charted the
vast stretches of the Northwest into Montana and Washington. More-
over, the discovery of gold in Sutter's Mill in 1849 and the subsequent
gold fever acted as a tremendous impetus for westward advancement.
However, from 1870 to 1910, an incredible expansion occurred that was
produced primarily by business in a vast free enterprise economy. Wil-
liam Greenleaf accurately stated that, "The economic development of
the United States since the Civil War encompasses the most rapid and
striking transformation of a major social order in the history of
mankind."59
There is no doubt that the Civil War helped spur Northern indus-
tries. After the war, the corporations looked for new ways to maintain
the production capacities that the war had demanded and that they had
furnished through industrial expansion. It was natural to assume that
after the war their attention would turn toward developing the vast
continent that stood ready to be exploited. Since England had just
gone through the early phases of the original industrial revolution, it
was easy for America to follow in the footsteps of the country that had
so much to do with its beginning. Most authorities claim the wealth of
the land as the main reason for the growth and progress of America. In
the author's opinion, however, the prime factor was the English legal
roots that established a constitution and freedom that enabled the
building of a nation in an atmosphere of peace.
58. This was developed in several works. H. FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY
391-419 (8th ed. 1960); G. FITE & J. REESE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 267-
91 (3d ed. 1972); GRAY & PETERSON, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 269-311
(1974); See, e.g., GREENLEAF, AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1860, 1-39 (1968); E.
KIRKLAND, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE, 431-98 (1932); LEVY & SAMPSON, AMERI-
CAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 310-20 (1962); TARBELL, THE NATIONALIZING OF BUSINESS
1878-1898 (1936).
59. GREENLEAF, supra note 58, at 1.
1984]
13
Telly: Proxies and the Modern Corporation: Scienter under Sections 14a a
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
TULSA LAW JOUVAL[V.
Within this legal structure was the concept of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century economic model, grounded on the right to property
and the right of business to operate with little or no interference.60
Once that is understood, then, as Greenleaf6t and Rostow62 both main-
tained, in every society, whether ancient or modem, a specific form of
"organized economic activity," like the wool trade in England in the
fifteenth century or Dutch shipping and commerce in the seventeenth
century, becomes the central "focus" of the "advanced energies and
techniques" of economic growth.63 Both agreed that in the United
States the railroad was the single most important force for economic
development and change. The railroad provided faster and more de-
pendable transportation than land or water; it increased Western settle-
ment; it created a land of cities all tied together in one national marker;
its enormous requirements for capital helped create a securities market;
and during the early developmental years, it was the single largest user
of labor and capital, which had a multiplying effect on investment in
the public and private sectors.'
Because the railroads needed tracks, bridges, and locomotives,
steel had to be produced. Huge iron ore deposits in the Lake Superior
region were discovered in 1844 and contributed iron to the huge steel
industry that developed.65
Coal became the most important source of power, and enormous
deposits of coal were found throughout the United States. Coal was
necessary to drive the locomotives, to produce steel, and to heat the
nation.66
60. Telly, supra note 29, at 442-45.
61. GREENLEAF, supra note 58, at 10.
62. RosTow, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 57-58
(2d ed. 1971).
63. GREENLEAF, supra note 58, at 10.
64. Id; see also ROSTOW supra note 62, at 55. It should be noted that Robert W. Fogel
disagreed that growth was from a single technological change. R. FOGEL, RAILROADS AND AMER-
ICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 236 (1964). He maintained, through
different sections in the book, that other means of transportation could have been used just as
effectively, and that the enormous revolution was induced by a multiplicity ofinnovations. On the
other hand, Fishlow felt that although Fogel may have had a point, and that other means of
transportation could have served the purpose that the railroads did, the fact was that the railroads
actually did serve that purpose. FIsHLow, AMERICAN RAILROADS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE ANTI-BELLUM ECONOMY 303-605 (1965). As far as this Article is concerned, the point that
the railroads were central to the development of the industrial revolution in America seems well
taken.
65. E. KIRKLAND, supra note 58, at 435-37; GREENLEAF, supra note 58, at 15, 125-42; H.
FAULKNER, supra note 60, at 417-18.
66. Id. at 433-34; H. FAULKNER, supra note 58, at 417-18.
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In 1859, the first oil well was drilled in the United States near Ti-
tusville, Pennsylvania. It was drilled in order to gain a more abundant
supply of an illuminant product, but it soon became an important
source of fuel and lubricant for the new machines of the age.67
In addition to the development of mineral resources and the "basic
industries," new inventions added to the frantic pace of economic ex-
pansion. An invention that revolutionized urban society was the tele-
phone, which was only one of the applications of a very significant
discovery--electricity, a new source of power and lighting.68 The list of
new machines that led to change in the industry and commerce of the
nation in that period seems endless.69
It is important to mention that the population of the country in-
creased enormously in those fifty years, primarily because of large fam-
ilies. There was little poverty, since as soon as a child was old enough
he or she would marry and the couple would move West to settle on
what land they wished to farm.
The second reason for growth was that between 1860 and 1920
nearly 28,500,000 foreigners sought these shores, equalling the total
population of the country in 1850.70 This enormous increase in people
meant a huge market in this country for the goods that were being pro-
duced. Many of these immigrants went West to settle on available
land. Professor J. R. Commons opined that more immigrants came be-
cause of companies' needs for cheap labor, the provision of low passen-
ger fare, and their wish to sell land, than to escape the stringent
conditions in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Whatever the reasons, these
immigrants provided the largest consumer market in the world.7 1
Viewed economically, this kind of population was extremely im-
portant. Most immigrants who came to this country were between 15
and 40 years old-the most productive age groups. This growing popu-
67. Id, at 434-36.
68. TARBELL, supra note 58, at 50-57; E. KIRKLAND, supra note 58, at 448-49; H. FAULKNER,
supra note 58, at 399.
69. E. KIRKLAND, supra note 58, at 452-57. Other new inventions included sewing machines,
typewriters, calculators, cash registers, agricultural machines, automobiles, etc. Id
70. H. FAULKNER, supra note 58, at 473-74.
71. J. COMMONS, RACES AND IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA, 108 (1924); Tarbell, supra note 58,
at 12.
The drive for settlers was conducted largely through, or in cooperation with, the steam-
ship companies and land companies. At one time the Inman Steamship Company had
thirty-five hundred agents in Europe and as many more in this country, selling tickets to
be sent to friends and relatives of immigrants already in the United States.
MAYO-SMITH, EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION 46, 186 (1890).
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lation also provided an abundant labor supply and an expanding mar-
ket. Furthermore, industries and farms continually added to
investment to meet the needs of more people and more households. 2
2. The New Corporate Form
The corporations that began to develop during these fifty years
were large organizations that merged with others to become immense
organizations. The railroads were the first of these organizations be-
cause, as indicated above, they were the initial impetus for the indus-
trial revolution in America. Initially, they became the largest and most
powerful business. The managers who ran the railroads became mod-
em business administrators with special skills and training. As Chan-
dler noted, "The operational requirements of the railroads demanded
the creation of the first administrative hierarchies in American busi-
ness. The men who managed these enterprises became the first group
of modem business administrators in the United States. Ownership
and management soon separated."73
Most railroad managers expected to work up the administrative
ladder. They progressively became professionals, and in time their ide-
ology dominated the major thrust of railroad policies.
The railroads created a mass distribution system in the United
States unknown before in history. It was not long before mass produc-
tion industries began to market their goods through this mass distribu-
tion system. The next step was to market the goods as effectively as
possible, and so two ancillary business institutions came into play-the
credit agency and the advertising agency. James Buchanan Duke ac-
complished this very effectively with cigarettes; he controlled the leaf
tobacco, the manufacture of cigarettes, and the contracts with the re-
tailers who sold the goods. But when the competition followed suit,
then all of them concentrated on advertising and the profits were re-
duced. In order to control the competition Duke and his four competi-
tors merged and formed the American Tobacco Company.74
The stories of the match, flour, soup, soap, and photography in-
dustries are all similar to the tobacco story. Other industries had their
own quirks and differences, but on the whole they developed into enor-
72. G. FITE & J. REESE, supra note 58, at 280.
73. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 87 (1977).
74. Id at 289-92.
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mous vertically integrated firms, and eventually into horizontal ones
that became huge, powerful entities.75
Why did the United States become the seed-bed for managerial
capitalism? The answer probably lies in the size and nature of its do-
mestic market, which became in the fifty-year period already discussed,
the largest and fastest growing in the world. It was also the most ho-
mogeneous. This market not only encouraged mass marketers, but it
hastened the adoption of new technologies. Americans pioneered new
machines and mass production, and also the manufacture of standard-
ized machines by mass production methods.76
Two results of the new managerial corporation are especially rele-
vant to this Article. First, it became apparent that enormous power
was lodged in the huge corporate forms that were created. Second, the
owner stockholders were no longer the controllers of the corporation,
which they legally owned. Instead, the managers, who were non-own-
ers, attained the position of corporate control.
III. PRINCIPAL AUTHORS CONTRIBUTING TO REFORM
A. Introduction
The rise of the huge corporations and their enormous power did
not bring much clamor for specific reforms, but it did cause many peo-
ple to become distraught at the growing menace of these huge corpora-
tions. They feared that a new feudalism had already arisen or might
arise from such a concentration of power. There was genuine concern
in this country that democracy was on the verge of being lost and big
business taking over.7 7 However, despite the opposition of big busi-
ness, the Sherman Anti-Trust Law was passed in 1890. A sigh of relief
swept the nation because everyone thought that now the trusts would
be controlled. Yet, for several years nothing happened. But at the turn
of the century, many of the trusts were in fact broken up, the most
important instances being the Oil and Tobacco Trust cases in 1911.78
The entire nation was excited about Teddy Roosevelt's adamant
behavior towards "trusts" and his "trustbusting." It was the big news
of the day. Many writers of this era described the destructive nature of
75. Id. at 498-500.
76. Id
77. Interview with Dr. Shaw Livermore, Dean of the Business and Public Administration
College of the University of Arizona (May 15, 1962).
78. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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huge trusts and their monopoly power in a democratic free enterprise
society,7 9 but no one dealt with the problems created by them in rela-
tion to the stockholder.
Although ahead of their time, a few writers during this period ex-
pressed concern that shareholders' rights were being erroded. This
thinking ultimately led to new laws for the restoration and protection
of these rights. A discussion of the more important writers and their
ideas is provided in order to facilitate greater understanding of the laws
which are central to this Article.
B. Influential Books
1. The Corporation Problem-William W. Cook (1891)
One of the first books concerned with the trust problem was writ-
ten by William W. Cook, who gained fame for his definitive work in
corporation law.8 0 His book entitled The Corporation Problem,"l pub-
lished in 1891, is a fine work dealing with the large corporations and
trusts and the monopoly power they wield. Although he does not spe-
cifically deal with the stockholder, Cook, in his thorough analysis, sug-
gested that the managerial plutocracy which acts through corporations
should be careful. The vast interests that they represent make it dan-
gerous for them to go against the American people, who look upon the
corporations as a threat to the republic, and who in a crisis rise to the
occasion.82 Then he concluded:
And so it will be in regard to the corporations. They will con-
tinue to vex the minds of men and to appear as ominous
spectors and omens of ill. But the American people, clear in
79. The number of books is almost without end. See, e.g., CLARK, THE PROBLEM OF Mo-
NOPOLY: A STUDY OF A GRAVE DANGER AND OF THE NATURAL MODE OF AVERTING IT (1904);
CLOUD, MONOPOLIES AND THE PEOPLE (4th ed. 1873); W. COOK, TRUSTS: THE RECENT COMBI-
NATIONS IN TRADE, THEIR CHARACTER, LEGALITY AND MODE OF ORGANIZATION, AND THE
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THEIR MANAGERS AND CERTIFICATE HOLDERS (2d ed.
1888); GUNTON, TRUSTS AND THE PUBLIC (1899); JENKS, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1900); JENKS &
CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1917); RIPLEY, TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS (1905);
SPETHING, BOSSISM AND MONOPOLY (1906); STEVENS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS
(1913); VAN HISE, CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL: A SOLUTION OF THE TRUST PROBLEM IN
THE UNITED STATES (1912); VON HALLE, TRUSTS OR INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND COALI-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1895).
80. W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCK AND STOCKBROKERS AS APPLICABLE TO
RAILROAD, BANKING, INSURANCE, MANUFACTURING, COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS, TURNPIKE,
BRIDGE, CANAL, AND OTHER PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1887).
81. W. COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM: THE PUBLIC PHASES OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR
USES, ABUSES, BENEFITS, DANGERS, WEALTH, AND POWER, WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE SOCIAL,
INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO WHICH THEY GIVE RISE (1891).
82. Id at 250-53.
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their intellectual powers, honest in their purposes, and deci-
sive in their acts, have no need to fear them. 'The Corpora-
tion Problem' will be solved, and the solution when it comes,
will be satisfactory, thorough, and complete.83
Although Cook's book is similar to those works which failed to
address the relationship of trusts and their monopolies with the share-
holder,84 he does voice an overall concern and warns of the underlying
problems.
2. Commercial Trusts. The Growth and Rights of Aggregated
Capital-John Dos Passos (1901)
One book of this period is unusual in that it does specifically dis-
cuss the shareholder. In Commercial Trusts. The Growth and Rights of
Aggregated Capital,85 published in 1901, John R. Dos Passos noted that
although there is no law on the subject of shareholders, none is needed
because the shareholders have the right through a court of equity or of
common law to open the corporate books. And that is the end of his
discussion. 6 Effectively, this author does not see any problem at all for
the stockholder, and yet obviously such a problem has been raised or
he would not have addressed it.
3. The Lawyer and the Community-Woodrow Wilson (1910)
Another important theorist to discuss the stockholder problem and
trusts was the fine historian and political scientist, Woodrow Wilson.
While serving as president of Princeton University, he delivered a ma-
jor address entitled "The Lawyer and the Community" to the Ameri-
can Bar Association on August 30, 1910.87 In his address, he concerned
himself with the new corporate organization that had arisen and the
responsibility the lawyer had vis-A-vis the individual and the corpora-
tion. He maintained that the individual had been submerged into the
organization and that those who controlled the organization had ex-
traordinary power. More specifically, he stated:
Most men are individuals no longer so far as their business, its
83. Id at 253.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. J. Dos PASSOS, COMMERCIAL TRUSTS: THE GROWTH AND RIGHTS OF AGGREGATED
CAPITAL 126-28 (1901).
86. Id at 126-28.
87. Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 35 A.B.A. 419 (1910). Following Wilson's ad-
dress, he was nominated and elected to the office of Governor of New Jersey in November, 1910,
and then served as President of the United States from 1912-1921.
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activities or its moralities, is concerned. . . . [T]heir individ-
uality and independence of choice in matters of business they
have lost. . . . They are not at liberty to ask whether what
they are told to do is right or wrong. They cannot get at the
men who ordered it,-have no access to them. They have no
voice of counsel or of protest.88
Woodrow Wilson was clearly concerned that individuals had no
rights within the corporation and that those who manage had all the
power. He went on to assert that the task of the law is to "rehabilitate
the individual," not to make him superior or to destroy the corporation
but, "to undo enough of what we have done in the development of our
law of corporations to give the law direct access again to the individ-
ual-to every individual in all his functions." 89 Thus, Wilson proposed
that the individual's rights be restored to him so that the corporation
would not have all the power.
Moreover, Woodrow Wilson presented an anomaly. He men-
tioned that those who have power could not have gained by themselves
the vast capital they employed as if it were their own. "[Y]et they have
not the full legal responsibilities of those who supplied them with it."90
4. Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It-Louis
D. Brandeis (1913)
A fourth important author was the great lawyer and later Justice
of the Supreme Court, Louis D. Brandeis. He wrote a series of articles
in Harper's Weekly on the money trust which had a nationwide impact.
These articles were subsequently compiled into a book, entitled Other
People's Money,9 that was published in 1913, and was equally
influential.
Brandeis began his book by analyzing the corporations and specif-
ically saying that they are owned primarily by small investors, "who do
not participate in the management of the company."92 Then he stated
88. Id at 426.
89. Id at 427.
90. Id at 428.
91. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1913). Bran-
deis was so admired for the positions he supported that he was nominated for Justice of the
Supreme Court by President Woodrow Wilson. Because Brandeis was unpopular among powerful
corporations, his appointment was in doubt. After considerable debate, and with Wilson's firm
support, the appointment was approved. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 491-508
(1946); A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 9-10, 345, 395
(1936).
92. Id at 7.
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that stockholders buy stocks and bonds on the New York Stock Ex-
change, which had over 1,600 issues aggregating to over 26 billion dol-
lars. These small investors, who are not professionals, he continued,
are unable to make intelligent judgments about stocks because they
lack the "ability," the "facilities," the "training," and the "time," to
investigate their investments properly.93 Thus these people needed the
advice of experts who do have the knowledge, judgment, facilities, and
incentive to make a thorough investigation. He pointed out that more
than half the owners of the stock of many large corporations at the time
were women. These women and other small investors depended upon
the banker's judgment, and of course this dependency gave great power
to the bankers.94
This kind of control was not enough, claimed Brandeis, as the
bankers became promoters and arranged mergers for substantial fees.
And in times of crises, the bankers became "Reorganization Managers"
and acquired control of many corporations. That was not enough
either, Brandeis said, as they also became directors of many companies
through their powerful influence or because of their control of custom-
ers' proxies.95
Another means of control, continued Brandeis, was to gain access
to those who were the large security buyers. The insurance companies
acquired huge aggregates of capital daily, which in turn needed to be
invested. It was thus "natural" for the investment bankers to wish to
control the corporations that received such large amounts of money.
The mutual insurance companies were supposedly controlled by the
stockholders, but an investigative committee concluded, "The so-called
control of life insurance companies by policy holders through mutual-
ization is a farce" and "its only result is to keep in office a self-consti-
tuted, self-perpetuating management." 96 Thus the core of Brandeis'
argument was that the stockholders had lost power in the corporations.
93. Id at 8.
94. Id The point was that these women were widows who had been the beneficiaries stock
left by their husbands, who had been knowledgeable in accumulating it, whereas the widows had
little knowledge about the stocks and were dependent on the banker's judgment.
95. Id. at 10-11.
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5. Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current
Unrest-Walter Lippman (1914)
The fifth author that is of concern is the columnist, critic, and
political theorist, Walter Lippman, who wrote a penetrating analysis of
the modern American society of 1914 in a book entitled Drift and
Mastery.9
7
He began by saying that the major question in that exceptionally
difficult time was "how business methods are to be altered, not whether
they are to be altered.""8 He went on to say that this is clearly one of
the central weaknesses of democracy.9 9 In the first chapter he focused
on the problem-corruption and loss of trust in business and govern-
ment, the central fabric of American democratic society. One of the
pillars of both business and government is private property, he said,
but it had been modified and businessmen were conducting quasi-pub-
lic enterprises. He asserted that they must learn that "it is no longer
altogether their business . . .They are talking more and more about
their 'responsibilities,' Their 'stewardship.' "'o
In chapter two, Lippman analyzed the old classical economic ideas
of individuals in an exchange relationship who contract as equals. He
said that in effect those rules do not mean much in modern society
because huge trusts are not individuals. Moreover, the corporations are
not even administered by owners but by managers "divorced from
ownership," who are being trained in the universities. Thus, there must
be a change from the profit motive, he said, to the "satisfaction of serv-
ices rendered and uses created . . ."o In chapter three, Lippman
attacked private property and said that large industries cannot be con-
ducted as long as the old principles of private property are left intact.
Then he drove home the key points of his thesis: "Scattered all over the
globe, changing from day to day, the shareholders are the most incompe-
tent constituency conceivable." ' 2 According to Lippman, shareholders
do not know or care to know what is happening to the corporation. He
referred to them as a "heterogeneous collection with a single motive,
and from that material some people pretend to expect a high sense of
97. W. LIpPMAN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN ATTEMPT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST
(1914).
98. Id at XIX.
99. Id at XX.
100. Id at 23.
101. Id at 46-49.
102. Id at 57 (emphasis added).
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social responsibility." 10 3 Lippman was careful to add that he did not
mean to imply that by owning a share of stock one is necessarily igno-
rant or tyrannical, but there is little benevolence that can be attained by
owning a share of stock because, "It is too abstract, too scattered, too
fluctuating."' "°
He concluded that the large-scale corporation has separated own-
ership from management. Ownership has been "diffused and diluted
till it means very little more than a claim to residual profits after ex-
penses are paid, after bondholders are satisfied, and perhaps, after in-
siders have decided which way they wish the stock market to
fluctuate."105
He added that private property is meaningless since stockholders
have been deprived of their property rights and transformed into mon-
eylenders. In addition, control has moved from the industries them-
selves into the hands of investment experts and banks.
10 6
Lippman then analyzed the purchaser of goods, who cannot have
full knowledge about the producer, that requirees the government to
step in and equalize the bargain by regulating the quality of goods and
the reasonableness of prices. 10 7
The gist of his conclusions was that antitrust should not mean
breaking up big business into small businesses. Instead, all that is
needed is order and purpose in the business world and administrative
methods to harness the great resources of our country--"industrial
statesmanship," he called it. In a larger sense, what is required is a
vision of democracy that can deal reasonably with the problems of to-
day and come to logical conclusions for tomorrow.'
6. Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times.-
The Case of America-Thorstein Veblen (1923)
The sixth important author is Thorstein Veblen, whose influential
book, Absentee Ownershp, was published in 1923.109 It was his last
book and probably the best summary of his doctrine. In the majority
of his writings, he argued against business and its domination in Amer-
103. Id at 58.
104. Id
105. Id at 59.
106. Id at 59-65.
107. Id at 66-70.
108. Id at 141 andpassim.
109. T. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUsINEsS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES: THE
CASE OF AMERICA (1923).
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ican society. In his introductory chapter, Veblen discussed the concept
of absentee ownership. Absentee owners are those who own the busi-
ness as stockholders but do not work the business, or those who own
stock and control the business but do not work directly to produce the
manufactured goods, or managers who run the business and make
large salaries but do not own the business nor directly produce the
manufactured goods. Thus, absentee owners reap the benefits but do
not directly produce the goods. According to Veblen, law and politics
serve the needs of the absentee owners but not the majority of the pop-
ulation. Moreover, corporations, rather than producing the maximum
output of goods at low cost in the interests of the general population,
produce instead a moderate output at inflated prices. 110
Veblen's entire thesis was a scathing diatribe against the Western
democracies. Veblen said that "due process" has become so expansive
that only absentee owners have rights under the law. These rights were
established in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, and
are considered immutable, even though society since the industrial
revolution has changed immensely. Veblen contended that within this
society have arisen the corporations, which all people have been
trained to respect and which have become "sovereign" with tenure in
perpetuity.
Veblen then discussed two more major ideas. First was the idea of
handicraft and natural right. After feudal allegiance no longer brought
man material advantage, he drifted to towns where industry started.
Trade, the essence of industry, "runs on this natural right of free bar-
gain," which means a working man's inalienable right to sell his labor-
produced goods."'1
The second idea concerned the natural right of investment. Own-
ership of natural resources rests upon the ancient feudal ground of
privilege and vested interest rather than upon the right of workman-
ship. "'12 Veblen said: "These owners own these things because they
own them. That is to say, title of ownership in these natural resources
is traceable to an act of seizure, legalized by statute or confirmed by
long undisturbed possession." 1 3 Not all ownership of natural re-
sources is absentee ownership since those who work land they own, like
the farmer, have a natural right equal to the craftman's right. Soon,
110. Id. at 3-10.
111. Id at 40-49.
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continued Veblen, the landed interest vested with title and absentee
ownership shifted from a small marketplace "huckster" to an "absentee
investor who took care of business," who by "degrees" grew to be a
"merchant prince."'1 14
Veblen said that Adam Smith spoke of the handicraft era, but it
was after Smith that:
[T]he businesslike management of industrial concerns begins
to shift from a footing of workday participation in the work
done, to that of absentee ownership and control ...
This rearrangement of economic factors, and division of
economic activities, was brought on by the increasing scale of
the industrial plant and operations, wherever and so far as the
new technology of the machine process took effect." 5
The net product produced, Veblen asserted, came from (1) the state of
the industrial arts, and (2) the growth of population." 6 Ultimately,
modem industry is a system of mechanical processes directed by expert
knowledge and brought to fruition by modem technology and raw
materials. Veblen concluded that the "natural right of investment be-
comes. . . a vested right of use and abuse over the current industrial
knowledge and practice.""17
Veblen also analyzed the era of free competition, when the "Cap-
tains of Industry" emerged."' These "Captains," defined as absentee
owners and controllers of industrial equipment and resources, became
very successful and set the standards of the community's aims and ide-
als. This period, until the mid-nineteenth century, was one not only of
free competition but also of increasing output that resulted in an in-
creased population. At this point, Veblen made an astute observation
and noted that the free competitive system was "dying at the top," and
was no longer the norm in the "key industries.""' 9 Three features de-
veloped: (1) industry became excessively productive because of greater
technological development; (2) the supply of industrial products over-
took demand; and (3) the use of credit increased substantially. Thus,
concluded Veblen, new changes were coming about to destroy the old
competitive system.'20
114. Id at 56.
115. Id at 58 (emphasis added).
116. Id at 62.
117. Id at 68.
118. Id at 70.
119. Id at 77.
120. Id at 79.
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, continued Veblen, cor-
porations goals shifted from productive work to profitable business.
This shift lead to salesmanship and an "industrial corporation," whose
interests, to acquire gain, but not to primarily produce goods reflected
those of the absentee owner.'21 Ultimately, asserted Veblen, the corpo-
ration "is an incorporation of credit, capitalized on the basis of funds
invested and to the amount of its prospective earning capacity."' 22
Veblen was upset with the way in which the country town has
changed from a little community of self-made individuals to one im-
posed upon by big businesses. 123 He also was very disturbed by the
manner in which "free enterprise" big businesses had taken over the
country's virgin timber and oil and wasted so much of the resources in
the process of making personal gain. He made an extremely sarcastic
attack on such waste by absentee ownership:
The whole of this routine of waste and inefficiency is a
matter of course under the American plan of seizure and con-
version; and it is at least a blameless exercise of private initia-
tive, commonly regarded as a meritorious work. It is, in
effect, no more than an exemplary working-out of the Ameri-
can citizen's dearest constitutional rights, and there isno fault
to be found with it all on any score of irregularity. In its time
and under the given conditions of law and custom it is sound
business enterprise; just as the Big Business and monopoly
control in which it invariably heads up is also sound business.
It is all in the day's work. It has seemed necessary here to
recall these workday incidents of business-as-usual in oil, just
because they show a concrete and exemplary working-out of
absentee ownership as it affects the country's natural
resources. 1
24
At this point in Veblen's book, there is a juncture between Part I,
that described the past, and Part II, in which Veblen's description of
the "New Order of Business" begins. Society was now catching up
with the new order that had gripped the country, as would be expected
when an older, established system of usages, beliefs, laws, and customs
must overtake the new. This was especially true in America, "where
the rate and volume of change in the material conditions of life during
121. Id at 82-85.
122. Id at 93.
123. Id at 142-65.
124. Id at 200-01.
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this interval have been large and swift beyond example."' 25 The new
order arose when the working majority of the country's industrial re-
sources came under absentee ownership on a large scale; a form of
ownership that was impersonal, dispassionate, and totally immune to
neighborly personalities and sentimental considerations.
126
In this new order, Veblen maintained, the country's key industries
have been progressively taken over by the absentee owners of the na-
tion's credit institutions.' 27 These key industries dominate by curtailing
the power and materials necessary for the rest of the manufacturing
industries. Underlying all of this, is the incentive of business not to
produce goods but to make money.128
In his conclusion, Veblen said:
In the last analysis the nation remains a predatory organ-
ism, in practical effect an association of persons moved by a
community interest in getting something for nothing by force
and fraud. . . . It is a residual derivative of the predatory
dynastic State, and as such it still continues to be, in the last
resort, an establishment for the mobili[z]ation of force and
fraud as against the outside, and for a penai[z]ed subservi-
ence of its underlying population at home. 1
29
Veblen thus made a drastically harsh condemnation of American
society. He said that these absentee owner businessmen, in control as
"Captains of Industry," and the managers, trained in business schools
and who worked their way up to control giant corporations, have be-
come new feudal lords, who, by force and fraud, control the wealth of
the nation. The laborers and small stockholders have no say, and con-
sequently have lost their country, even though the trappings of democ-
racy still exist.
7. Main Street and Wall Street-William Z. Ripley (1927)
The seventh author is William Z. Ripley, the Nathaniel Ropes
Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University, who wrote Main
Street and Wall Street in 1927.13 This is a seminal work because, as
the introductory personal note said: "This book is not just a treatise on
economics; nor is it a handy manual for investors. It purports to go
125. Id at 207.
126. Id at 212-13.
127. Id at 231-32.
128. Id at 248.
129. Id at 442.
130. W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927).
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deeper than that, down toward the root of things,"' 1 that is, the
problems in our democracy. For Ripley, democracy has had basic ide-
als, such as "to promote a greater equality of opportunity among men"
and a "fairer show at conserving the fruits of such activity thereaf-
ter," 32 and these ideals must be stimulated and preserved by govern-
ment. Ripley then made a strong statement, "Property should never be
allowed to degenerate into an instrument of oppression." 133 Ripley
wanted us to understand the role of property in our civilization, so that
democracy can act to maintain it as a viable fruit for all the people.
Ripley was careful to say that his study was a weapon of "honey,"
not of "sting."'134 The essays were not attacks on our democratic sys-
tem, nor were they muckraking. During a great period of prolonged
prosperity in 1927, he felt that we should recognize what is sound and
good but that "we should inquire deeply concerning those things which
might better serve the common good than is now the case."'' 35
Ripley acknowledged the value of the books authored by Bran-
deis,' 36 Lippman, 37 and Veblen,138 but he said that Veblen's book,
while "stimulating," was "perhaps too promiscuously accusative."'' 39
Ripley's book was a sincere effort to look at the corporation and some
of the major problems that had arose, so that he could suggest reforms.
Ripley pointed out that America was the unsurpassed world leader
in its annual crop of corporate charters. Each of the forty-eight states
produced its share of new corporations, but the state that produced the
most was the one with the easiest laws. Much of the competition be-
tween states for corporate favor arose from the desire to increase public
revenue. 
40
This competition for corporation chartering for revenue purposes
resulted in undesirable charters, which trampled on the old common
law rights of the shareholders. Among those common law rights was
preemption, where new stocks were offered to existing shareholders
before being offered to the general public so that the original share-
131. Id at V.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id at VI.
135. Id
136. L. BRANDEIS, supra note 91.
137. W. LipPMAN, supra note 97.
138. T. VEBLEN, supra note 109.
139. W. RIPLEY, supra note 130, at VI.
140. Id at 16-37.
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holders could maintain their former voting rights and control. After
1919, a new law became prevalent among the states, effectively abolish-
ing that common law right by allowing a corporate charter to authorize
new stock without having to offer it to the shareholders. 14 1
The second "innovation" was the non-par capital stock. The com-
mon law rule was that all stock had to be issued with a par value and
any issue of shares for less than par value was unlawful because it di-
luted the prior securities issued. But, if the stock was selling at less
than the par value, then a corporation could be embarrassed when it
needed further capital because it could not raise the money. Thus, the
new invention of non-par stock had done away with the safeguard for
the shareholders, and indeed allowed for a higher danger of misrepre-
sentation by the corporation to the investing public. 14 2
The third problem was the liability of the directors. The common
law liability rule was that a director could not under any circumstances
act for himself and at the same time act as an agent for the corporation,
or he would be absolutely liable for any losses to the corporation. Now
the law had changed to allow the directors to do this without any sub-
sequent liability, as long as there is no fraud in the transaction. Ripley
objected to this new law because it allowed the director, as an insider,
to have undue influence over the corporation. 143
The fourth problem was the new holding company, which allowed
one company to hold stock in another company. The old English com-
mon law forbade a corporation from holding stock in another. New
Jersey expressly allowed this in 1889. It had caused a great intermin-
gling of corporations, and allowed a huge corporation to control those
corporations in which it held shares and leave the minority sharehold-
ers with almost no rights.'" Ripley opined that: "Some way ought to
be found by which minorities shall have more of an opportunity, if not
to block action detrimental to their interests, at least to assure a full
opportunity for the presentation of their case before final action be
taken." 145
Fifth, Ripley was concerned with the situation of private property
in our civilization. 146 Managers of the corporations are salaried and
141. Id at 37-46.
142. Id at 46-54.
143. Id at 55-61.
144. Id. at 73-77.
145. Id at 76.
146. Id at 85.
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thus independent of year-to-year fluctuations of the corporation.
Shareholders, under the old common law, had voting rights and thus
control, but in recent years many stockholders had lost their voting
rights because of the introduction of different classes of stock, most of
which were non-voting ones.
Moreover, and extremely important, the number of shareholders
in the corporations has increased enormously. As Ripley maintained,
"[T]he larger the number of shareholders, the more easily may a small
concentrated block of minority shares exercise sway over all the
rest."' 47 When there are few owners, fifty-one percent is probably nec-
essary for dominance, but with many owners (300,000 for example),
fifteen percent or less can seldom be outvoted at an election.'48
Why do the shareholders allow this to go on? The reason, asserted
Ripley, is that investers are very docile and act like a flock of sheep;
149
many times it is difficult to get the stockholder to vote at all. However:
[T]he fact remains that the power, even if rarely exercised,
.. .was there; and every once in a blue moon some resolute
individual or stockholder could rise in his place and organize
a protective committee or dissenting group-and, if nothing
else happened, at least there was a thorough ventilation of
what sometimes proved to be a musty or unsafe tenement. 50
And, of course, it was always encouraging when one individual, acting
alone, forged ahead to act for the benefit of all.
Yet, all of the right to control is "closed out forever once people
who own that property have allowed themselves to be utterly divorced
from the exercise of their natural right to elect the directors and to in-
fluence, if not to determine, the corporate policy."'' Ripley lamented
that the trend of diminishing the responsibility and accountibility of
the property owners continues.
It is important to note that in 1927 there was great prosperity and
the depression of 1929 had not hit. Ripley made this prophetic
observation:
The house is not falling down-no fear of that! But there are
queer noises about, as of rats in the wall, or of borers in the
timbers. I believe that the trouble has to do with the growing
147. Id at 95.
148. Id
149. Id at 96 (from an address by Robert F. Herrick).
150. Id at 98.
151. Id at 99.
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dissociation of ownership of property from responsibility for
the manner in which it shall be put to use. And now is the
time for action. It is not yet too late.1 52
After discussing the ways in which corporations have trampled on the
common law rights of shareholders, Ripley mentioned a few solution
such as cumulative voting, shareholder audit committees, and perhaps
most important, more disclosure of information to the stockholders.' 53
Too much of the business of corporations was being carried on in
"twilight" rather than in the open light of day. Perhaps that was not
too unacceptable when the corporations were owned by only a few
shareholders, but when Main Street'54 and Wall Street'55 crossed at
right angles, there was a need for a universal disclosure of informa-
tion. 56 Ripley cited examples such as the failure of Westinghouse to
have an annual meeting for ten years (1897-1905) and the U. S. Express
Company to hold one at all.' 57
Another problem noted, was that proxy information was insuffi-
cient, with blank proxies in some cases being sent out to stockholders to
sign. Certain companies (Singer Manufacturing Company, for exam-
ple) never sent out financial data to the shareholders.'58 Others send
colorful pictures of factories and offices, but not financial data; and any
reports presented contained material that was of little use.' 59
Thus, Ripley's point was that a very important right of the stock-
holders was access to or disclosure of adequate information. Not only
did the stockholders need to know, but the state and general public also
had the right to know what was happening, since incorporation was a
privilege granted by the state. With adequate information, the stock
exchanges could act intelligently and so could the stockholders and
general public. Ergo: "This, then, is the ultimate defense of publicity.
It is not as an adjunct to democratization through the exercise of voting
power, but as a contribution to the making of a true market price. This
is a point but half appreciated at its real worth."' 60
In line with this concept of disclosure, Ripley felt that the balance
152. Id at 116.
153. Id at 135-55.
154. Id at 156-57. Main Street referred to widespread ownership of corporations. Id
155. Id at 156-57. Wall Street referred to the aggregation of financial and directorial power
in the capital centers. Id
156. Id
157. Id at 159.
158. Id at 162.
159. Id at 160-64.
160. Id at 169-70.
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sheet and the income statement should both be made available to the
shareholders."1 Too many happenings in the world affected a com-
pany's business and the shareholder had a right to know how the com-
pany is reacting. Then, if the shareholder agreed with these reactions,
he could either stick with the company or get out.'62
Corporate directors needed to be more careful of their "obliga-
tion" to pay dividends. Ripley cited the Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal
Company, which paid no dividends for years and did not issue re-
ports.163 The method of assessing the value or net worth of the corpo-
ration needed to be made clear. With the concept of no par value now
accepted and the liberties taken with placing a great deal of value on
something like good will, the valuation could be very misleading. 64
Ripley's last major point was that corporations should, by rigorous
initiative from within, adequately present to the shareholders all perti-
nent facts. The New York Stock Exchange had done admirably, he
asserted, but its influence was limited to corporations which were regis-
tered with it.' 65
Ripley concluded by saying that the crux of the problem of United
States corporations in 1927 was the way the property owner, the share-
holder, had lost many of his common law rights and had been dispar-
agingly treated by corporate management. In short, the fights of the
shareholder vis-A-vis the corporation and its management needed to be
drastically improved.
8. The Modern Corporation and Private Property-Adolph A.
Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means (1932)
The final book is The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
written in 1932 by Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means. 66 Be-
cause of the importance of this book, each of the four parts will be
161. Id
162. Id at 177-78.
163. Id
164. Id at 191-207.
165. Id at 208-09.
166. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 33. This book was read nationwide and was so suc-
cessful it has been reprinted several times. It was the first printed by Commerce Clearing House
in 1932. Then it was reprinted by Macmillan Company in 1932 and again in March, April, June
(twice), October, 1933; February, November, 1934; October, 1935; September, 1936; April 1947;
December, 1948; March, 1968. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. has recently reprinted it.
Two other books written in this period may appeal to the reader. See, SEARS, THE NEw
PLACE OF THE SHAREHOLDER (1929); I. WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931). Al-
though much was offered in both books on the current discussion, because of their length, it was
decided not to include them.
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discussed. Book I, Property in Flux: Separation of the Attributes of
Ownership Under the Corporate System, explained the nature of the
corporation and how it rested on two developments: (1) the factory sys-
tem, which came about because of the industrial revolution and which
caused a large number of workers to come under a single management;
and (2) the placing of the wealth of many people through shareholders,
under the central control of managers. When there is a huge multipli-
cation of ownership, the control passes to the managers through their
use of proxy machinery to become a self-perpetuating body, even
though they may own but a small fraction of the outstanding stock.
This separation of control allows huge aggregations of property and
therefore the development of huge corporations, whose equity or stock
is sold through the stock exchange. The corporation has thus become a
different organization. As Berle and Means expressed it:
In creating these new relationships, the quasi-public cor-
poration may fairly be said to work a revolution. It has de-
stroyed the unity that we commonly call property-has
divided ownership into nominal ownership and the power
formerly joined to it. Thereby the corporation has changed
the nature of the profit seeking enterprise.' 67
Berle and Means discussed very briefly the genesis and rise of the
corporation, but the important part of this section concerned the enor-
mous concentration of economic power in America in 1930. Their the-
sis and the facts and figures that backed it up showed that the two
hundred largest nonbanking corporations in the United States pos-
sessed almost half of the corporate wealth in the country.'68 Further-
more, Berle and Means asserted that the rates of growth of this group
were much more rapid than those of all other corporations. 169 Their
conclusions were (1) The huge corporation had come to dominate most
major industries in the United States. (2) An increasing portion of
business was carried on by this form of industry. (3) There seemed to
be no immediate limit to this increase. (4) This form of industrial unit
was rapidly becoming the one with which American economic, social
and political life must deal.' 70
These conclusions lead to several others: (1) It was becoming nec-
167. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 33, at 6-7.
168. Id at 19. It is interesting to note that not long after this thesis was presented, Fortune
magazine came out with their now famous Fortune 500 in 1955.
169. d at 35-37.
170. Id at 44.
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essary to think in terms of these large units rather than in terms of
small units that compete with each other. (2) Competition had changed
from free competition to huge dominant corporations, where the prin-
ciples of oligopoly are important. (3) More goods were being produced
for producing organizations, which in turn made further goods; quality
suffers because there is no incentive to the general public. (4) The na-
ture of capital had changed; more and more it was composed, not of
goods, but of organizations. (5) Finally, a society in which production
was governed by blind economic forces was being replaced by a society
in which production is controlled by a few individuals. 17
Accompanying the concentration of economic power and making
it possible, was an even wider dispersion of stock ownership. Evidence
was presented to show the wide dispersion of stock ownership in the
two hundred largest corporations,1 72 and it was even happening in the
smaller corporations. The dispersion of ownership had gone so far that
generally, "the larger the company, the more likely is its ownership to
be diffused among a multitude of individuals."'' 73 This dispersion was
a continuing process. Once under way, it proceeded very swiftly,174
with the ownership of stock by officers and directors decreasing. 75
Further conclusions reached include the following: (1) The posi-
tion of ownership had changed from active to passive. Rather than
having direct physical ownership, the owner now only had a piece of
paper, and without physical control over the instruments of production,
the owner had very little control. (2) The intangible values of the spirit
that went with ownership in the past were now lost to the owner, simi-
lar to the worker's loss of satisfaction in producing an entire piece of
goods. (3) The value of a person's wealth depended on forces outside
himself and his own efforts and was determined instead by those indi-
viduals in command and by the marketplace. (4) Individual wealth
had become very liquid and subject to constant fluctuation in the or-
ganized markets. (5) Wealth was no longer in a form that could be
directly used by the owner, like land. Instead, only through sale in the
market could the owner obtain direct use of it. (6) The owner was left
with a symbol of ownership, while a managerial group had actual
171. Id at 45-46.
172. Id at 48-49.
173. Id at 52.
174. Id at 53-57.
175. Id at 52.
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control. 176
The concept of control divorced from ownership was so unfamiliar
and so central to the corporate system, that Berle and Means devoted
an entire chapter to it, and it deserves further analysis here. In the
election of a board of directors, the shareholder's personal vote counts
for little or nothing at the meeting unless he has a large block of stock.
Thus the shareholder is reduced either to not voting at all or "handing
over his vote to individuals over whom he has no control and in whose
selection he did not participate."'117 In neither case would the share-
holder be able to exercise any control, since control would be in the
hands of those who selected the proxy committee, who in turn elect the
next directors. Since the proxy committee is appointed by the manage-
ment in power at the time, management could dictate who would suc-
ceed them. When ownership is spread out, management becomes a
self-perpetuating body, even when it has very little ownership of stock
itself. This kind of management control, "though resting on no legal
foundation, appears to be comparatively secure where the stock is
widely distributed." ' 8 When there is serious mismanagement of the
company, stockholders may combine to oust the management, but,
generally, control is quietly exercised for many years without share-
holders having a chance to choose between two opposing groups.
Berle and Means studied the two hundred largest corporations
carefully and showed that control had to a "very considerable extent
become separate from ownership."' 179 They concluded Book I with
these salient words:
In examining the break up of the old concept that was
property and the old unity that was private enterprise, it is
therefore evident that we are dealing not only with distinct
but often with opposing groups, ownership on the one side,
control on the other-a control which tends to move further
and further away from ownership and ultimately to lie in the
hands of the management itself, a management capable of
perpetuating its own position. The concentration of economic
power separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic
empires, and has delivered these empires into the hands of a
new form of absolutism, relegating "owners" to the position
176. Id. at 66-68.
177. Id. at 87 (emphasis deleted).
178. Id. at 88.
179. Id. For an entire discussion of how control was separated from ownership see id. at 90-
118 (tables on pp. 95-116).
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of those who supply the means whereby the new princes may
exercise their power.180
Book II was entitled, Regrouping of Rights: Relative Legal Position
of Ownership and Control It showed how the legal position of owner-
ship had become a hollow concept through the deft use of the proxy to
manipulate the shareholder.
Much of what Berle and Means stated at this point pertained to
the first part of this Article relating to the common law rights of the
shareholder. They also showed the gradual changes that came about
through the growth of the nation, the corporation, and the laxity in
state statutes, leaving the shareholder with only a titular right to the
corporation, but no actual rights or control.
The foundation of the original corporation, maintained Berle and
Means, was the corporation contract, which was originally thought of
as providing a set of more or less rigid participations exercised through
the rights of shareholders. 1" The most important of these was the pre-
emptive right to the corporate assets, based on the concept that these
assets were owned among the shareholders on a pro rata basis depend-
ing on how many shares they owned.
Various classes of stock allowed greater or lesser participation in
assets or earnings to be set up in the corporation contract. Further-
more, the combination of these participations could insure a prior
claim on earnings, or a prior claim on dividends, or any other arrange-
ment which the drafters of the corporate charter determined were in the
best interests of all. Whatever the participations, they were established
and sanctioned by the state through legislative charter, and, since they
were executed in a legal and contractual manner, the assumption was
that they were not easily changeable. 182
This rigidity, however, had been lost because the states had eased
regulations in the drafting of corporate charters, causing a freedom of
contract. No single change had caused this loss of rigidity, but it had
evolved as the board of directors had slowly used their power through
proxies to gain more and more control, by varying the original pro rata
rights of the shareholder in assets and earnings.' 3
Management used two mechanisms to accomplish this task:
180. Id. at 124.
181. Id. at 127-34, 154;seesupra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of comon law
protections.
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(1) dilluted participations and (2) unascertained participations.184
Basically, diluted participation means "the reduction of the pro
rata part of assets and earnings accruing to each share through the
issue of additional shares not representing a corresponding contribu-
tion to the corporate capital." '85 These devices deprived the share-
holder of his right to preserve his pro rata position in the corporation,
or, to the extent that he had lost that position, his right of compensation
through the sale of his preemptive right.'86
Par value shares, as indicated earlier, meant that a fixed minimum
contribution had to be received from each purchaser of the original
issue, and that it had to be cash. It was not until later that payment
could be by other means. When directors were allowed to determine
the value of the stock, the change was drastic. Par value was at first
$100 or more, but later it became customary to designate any par value
desired, until finally, the directors issued at will shares authorized in
the charter.I8 7 These last two steps destroyed the concept of par
value 88 and allowed the directors to dilute the stock. 89
Parasitic shares are shares that are divided into classes. For exam-
ple, Class A receives two thirds of the dividend and Class B receives
one third. If the board of directors chooses to increase the number of
Class A shares, then in effect Class B shares become parasitic in that
they automatically absorb some of the earning power of Class A stock.
Thus the directors have the power to issue more shares of one class
which reduces the share of earnings for that class.190
Any number of variations can occur.'9 ' Sometimes directors make
a decision to effect a merger. The exchange of shares may turn out to
be grossly inadequate and cause one set of shareholders to suffer dilu-
tion in value of their shares.' 92 Purchase by the corporation of its own
stock is another device; if the shares are bought at unrealistically high
prices, the values of all of the shares decreases. 193 Another device is the
removal of the preemptive right altogether from the corporate
184. Id. at 154-55.
185. Id. at 154-55.




190. Id. at 160.
191. Id. at 160-62.
192. Id. at 172-73.
193. Id. at 172-73.
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charter. 194
Unascertained participation means that, "An extreme grant of
power has been taken and secured by directors where statutes have per-
mitted corporate charters to authorize the issue of securities whose pre-
cise claim on the corporate earnings and assets is not to be ascertained
until later."" 5 As an example, Berle and Means cited the stock
purchase warrant, which today would be the stock option. 196 In any
case, they work in the same manner by permitting the holder to sub-
scribe to a designated number of shares at a price stated on the option
for a specified number of years or even permanently. This device,
when exercised, obviously means a dilution of the shareholders' stock.
Generally, the power to issue these options or warrants rests exclusively
with the board of directors, who are subject to no control in the issu-
ance thereof.197
Another unascertained participation is the securities convertible at
the option of the corporation into other securities. The point that Berle
and Means made is that the securities are subject to the will of the
directors, not of the shareholders. 98
Next, Berle and Means discussed the routing of earnings by the
directors to the shareholders. The primary device, they maintained,
was allowing the directors to determine when dividends would be paid.
This was a powerful control since the only limitation imposed by law
was that the earnings must not be withheld to an unreasonable degree,
which allowed extremely wide latitude.' 99
Another means of control was through noncumulative preferred
dividends that did not have to be paid.21 Usually, the preferred divi-
dend was limited to, say, seven percent, and if it was not paid, the com-
mon stock dividend would not be paid either. If the directors elected
not to pay one year, but then decided the next year to pay the pre-
ferred, there would be more money for the common stock dividend
since the preferred dividend wa not paid the year before.20 '
194. Id. at 174-76.
195. Id. at 180.
196. Id. at 180-81.
197. Id. at 180-85.
198. Id at 187-88.
199. Id at 189-90; see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
The court held that Henry Ford, as controlling shareholder and chairman of the board, could not
refuse to pay dividends when the corporation made a substantial profit.
200. A. BERLE & G. MEANS supra note 33, at 190-92.
201. Id at 190-91.
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Berle and Means then discussed the power to alter the original
contract rights of security holders by a majority or two-thirds vote of
the shareholders to amend the corporate charter accomplished through
the proxy machinery which is effectively controlled by the directors, as
discussed above.20 2
At first the power to make such a change was quite difficult, but
the courts have gradually made it very easy.20 3 For example changes
can be voted in order to retire part of the preferred stock. This could
be accomplished by a bond issue, or by a reduction in the preferred
shareholder's dividends. In addition, there could be an amendment to
change the voting rights of a certain class of stock or to change divi-
dend rights between two classes of stock and make them the same, and
so on.
204
Berle and Means concluded with these salient words on this
device:
Most changes in contract positions proposed by amendments
go through; and the management and control in practice rely
on the possibility of using this power as a last resort where
their corporation did not at the outset provide itself with a
sufficient number of the mechanisms. . . . If put to their
trumps a management can usually make a showing of "busi-
ness exigency"; and if it is far-seeing it can set the stage to
indicate such business exigency long in advance. A share-
holder who objects must sustain the burden of proof of un-
fairness, in which case he is commonly at a hopeless
disadvantage in coping with the "control" which has both the
funds and the information of the corporation at its free dispo-
sal. As a result, the power of amendment of the corporate
charter. . . remains the residual expedient of the "control"-
an expedient often used with telling effect.
2 5
While the legal position of management has not really changed, it
was not very shareholder-oriented in the beginning. All the manager
must do is follow three main rules of conduct. First, pay a fair amount
attention to business. Second, display loyalty to the corporate interests.
Finally, at a minimum, make reasonable business decisions. Basically,
this only requires that the manager not serve his personal interests
202. Id. at 207
203. Id. at 208-12.
204. Id at 208, 210-11, 214-18.
205. Id at 218-19.
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where they are adverse to the corporation and that he use reasonable
business judgment.
Thus, Berle and Means emphasized that the pro rata rights of the
shareholders have been taken by management by diluting the preemp-
tion through corporate devices until these rights are almost nonexistent.
The stockholder in the modem corporation had thus surrendered
"definite rights" for "indefinite expectations."2 6 Berle and Means
stated it well: "In almost no particular is he [stockholder] in a position
to demand that they [management] do or refrain from doing any given
thing."20 7 The result is that the interests of the shareholder are made
subservient to the will of the controlling managers. The legal doctrine
that the judgment of the directors must prevail as to the best interests of
the enterprise was the same as saying that the interests of the individual
must be sacrificed to the economic needs of the enterprise as a whole,
and the directors made the decision as to what those needs were.
Book III is Property in the Stock Markets: Security Exchanges and
Liquidators as Appraisers. It discussed stock markets, primarily from
the standpoint of their functions. Berle and Means said that there must
be disclosure in the process of introducing securities into the public
market, and there must not be false statements or there must be liabil-
ity for deceit. This requirement arose from the common law case Bed-
ford v. Bagshaw.208
There were also a few remarks about the difficult concept of dis-
closure requirements imposed on corporations by the New York Stock
Exchange.20 9 Book IV is called Reorientation of Enterprise: Effects of
the Corporate System on Fundamental Economic Theory. It analyzed
the traditional concept of property and said that traditional theories are
no longer adequate. Instead, new theories of property, profits, and the
corporation needed to be developed.
C. Reviews of The Modem Corporation and Private Property
Each of the books discussed above was important and did much to
influence the thinking of the time. Because the Berle and Means book
was the most important and influential of all, a few comments from
206. Id. at 277.
207. Id
208. 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859). See Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A.B. Leach and Co., 247 N.Y.
1 (1928).
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reviewers seem appropriate. E. Merrick Dodd, one of the great corpo-
rate law thinkers, wrote: "Despite its failure to deal with the possibili-
ties of reform through legislation, the picture which it presents .. .
should prove of material assistance to the advocates of such reform."'2 10
An equally significant scholar in corporate law, H. W. Ballantine, com-
mented that he felt this book would help economists, lawyers, and leg-
islators "with reference to the possible regulation of corporate
management and the functioning of our stock exchanges."21
Other reviews showed tremendous respect and far-reaching effects
the book had on the 1930's era. Joseph V. Kline, a New York lawyer
and knowledgeable contemporary, wrote: "Here we have the law, the
logic, and the philosophy of the New Deal." '212 Mr. Kline also quoted
from Professor Beard's book review in the N. Y Herald-Tribune,
showing dramatically the impact the book had: "'In time to come this
volume may be proclaimed as the most important work bearing on
American statecraft between the publication of the of the immortal
Federalist . . .and the opening of the year 1933.' "213
Kline continued by maintaining that most people realized that
"Professor Berle was one of the prominent members of the 'brain trust'
which supplied the economic sinews for the speeches of the Democratic
candidate, and is now one of the chief economic advisors of President
Roosevelt."2 4 The point was that Berle and Means' book had much to
do with the New Deal legislation.
In the Yale Law Journal, Nathan Isaacs reviewed the book favora-
bly and presented what in his estimation was the major thesis of the
book, the separation of ownership and control:
Their definition and analysis of control are a major con-
tribution to this whole study. It is not merely majority voting
power. . . not even legal voting power where securities are so
widely scattered. . . . It is . . .that with proxy machinery
developed as it is and with the attitude and understanding of
stockholders such as they are, a small group at the center of
affairs exerts actual control.215
Jerome Frank, a research associate at the Yale Law School, who
210. Dodd, Book Review, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 782, 785 (1933).
211. Ballantine, Book Review, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 78, 79 (1932).
212. Kline, Book Review, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 557, 557 (1933).
213. Id (quoting Beard, Book Review, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Feb. 19, 1933) (emphasis
added).
214. Kline, supra note 212, at 557.
215. Isaacs, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 463, 464 (1933).
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later became an eminent legal scholar and Chairman of the SEC, made
an extremely forceful statement:
THIS book will perhaps rank with Adam Smith's Wealth of
Nations as the first detailed description in admirably clear
terms of the existence of a new economic epoch. For what, in
effect, the authors tell us is this: Without our knowing it, we
have been passing through a revolution comparable to the so-
called industrial revolution-analogous to the feudal sys-
tem-the corporate system of economic government ...
Those few men [who control 200 corporations] do not rely for
their control on ownership . . . of the shares of stock ....
The owners ...are almost completely divorced from the
power to influence their management.216
Frank went on to say that if the new corporate epoch continued, we
would be confronted with new rulers, and "the ordinary stockholder
[will be] in a rather hopeless condition." 217
One derogatory review was written by Professor I. Maurice
Wormser at Fordham University, who was disturbed because he
thought that the book pretended to be a study of the break-up of pri-
vate property. He complained that the book "is marred throughout by
its sweeping condemnations as well as its general trend, . that the
authors are engaged in 'A study of the break up of Private Prop-
erty.' "218 The reviewer "assures them [Professor Berle and Dr. Means]
that neither they nor their children, nor their grandchildren, will see in
this country 'the break up of private property.' 219
IV. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS
Federal securities legislation did not spring forth full grown from
the philosophy of the New Deal. Instead, it evolved from a history of
state regulation and several centuries of legislation in England.22 ° In
the late 1920's and early 1930's, before the depression, the country was
swept by a corporate reform movement,221 a movement that received a
216. Frank, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 989 (1933) (footnotes omitted).
217. Id at 991 (footnotes omitted).
218. I. Wormser, Book Review, 19 A.B.A.J. 113, 114 (1933) (quoting from a cover flap on A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 33.).
219. Id
220. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (2d ed. 1961); BUCKLEY, THE COMPA-
NIEs ACTS 96 (13th ed. 1957); DUBOIS, supra note 39; HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Bust-
NESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND 1800-1867 (1936).
221. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 119-21; Feller, The Movement/or Corporate Re-
form: A World-Wide Phenomenon, 20 A.B.A.J. 347, 348 (1934); Kessler, The American Securities
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powerful impetus from the stock market crash of October 1929. The
Roosevelt New Dealers decided that the best overall philosophy for the
new Securities Exchange Act was a disclosure philosophy.222 Much
can be said about this era and the disclosure philosophy, but President
Roosevelt stated it appropriately in his message to Congress: "This
proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor the further doctrine
'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth
on the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and
thereby bring back public confidence. 223 Effectively, disclosure meant
that the seller was bound by the law to lay bare the facts about the
securities he was selling so that the public could decide whether to buy
them.
The gist of Roosevelt's message, however, was at the end of the
address where he emphasized that, "[w]hat we seek is a return to a
clearer understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage
banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other peo-
ple's money are trustees acting for others." 224 This statement reflected
the philosophy of Justice Louis D. Brandeis. As stated by an historian
of that era, Ralph F. de Bedts, "[t]he goal of a legitimate relationship
between fiduciary and depositor or investor was stated in simple
Brandeisian terms even including the title of Brandeis' work within its
context." '225 Thus, the major thrust of New Deal thinking was that
those who managed other people's money should be in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to those people, whether depositors or investors.
On the basis of this philosophy of disclosure and fiduciary rela-
tionship, the Securities Act of 1933 and the supplementary Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 were passed by the New Deal Congress.
The Securities Act of 1933 is concerned with the initial distribution
of securities. Its purpose is to require full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate commerce and through the
Act and Its Foreign Counterparts: A Comparative Study, 44 YALE L.J. 1133 (1935); Kock &
Auerbach, The German Company Law of 1931, 18 VA. L. REV. 850, 850 (1932); Neff, A Civil Law
Answer to the Problem of Securities Regulation, 28 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025-26 (1942); Rosendorff,
The New German Company Law and the English Companies Act, 1929, 14 J. CoMP. LEG. (3d ser.)
94 (1932), 14 J. Comp. LEG. (3d ser.) 94 (1932), 15 J. COMP. LEG. (3d ser.) 112, 242 (1933).
222. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 121-28.
223. Hearing on H. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
224. Id
225. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 34 (1964) (referring to L.
BRANDEIS, supra note 91).
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mails, and to prevent fraud in their sale.226 The Act seeks to accom-
plish this by requiring the filing of a registration statement containing
material information about the issue and the securities, and the use of a
prospectus in attempts to sell the securities.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, on the other hand, is con-
cerned with postdistribution trading. It is not as structured as the Se-
curities Act because it deals with all that is not concerned with the
initial distribution process. Initially, it deals with "second-hand trad-
ing," that is, trading of securities after their initial issuance; with fraud
in securities trading and manipulation of the markets; and with regula-
tion of the markets, including control of the amount of credit that goes
into those markets. Finally, it also includes the solicitation of proxies
for listed and registered securites.227
Within the Exchange Act are two specific sections important to the
framers of the Act. These two sections are Section 10, concerned with
fraud, and Section 14, concerned with proxies. The remainder of this
Article will focus on those two Sections and on the two Rules promul-
gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to further the
purposes of those Sections, Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14a-9. It will also deal
with their relationship to each other, and the role of scienter.
V. SCIENTER AND ITS EVOLUTION TO INCLUDE NEGLIGENCE
A good definition for scienter has proved elusive. Professor Loss
has stated that the term "has been variously defined to mean everything
from knowing falsity, with an implication of mens rea, through the var-
ious graduations of recklessness, down to such non-action as is virtually
equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault.228 Morris and
Morris, in their torts hornbook, said very carefully, "In cases where
scienter is required, liability cannot be based on mere negligence." '229
226. 1 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 130; MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES ACT
AND THE S.E.C. 24 (1948); BERLE & McGILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE
662 (1942); H. BLUMENTHAL & WING, SECURITIES LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1-9 (1933).
227. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 130-3 1; BLUMENTHAL & WING, supra note 226, at
1-12.
228. 3 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 1432; see also, 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD
SECTION 8.4 (503) at 204.103 (1975); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 at 684
(4th ed. 1971). It is also interesting to note that Corpus Jurs Secondum begins the definition of the
word scienter with: "It has been said that the word 'scienter' is not a word of mystery or magic
meaning. . ." 79 C.J.S. Scienter 456 (1952). That such a statement was made illustrates that the
concept has been a difficult one in law.
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However, they effectively agreed with Professor Loss when they said,
"But certain kinds of sloppiness somewhat similar to negligence have
been held to satisfy the requirement of scienter."'23 Later, after analyz-
ing a few cases, the authors concluded:
Thus in some cases, proof supporting a finding of lack of due
care is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement and sus-
taining a finding of fraud. . . . Proof adequate to support a
finding of negligence, therefore, may be sufficient to sustain a
finding of fraud-even in the face of defendants' protestations
from the witness stand that they honestly believed they had
reported truthfully.23" '
Bucklo has also written on the scienter issue and obviously feels
that scienter is "many-faceted" and thus truly difficult to define.232
More importantly, Bucklo zeroed in on the major problems. She be-
gins with an extensive use of Keeton's233 excellent discussion on fraud
and states that there are five states of mind that may be found when a
defendant commits fraud: (1) The defendant may be convinced of the
truth of his representation, because it is based on knowledge of facts
that constitute a reasonable basis for belief. (2) The defendent may be
convinced of the truth of his representation, but it is based on limited
knowledge of facts that do not constitute a reasonable basis for belief.
(3) The defendant may not have a reasonable basis for believing his
representation to be true or false. (4) The defendant may know that his
representation is false. (5) The defendant may know that his represen-
tation is false and intend to mislead the listener.2 34 The third example
is such reckless behavior that it constitutes constructive knowledge of
the misrepresentation. In such a case, the defendant would be held
liable at common law.235 Constructive fraud is generally the phrase
applied to such conduct. The fourth example, in the same vein, is ac-
tual knowledge of the falsity of the misrepresentation. The fifth exam-
ple is the common law intent to defraud or to act with malice. In both
230. Id
231. Id at 293-94 (emphasis in original).
232. Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 567-71 (1972).
233. See Keeton, Fraud- The Necessityfor an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REv. 583, 589
(1958).
234. These five have been adapted from Bucklo, supra note 232, at 568; Keeton, supra note
240, at 589.
235. See C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, JR., supra note 229, at 293-94; W. PROSSER, supra note 228,
§ 107 at 701; Bucklo, supra note 232, at 568; Keeton, supra note 233, at 590.
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instances, the defendant would be liable under common law fraud. 236
The important focus is the distinction between the second and
third examples because that constitutes the difference between simple
negligence and gross negligence. In the second example, it may be said
that there is some factual basis for the defendant's belief in his state-
ment. There is no bad faith, but there is lack of diligence on the de-
fendant's part. This differs from example number one in which the
court will find the defendant innocent. In example three the defend-
ant's lack of knowledge is attributable to fault on his part.
Therefore, Keeton and Bucklo strongly advocate that scienter
"should be interpreted to mean knowledge of facts, either actual or
constructive. '237 Constructive knowledge means that the defendant's
lack of knowledge results from conduct "sufficiently careless that
knowledge will be attributed. 2 38 Even though the court might not be
convinced that the defendant actually knew the facts, "his lack of
knowledge is inexcusable. 239 On the other hand, negligence is con-
duct not wholly innocent, but not so careless that it is inexcusable. The
gist is, was the failure to make a diligent investigation "so unreasonable
that the defenses of due diligence and good faith are unavailable[?] 2 40
The entire argument is brought into full focus in the fine presenta-
tion by the famous torts theorist Leon Green.24" ' Green initially states
that "neither alternative, 'actual fraud' on the one hand, nor 'innocent
misrepresentation' on the other, is sufficient as a doctrine for any juris-
diction."2 42 Then, he adds, that no matter how vigorously one alterna-
tive is insisted upon, "sooner or later it is modified so as to
accommodate the opposite extreme. 2 43 The reason for this, Green
maintains, is that in some instances the courts have taken the adamant
position that the defendant must be held to stand by his representa-
tions, while in other cases, it has been looked at by the courts as equally
unbearable that a person be held totally liable for what his words or
acts imply. 2' Green feels that the reason the courts can go either way
236. C. MORRIS & C. MORRIS, JR., supra note 229, at 292-93; W. PROSSER, supra note 228,
§ 105 at 686-87; Bucklo, supra note 232, at 568; Keeton, supra note 233, at 590.
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is that dealings between people are often loose affairs involving much
"talk and rambling negotiation, '245 The doctrines of "actual fraud"
and negligence are employed so that the different interests and habits
of people may be served.2 46
Green feels that there is no one way to classify these cases 6ther
than to recognize the wide variation in deceit cases and that the concept
of scienter covers a wide range from actual fraud to nothing more than
an unintentional false statement.247 He gives examples of this in a con-
tinuum. First is the "honest liar formula" followed by many American
jurisdictions. Quoting from Lord Herschell:
First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be
proof of fraud, and nothing short of that will suffice. Sec-
ondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false represen-
tation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in
its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.
Although, I have treated the second and third as distinct
cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for
one who makes a statement under such circumstances can
have no real belief in the truth of what he states. To prevent a
false statement being fraudulent, there must, I think, always
be an honest belief in its truth. And this probably covers the
whole ground, for one who knowingly alleges that which is
false, has obviously no such honest belief.248
Green suggests that although this formula looks very clear, in reality it
is not very definite and in fact allows the judge a maximum of power to
decide each case. The jury evaluates the evidence and the judge can go
either way.24 9 An actual illustration of this concept is Derry v. Peek2
5 °
where the misstatement was softened to a point where a majority of the
judges said the statement was not false.
The second formula, Green continues, is the allowance of a charge
of scienter where there is a false statement knowingly made by the de-
fendant, as long as what is stated is not merely a matter of opinion,
estimate, or judgment, but "susceptible of actual knowledge."25 This
also looks like a cleancut formula, but in actuality the courts follow a
continuum in reaching their decisions, such that the court's power is
245. Id.
246. Id at 752.
247. Id.
248. Id at 752-53 (quoting Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889)).
249. Id at 753.
250. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
251. L. Green, supra note 241, at 753-54.
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probably as wide and equal to the discretion exercised by the court in
Derry. 252
The third formula dispenses with the "scienter" element, notes
Green, but the wide range of decisions in this third formula does not
provide a clear answer. A Texas case noted that, "If the representa-
tions are untrue, it is immaterial that they may have been made without
fraudulent intent."253 A Florida case ended with the same conclusion,
although stated differently.2
5 4
Green thus concludes that the formulas are not so very different,
but are equally elastic, allowing a broad range of action by the courts to
use their own judgment or to permit the employment of a jury. The
choice of formula then, is relatively immaterial,2" and Green quotes
Williston as saying that the issue is "who shall bear the loss.' ' 256
The overall conclusion asserted by Green is that the courts will
decide according to the facts of the particular case. The best example,
he argues, is Glanzer v. Shepard,2 " which followed the holding in
Derry. Green suggests, although the court in Glanzer said it was apply-
ing the negligence theory, its decision was in fact "but a screen which
permitted the court to employ a doctrine equivalent to the 'innocent
misrepresentation' doctrine, but in a way to avoid embarrassment from
its seeming adherence to the formula in Derry v. Peek.' '258 In other
words, although the court claimed it followed the "innocent misrepre-
sentation" doctrine and, therefore, the negligence theory, it in fact de-
cided on a deceit theory. He emphasizes this idea when he says:
It is rather striking that the court does not advert to the "de-
ceit" theory at all. The case illustrates the wealth of legal the-
ories at the command of courts generally, as well as the great
capacity which the Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals and his associates have demonstrated on many occa-
sions for utilizing legal theories without destroying their in-
tegrity as means of articulating more acceptable
judgements.259
The best way to emphasize this final point, continues Green, is to quote
252. See id at 754-55.
253. Id at 756 (quoting Scale v. Baker, 70 Tex. 283, - 7 S.W. 742, 744 (1888)).
254. See Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, _ 25 So. 678, 682 (1899).
255. L. Green, supra note 241, at 757.
256. Id (quoting Williston, Liabilityfor Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv. 415, 434
(1911)).
257. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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from a statement made by Justice Lamm of the Missouri Supreme
Court:
Fraudis kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being infinite and taking
on protean form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by
defining it with a hard and fast definition, their jurisdiction
would be cunningly circumvented at once by new schemes be-
yond the definition. Messieurs, the fraud-feasors, would like
nothing half so well as for courts to say they would go thus
far, and no further in its pursuit. . . . Accordingly, defini-
tions of fraud are of set purpose left general and flexible, and,
thereto courts match their astuteness against the versatile in-
ventions of fraud-doers.26°
In analyzing Green's position it is apparent that he believes that the
law of deceit, although seemingly between the intentional conduct of a
party and the unintentional conduct, is in fact not so. The problem is
far more complex, and because actual situations are numerous and va-
ried, the courts have taken the best approach by making decisions case
by case. The bottom line is that fraud and negligence, intentional and
unintentional conduct, are too vague to call and thus must be decided
case by case. Green concludes:
But the point to be stressed here is that whatever sort ofjudg-
ment is desired, the formulas which have been evolved and their
coteries of attendant phrases provide the most flexible accom-
modation without in the least impairing their own integrity or
that of the judicialprocess. A science of law could ask little
better by way of intellectual machinery for handling these va-
ried and difficult cases.2 6 1
Of course, Bucklo would not say that this is exactly what she
means. Her point is that such unintentional conduct as she has de-
scribed is deceit and should be recognized as such. Green, on the other
hand, is saying that on some occasions, there should be liability, and on
others, there should not be and that the decision should be left up to the
courts. Would Bucklo accept this? It is difficult to know, but surely she
would accept it over the argument that allows liability only if there is
intent and that excludes altogether any conduct where intent cannot be
shown.
There is more. When Green wrote his definitive article, he made
reference to the position that liability in such situations should be held
260. Id at 769-70 (quoting Stonements v. Head, 248 Mo. 243, _ 154 S.W. 108, 114 (1913)
(emphasis added).
261. Id at 770 (emphasis in original).
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only if there is definite proof of intent and made several references to
an article in the Harvard Law Review by Professor Bohlen.262 Professor
Bohlen took great offense and wrote a second article which was a scath-
ing polemic against Green's position on deceit.263 Succinctly put, his
position is:
One who states that a fact exists which he knows does not
exist, or who misstates his own state of mind in regard thereto,
as by saying that he knows its existence when he is conscious
that he merely believes it to exist, does intentionally mislead
him to whom the information is given. He may not intend to
mislead the other to his harm; indeed, he may hope that the
future will make true that which he knows to be at the time a
misstatement, or he may mislead the other for what he him-
self believes to be the other's good. But, even so, he does in-
tend to mislead. If, however, he honestly believes that not
only the facts but his conviction as to their existence are ex-
actly what his statement represents them to be, he can have no
intention to mislead. At most he is guilty of negligence in that
he has failed to exercise diligence and competence in ascer-
taining the basis of his statement or failed to use the judgment
of a reasonably intelligent man upon the data which he has
carefully and accurately collected.264
The point, of course, is that if the person does not intend to mislead, he
is guilty of negligence but not fraud, which Bohlen views differently.
The basis of the tort action in negligence is not intentional conduct, as
compared to fraud. Bohlen concludes: "This article is written in the
hope it may cause courts to realize that in negligent misrepresentation
the important thing is the negligence. . . . Accordingly, the liability
should be determined by the general principles of the law of negligence
.... 265 Bohlen was much more adamant in his second article. He
seemed to feel that Green had misunderstood his position, and there-
fore, Bohen wrote this second article as a polemic against Green's
article:
I now repeat what I meant to say, and what I believe I
did say in my Harvard Law Review article-that it is apt to
lead to false analogies to speak of negligent conduct which
262. Bohlen, Misrepresentation As Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 HARM. L. REV. 733
(1929).
263. Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated as Negligence or Fraud? 18 VA.
L. REv. 703 (1932).
264. Bohlen, supra note 262, at 738 (citations omitted).
265. Id at 746.
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leads to unintended misinformation as fraud, which, both in
the law and in public opinion implies a conscious purpose to
mislead.266
His point is that both the law and the general public interpret fraud to
mean a "conscious purpose to mislead." And, he continues, there is a
grave danger that what is a conscious dishonesty where clearly an ac-
tion in fraud may arise, will now become actionable in tort, although
there is no conscious effort to deceive. He elaborates on this position
and reasons that:
Our law should be made safe for democracy. For good
or evil, it is administered by legally trained judges and un-
trained jurymen. So long as this is so, it is obviously harmful
to the proper administration of our law that a word, which is
understood by laymen to mean one thing, and one thing only,
should "in law" mean something different or be arbitrarily
given an additional meaning which is absolutely contradic-
tory to the sense in which it is properly understood. The ordi-
nary man regards the word fraud as necessarily implying
conscious dishonesty. Is it not preserving the idea of law as a
mystery which only its priests and initiates can understand, to
brand conduct as fraudulent "in law," when in fact it is not
fraudulent at all but at most merely careless? 267
Thus, Bohlen is saying that the concepts of fraud and negligence are
clear to judges, lawyers, and common people, and should remain so.
Then, Bohlen makes his most flagrant statement: "True realism should
condemn and not approve any formula because it enables judges to
give lip service to a false ideal of an absolutely immutable law while
changing the law by word jugglery.' '261 Finally, Bohlen accuses Green
of wanting a legal system in which judges make the decisions, resulting
in a government of men and not of laws: "To paraphrase Dr. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, 'We know your god, but we call him the devil.' After
all it is a matter of taste. De gustibus non est disputandum . '269
Does the Green position cause problems? Not really, because
many times the obvious issues are easily solved, and the ambiguous
ones can be resolved by the courts in accordance with the facts. Al-
though this does not completely satisfy Bucklo or Bohlens, it remains a
practical and meaningful approach.
266. Bohlen, supra note 262, at 706.
267. Id at 711-12.
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A further clarification of the Green position is made by Williston,
known for his comprehension about difficult legal issues.27 0 He begins
his article by saying that often areas of the law have grown up with
little regard to each other when in fact there is a logical and intimate
connection. "It is impossible that such a situation can be allowed to
exist permanently,"27 ' he says, and then he proceeds to show that deceit
initially was not a clear concept for early common law lawyers.272 He
continues by showing that although warranty of title and warranty of
quality are dependent upon intent, the doctrine of estoppel is not, since
it is considered as a rule of evidence only, and an action cannot be
founded upon it. 73 But, says Williston, "To speak of conclusive evi-
dence of something admittedly false may be a useful formula, but it
disguises the truth. An estoppel is in effect a conclusive admission of
the truth of a nonexistent fact."274 This means that in each case there is
a cause of action -because of the damaging misrepresentation, and
fraudulent intent'has nothing to do with it. Williston asserts: "It is
difficult to see how the law of estoppel and the doctrine of Derry v.
Peek can permanently be kept in separate compartments when law and
equity are fused and pleading, reduced to a mere statement of the facts
of case."
275
Williston maintains that there is plenty of authority to place the
bench and bar on notice of the merit of holding one liable for a false
statement when the person making the statement is reasonably sup-
posed to have, or should have, knowledge of the information. He sug-
gests quite strongly that the use of the words fraud and deceit have
"exercised an unfortunate influence in the development of the law on
the subject."2 7 6 Those words, he maintains, import a consciously dis-
honest conduct by the defendant, and a legal fiction, such as "construc-
tive fraud" or "legal fraud," is not the way to solve the problem.
Instead, the issue should be looked at in a straightforward manner.
The major question posed would then be a determination of who
should bear the loss, once the defendant has acted in such a manner.
With the issue thus resolved, the law should not be looked at illogically
as in Derry v. Peek, but logically. The actor has induced someone to act,
270. Wiliston, supra note 256, at 434.
271. Id at 415.
272. Id at 416.
273. Id at 425.
274. Id
275. Id at 426-27.
276. Id at 434.
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therefore liability should ensue. This is only morally and legally correct
and desirable, and continues Williston, this position is supported in the
dissent of Pasley v. Freeman,277 the original and leading case for hold-
ing a person liable for knowingly making a false statement. Similar
cases in modem decisions in several states support that view.278
The second qualifying principle, Williston proceeds, should be
that if there was reasonable ground for believing that the statements
were true, no liability should ensue. But when the person has acted
negligently and had reasonable grounds to believe that his statement
was untrue, liability should ensue.279 To hold someone liable for any
statement made when there is no intent is unreasonable but, to hold
him liable for actions that are negligent and that cause harm to some-
one else is perfectly reasonable and meaningful in legal theory and
practice.280
With the Green-Williston approach, the arguments that Bucklo
and Bohlens get into are resolved, not by looking at the "fraud" and
"intent" problems controlled by old common law prejudices, but by
looking at the problem itself, recognizing the negligence and finding a
remedy. When there is actual intent, then the courts should treat the
problem like the fraud cases described by Keeton-that is, by imposing
clear liability. But when the problem involved is that of fault, then the
question is whether there was injury and whether the defendant acted
negligently. If the degree of negligence is minimal, then no liability is
imposed. Yet, the question of how to measure the degree of negligence
is difficult to resolve and is best left to the courts to determine, case by
case.
Finally, Professor George B. Weisiger has made some thoughtful
contributions to this area.28' He is careful to point out that the old
rules of negligence related primarily to personal injury and property
damage cases. In the area of commercial law, a different approach has
often been applied in the case of negligence. The question posed is, if
negligence is the theory applied, what will the judges do with it, and
which of the above theories of negligence will they apply? But, as
Weisiger says, "The degree of protection given any interest changes ac-
277. 3 T.R. 51 (1789).
278. See, Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908).
279. Smith, Liability For Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L. REv. 184 (1901) cited with approval
in Cunningham v. C.R. Pease Co., 74 N.H. 435, 69 A. 120 (1908).
280. Id. at 195-96.
281. Weisiger, Bases of Liability for Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REv. 866 (1930).
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cording to the needs of society." '2 82
He goes on to say that certain individual interests have to disap-
pear as business becomes more complex. For example, the absolute
individual rights to the air above one's land have to be abandoned for
new methods of transportation. A further example is business transac-
tions, which have become much different from what they were before
the advent of a huge complex society. The sale of chattel was originally
followed by a delivery of goods into the hands of the purchaser, who
could assure himself of the weight of the goods if he had any doubt.
But when it has become customary to sell goods by weight to a person
two thousand miles away and the buyer subsequently sells the goods
without seeing them, the seller's certificate of weight is relied upon.
When it becomes the practice of a buyer to rely on the certificate of
weight by the seller, then there must be a requirement that the weigh-
ing be done with reasonable care. If the buyer is thereby harmed by
the failure of reasonable care, then the weigher should take the 1oss.283
The key to Weisiger's thinking is eminently illustrated in the fol-
lowing statement:
Duties arise as it becomes difficult or inexpedient for the
plaintiff to protect his own interests, or when he may properly
assume that they will not be invaded by the defendant's con-
duct. In this respect an interest grows in legal significance as
individuals must depend more on each other.284
Thus, Weisiger's point is that as business society grows larger and more
complex, individuals must depend on each other, causing more liability
to arise. The courts will initially protect the plaintiff from intentional
harm. The next step, however, leads to negligence as a basis for liabil-
ity because of the plaintiffs right of reliance. Moreover, the courts may
allow recovery in limited cases based on the doctrine of absolute liabil-
ity where expectation by the plaintiff is so warranted. 285
One must conclude that the Bucklo and Bohlen arguments are too
polar. The problem really is not one of intent, but allocation of loss. If
there has been intent, clearly the actor is liable. Where there has not
been intent, the court may decide from the facts that the actor should
be held liable because, even if he did not know the falsity of certain
statements, he should have known so under the circumstances. When
282. Id at 874.
283. Id at 874-75.
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parties are acting face to face and each is aware of the surrounding
facts, then intention and only intention should suffice for the basis of
liability. Times have changed, however, and the defendant must be lia-
ble for some negligent acts that are not intentional.
VI. SECTION 10(b) AND RULE lOb-5: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS A
BROAD STANDARD
A. General Legislative Intent
There is no question that legislators wished to alleviate the fraud
that was rampant in the buying and selling of securities, both in pri-
mary issuance (Securities Act) and in secondary trading (Exchange
Act). In speaking for the Securities Act, the sponsor of the Senate pro-
posal, Senator Fletcher, made some introductory remarks about the
"saturnalia of speculation throughout the country" '286 and the many se-
curities that had become worthless to investors:
The purpose of the bill is to protect the investing public and
honest business. The basic policy is that of informing the in-
vestor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale
in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection
against fraud and misrepresentation. That is the general pur-
pose of the bill. The aim is to prevent further exploitation of
the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless
securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and
true information before the investors; to protect honest enter-
prise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the com-
petition afforded by questionable securities offered to the
public through crooked promotion.28 7
This is a broad statement about fraud and misrepresentation. No other
sections of the Securities Act pertain to section 10(b) or to fraud.288
In the House of Representatives Report, Sam Rayburn of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reproduced verbatim
the message that the newly inaugurated President, Franklin D.
Roosevelt had delivered to Congress:
In spite of many State statutes, the public in the past has sus-
tained severe losses through practices neither ethical
norhonest on the part of many persons and corporations sell-
ing securities.
286. 77 CONG. REC. 2982 (1933).
287. Id at 2982-83.
288. See id at 2916-55, 2978-84, 2986-3000.
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Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not
take any action which might be construed as approving or
guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties
which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall
be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that
no essentially important element attending the issue shall be
concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the
further doctrine "let the seller also beware." It puts the bur-
den of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give
impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back
public confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public
with the least possible interference to honest business.
This is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting inves-
tors and depositors. It should be followed by legislation relat-
ing to the better supervision of the purchase and sale of all
property dealt in on exchanges, and by legislation to correct
unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers and di-
rectors of banks and other corporations.
What we seek is a return to a clear understanding of the an-
cient truth that those who manage banks, corporations, and
other agencies handling or using other people's money are
trustees acting for others.289
The Committee interpreted the message to Congress as making the fol-
lowing three points. (1) It is a situation that is so bad that action is
demanded. This action compels "full and fair disclosure." 9 0 (2) The
principles of the President's message are "full disclosure," that "the
• . . action. . . by the Federal Government for such disclosure ...
should be so devised as not to . . . be construed as an approval or
guarantee of a security issue,"2 9'1 and "a demand that the persons,
whether they be directors, experts, or underwriters, who sponsor the
investment of other people's money should be held up to high stan-
dards of trusteeship."292 (3) "The imposition of standards of trustee-
289. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933).
290. Id at 2.
291. Id at 2.
292. Id. at 2.
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ship. Honesty, care and competence are the demands of
trusteeship.) 293
These three points from the President's message stressed the neces-
sity of formulating security laws to protect the general public. The
Committee seemed to be saying that the laws should treat those in posi-
tions of knowledge (insiders) like trustees or fiduciaries. Such words
surely assumed a broad liability on the part of those who hurt others by
their actions. Thus, it is not intent that is at issue, but past actions
themselves which had hurt the general public.
B. Difficulty of Interpretation
Much time has been spent by this author and by many others on a
subject that defies analysis. It is very difficult to know exactly what the
legislators intended. In the introduction to the book, The Modern
Theme, by Ortega y Gasset, Jose Ferrater Mora said:
The best way to tackle a problem, he [Ortega] often con-
cluded, is to "catch it by the horn." And problems-real
problems, that is-are like bulls: roaring, powerful, and terri-
fying. Thinkers must be skillful in addition to being thor-
oughly trained in the rules of the game. They must kill the
problems-try to solve them-but also hold them in respect,
namely, let the problems be what they are, and not coat them
with large doses of optimism or "utopianism."294
In spite of the many times the present writer has studied the House of
Representatives Reports, the Senate Reports, and the Congressional
Record of the 73rd Congress, nothing definitive on the problem of
whether negligence, recklessness or scienter were intended can be de-
duced. Bromberg and Lowenfels noted in their excellent treatise: "Nor
does the legislative history offer any clear guidance."2 95 And, after a
lengthy discussion, they concluded, "Although there are straws to grasp
at on both sides, the words of the Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 and the legislative history are simply insufficient to an-
swer the scienter question firmly." '296 Arnold S. Jacobs confirms this
293. Id at 3.
294. Mora, "Introduction to the Touchbook Edition," ORTEGA Y GAssET, THE MODERN
THEME 2 (1961) (Trans. James Cleugh).
295. 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD,
§ 8.4(505), 204.106 (1971); Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48
N.C.L. REv. 482, 496-97 (1970); Misenholder, Scienter and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit
Against Seller Under Rule 10b-5, 4 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 27, 38-39 (1963); Comment, 32
Cii. L. REv. 824, 828 (1965).
296. 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 295, § 8.4(506), 204.109.
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conclusion in his fine treatise by saying: "The legislative history of Sec-
tion 10(b) is so meager that little can be drawn from it concerning the
scope of l0b-5. '297 Nevertheless, an analysis of the available material
will be attempted, simply to lay the issue to rest.
C. History of the Fraud Provisions ofthe Securities Act
The Securities Act and the anti-fraud provisions were aimed at
abuses in the sale of new issues or distributions of securities that were
outstanding.29 The three main statutory anti-fraud provisions enacted
in 1933 were Sections 11, 12(2) and 17(a).299 The second clause lan-
guage, which is in all three sections, went through several different ver-
sions. The final wording was composed by Middleton Beaman, chief
legislative draftsman of the House.
Section 17(a) is the more important provision because it has the
most general anti-fraud language and Rule 1Ob-5 was later copied from
it.3°1 Section 17(a) went through several versions. The first version was
introduced by Representative Rayburn and Senator Robinson:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or
other entity in any interstate sale, promotion, negotiation, ad-
vertisement, or distribution of any securities defined by this
Act willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud or to obtain money or property by means of any false
pretense, representation or promise, or to engage in any trans-
action, practice, or course of business relating to the interstate
purchase or sale of any securities which operates or would op-
erate as a fraud upon the purchaser. °2
A second version by Representative Rayburn weeks later was much
closer to the final phrasing:
Fraudulent Interstate Transactions
Sec. 16(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of
any securities by theuse of any means or instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails-
297. 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1Ob-5, § 5.01, 1-159 to -58 (previ-
ously published as 5 A. JACOBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1Ob-5, § 5.01, 1-126 (rev. ed. 1980)).
298. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess, 1-5 (1933).
299. Sections 11, 12(2), 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2), 77q(a) (1982)).
300. Landis, The Legislative History ofthe Securities Act of 1930, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29,
38, 46 (1959).
301. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
302. H.R. 4313 and S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 13 (1933).
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(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of, or ommission to state, a material fact, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud upon
the purchaser. 3
The bill was reported and passed by the House with this language, but
the Conference Committee between the House and Senate emerged
with a slightly different version and it became the law:
Fraudulent Interstate Transactions
Sec. 17. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of
any securities by the use of any meansor instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by meansof any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any trans-
action, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.3°
As can be seen, Clauses 1 and 3 did not change from the second version
to the last, but Clause 2 was changed by the deletion of "false pretense
...or promise," and by the addition of "material" and "fact," as well
as the addition of the reference to omissions which make statements
misleading.
Clause 1 was probably copied from the phrase "having devised
...any scheme or artifice to defraud" in the mail fraud statute. °5
The Clause 3 language was probably taken from the New York Securi-
ties Fraud Statute °.3  In 1954, Section 17(a) was amended to read "un-
lawful. . . in the offer or sale. . .30 It would appear that none of the
above points to a scienter standard. In addition, when the thinking in
Chapter V is added, the argument against scienter is increased.
303. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 16(a) (1933).
304. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (Conference Report) (1933).
305. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
306. 1929 N.Y. Laws ch. 649, 1984-90 (as codified and amended in N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 352(e)(McKinney 1968)).
307. Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-577, § 10, 68 Stat. 685, 686 (1954).
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14(a), Section 10(b), and Rule lob-5
The Exchange Act was aimed primarily at the trading markets and
not at the new issue markets. The intent was to protect investors
against any manipulation of stock prices. To accomplish this, the law
regulated the stock exchange, over-the-counter (OTC) transactions,
and reporting requirements for all issues of securities listed on the stock
exchange.3 °8 This law was extended in 1964 to include the major OTC
securities.3 °9 Section 9 of the Exchange Act was part of the original
1934 Act and has not been materially amended.310 Generally, it pro-
hibits wash sales, matched orders, and other market operations. It also
prohibits false or misleading statements. Because it is a self-operative
part of the law, it does not require any SEC rules to implement it.
Section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act was enacted in 1936 to pro-
hibit the use by broker-dealers of "any manipulative, deceptive or
other fraudulent device or contrivance. '' 31 1 It was modeled on Section
10(b), and was self-operative, but it also gave the SEC authority to de-
fine terms. There are a number of more specific SEC rules under Sec-
tion 15(c)(1) outlawing various practices and requiring disclosures.3t 2
Section 15(c)(2) was added in 1938, and has to do primarily with ficti-
tious quotations.31 3
In 1975 extensive amendments to the Exchange Act were made,
but the fraud provisions were left alone except for a few minor changes
to Section 15(c)(1) and (2).314
Again, none of the above points to a scienter standard and if the
thinking in Chapter V above is included, the argument against scienter
increases.
E. History of Exchange Act. Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) was initially introduced into Congress by Senator
Fletcher and Representative Rayburn as Section 9(c):
Regulation of the Use of Manipulative Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
308. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-5 (1934).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
310. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
311. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(i)(1982).
312. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 1474-8 1; 6 L. Loss, supra note 220, at 3670-80.
313. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)(1982).
314. See Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97, 125-26 (1975).
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useof any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails or of any facility of a national securities exchange
• . . (c) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities ex-
change any device or contrivance which, or any device or con-
trivance in a way or manner which the Commission may by
its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest
or to the proper protection of investors.3" 5
After hearings in the House on H.R. 7852, a second version of the
bill was introduced by Fletcher and Rayburn which read:
Regulation of the Use of Manipulative Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change . . . (c) To use or employ in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national secur-
ities exchange or any security not so registered any manipula-
tive device or contrivance which the Commissionmay by its
rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or
to the proper protection of investors.316
In both of the above versions, Section 9(a)317 dealt with short sales
and Section 9(b)318 dealt with stop loss orders.
A third version, introduced in the House by Representative Ray-
burn, was a Section 9 dealing only with short sales and stop loss orders.
This version completely deleted Section 9(c), which dealt specifically
with "other devices and contrivances. ' 319 Section 9 was passed by the
House in this third form. No reason was given in the House hearings
or the Congressional Record for leaving out the "devices and contriv-
ances" language.
While these events were happening in the House, the Senate cre-
ated its own version and passed it as Section 10(b):
320
Regulation of the Use of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices
Sec. 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
315. S.R. 2693 and H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 78 COMG. REC. 2267 (1934).
316. S. 3420 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Section 9(c) (1934).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and 78 Cong. Rec. 8027 (1934).
320. S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Section 10(b) (1934).
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securities exchange-. . . (b) To use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance which
the Commission may be its rules and regulations declare to be
detrimental to the interests of investors.321
After the House and Senate had conferred, the final version of Ex-
change Act Section 10(b) was enacted into law. It read:
Regulation of the Use of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange. . .(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection in investors.322
Again, the other part of Section 10 is 10(a), which deals with short sales
and stop loss orders.323
How does the final version differ from the first one? The specific
differences are quite obvious. First, the two key terms, "manipulative"
and "deceptive," were added. Second, the word "deceptive" was added
to the heading. Lastly, the limitation to listed securities, meaning those
listed on national securities exchanges, was omitted. Important phrases
like "any person," "directly or indirectly," "in connection with," and
"purchase or sale" remained from the earlier versions, and the author-
ity to make rules remained with a federal agency, first with the FTC,
then the SEC.324
The final wording, which relied upon the Senate version exten-
sively, was agreed to in the Conference Committee.325 But nothing ap-
pears in any of the records to show who wrote it.
The word "device" probably came from the Securities Act, Section
321. Id
322. Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1982).
324. The FTC was the original agency created to administer the Securities Act. With the
passage of the Exchange Act, the SEC was created to administer both acts.
325. H.R. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 (1934); 78 CONo. REc. 10,261 (1934).
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17(a)32 6, and the word "deceptive" from the Securities Act, Section
17(a) . 27 "Manipulative" was in the heading of all three versions of
10(b), but was not in the body of Section 10(b) until the Senate passed
its modification. Section 10(b) has not been modified in any way since
its passage.
There were many arguments in the Senate about regulation of the
stock exchange, margin rules, shortswing insider trading, registration,
reporting requirements, and so on. The many pages of House hearings
contain little reference to Section 10(b) which appeared to have been
generally noncontroversial. Even in floor debates in Congress, material
about Section 10(b) is almost nonexistent. When Senator Fletcher
commented on Section 9(c), as Section 10(b) was then called, he said:
"The Commission is also given power to forbid any other devices in
connection with security transactions which it finds detrimental to the
public interest or to the proper protection of investors." '328 Once again,
none of the above points to a scienter standard, and when added to the
thinking in Chapter V the argument for scienter is even weaker.
A statement often quoted is that made by one of the brightest men
of the New Deal, Thomas G. Corcoran, who apparently helped draft
the Section 9(c). He said of Section 9(c): "Subsection (c) says, Thou
shalt not devise any other cunning devices. Of course subsection (c) is a
catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. . . . I do not think
there is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should
have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices." '329 Many
courts in attempting to define 10(b) have cited this statement by Corco-
ran.330 Of course, when Corcoran spoke, Section 9(c) was not as broad
as it was after its final form as Section 10(b), which included transac-
tions in unlisted securities and deceptive devices, in addition to manip-
ulative devices. The statement by Corcoran seems to make it quite
clear that Section 10(b) was intended to be a general, expansive, and
broad section.
326. See 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1982).
327. Id.
328. 78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934).
329. Hearings on HR. 7852 and H.. 8720 before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
330. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 766 (1975) (Blackman, J.
dissenting); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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F. Rule lob-5 Promulgated to Expand Section 10(b)
Obviously, the various practices that any law is intended to hold
unlawful can be particularized. On the other hand, as is generally the
case in matters when an agency like the SEC is created, it is desirable to
allow the agency to use its rule-making powers to develop its own ap-
proach in accordance with the guidelines established by legislative
enactment.3 3'
In accordance with this line of reasoning, the SEC, in 1942,
adopted Rule lob-5 pursuant to the authority granted in Section
23(a)332 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It provided as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.333
As stated above, Sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act pro-
tected buyers of securities against particular misstatements and omis-
sions. Section 15(C) 334 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
prohibited fraudulent practices in the sale of securities and the
purchase of securities, but it pertained only to brokers and dealers.
Section 9 of the Act prohibited certain practices in order to protect buy-
ers and sellers, but it pertained only to listed securities. The conclusion
is that before the adoption of Rule lOb-5, there was no general federal
protection for a person who was induced by fraud to sell securities.
Thus, Rule lOb-5 filled a need.
331. See Sommer, Rule 10b-5: Notesfor Legislation, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1029, 1035
(1966); PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 19 (1968).
332. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(1982).
333. Originally Rule X-10B-5, SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). The rule was
originally numbered X-10B-5 when all Exchange Act rules were prefixed by an X. This designa-
tion remained until 1956-1957 when there was a general renumbering and it turned into lOb-5.
The old label sometimes continues to be used informally.
334. Cf. Securities Exch. Act of 1934 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982).
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not specifically give any private
right of action to any person who has been injured by a violation, and
apparently the rule was not intended to do so. Milton V. Freeman, an
SEC attorney, stated that the rule "was intended to give the Commis-
sion power to deal with this problem [fraudulent purchases]. It had no
relation in the Commission's contemplation to private proceedings" 335
It was not until 1947 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. that this rem-
edy was generally implied by the courts. 336
As indicated, Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 do not specifically give
any private right of action to any person who has been injured by a
violation; they only make it unlawful. Because other sanctions of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act which created civil liability clearly
state the liability and its limitations,337 arguments were made that Sec-
tion 10(b) was not written with any intent of creating a civil liability.338
But cases after Kardon argued that a private right of action was avail-
able for a violation of Rule lOb-5.339
It was not until 1971 in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life
Casualty Co. 340 that the United States Supreme Court considered a
case involving such a private right of action. The court, however, did
not decide within the body of the opinion that such a right existed,
merely recognizing it in a footnote.341 Eventually the Supreme Court
expressly sustained a private cause of action under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.342
It is easy to conclude that when the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5,
it wanted a broad interpretation in order to perform its duties as a pro-
tective agency. Additional support of this conclusion has been the
Supreme Court's expansion of Rule lOb-5 to include a private right of
action.
335. See, Conference on Codfication of Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967); 3
L. Loss, supra note 220, at 1784-96.
336. 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
337. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 13, & 15 (codified as amended §§ 77k-m, 77o);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9, 16, & 18 (codified as amended §§ 78i, 78p & 78r).
338. See, e.g., Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10-b5: Judicial Revision of the Legislative In-
tent, 57 N.w. U.L. REV. 627 (1963). But see Joseph, Civil Liability under Rule l0b-5: A Reply, 59
Nw. U.L. REV. 171 (1964).
339. See Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
340. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
341. Id. at 13 n.9. In 1966, the Supreme Court had hinted that it would approve a private
right, in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373-74 (1966).
342. 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
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VII. CASE LAW BEFORE HOCHFELDER: PRIMARILY A NEGLIGENCE
STANDARD
The first major case decided by the SEC in 1943 using the newly
promulgated Rule lOb-5 was WardLa France Truck Corp. 343 The facts
are presented briefly to exemplify a usual fact situation where fraud is
present and Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are the appropriate legal
remedies. Two parties, La France, president, and Grossman, treasurer,
of Ward La France Truck Corporation owned eighty percent of the
stock of the company. A significant improvement in the operating con-
dition of the company occurred in 1942 due to orders from the United
States Government, but shareholders were not advised of this improve-
ment. The company, through a third party, bought the corporation's
shares on the open market at $3.25 and $5.75 per share. The share-
holders were not advised that the third party was buying the shares for
Ward La France Truck Corporation and that La France and Grossman
had negotiated to sell the company stock to Salta Company (Salta) for
$45.00/100 per share and thereafter liquidate the company.3" Nor
were they informed of the amount to be paid on liquidation
($25.00/100) and the generally improved financial condition of the
company.345 Salta thereafter bought stock for $6.00 per share and
failed to disclose the above information.3 46 The SEC noted that many
similar fact situations were occurring and consequently brought an ac-
tion for a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violation.
The SEC did not make a detailed analysis of Section l0b or Rule
lOb-5. Instead, it made a broad statement in the early part of the case:
"The nondisclosure of the amount likely to be and actually paid to La
France and Grossman acted as a deceit upon the shareholders by leav-
ing them completely in the dark as to the real value of their interest in
the corporation. ' ' 347 Then, the SEC quoted verbatim Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 and stated without any further analysis:
It is our opinion that the purchase of the securities under the
circumstances set forth herein unaccompanied by appropriate
disclosure of material fact, constituted a violation of Rule X-
10B-5. We believe adherence to the standards set forth in the
rule would have prevented the transactions disclosed in the
343. 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
344. Id at 374-75.
345. Id at 377.
346. Id at 376-77.
347. Id at 380.
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instant investigation.348
In short, the SEC was saying that since there was no disclosure,
there was liability under Rule lOb-5. To reinforce this reasoning, the
SEC, in a footnote, noted that, "The standards adopted by the Com-
mission . . . make applicable to securities the same broad antifraud
provisions which Congress impassed in Section 17(a) of The Securities
Act of 1933, in connection with the sale of securities. 349
The SEC thus used the term "deceit" broadly and held the defend-
ants liable for their actions, which were detrimental to the shareholders
and contrary to the fraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Neither intent nor scienter was ever mentioned as part of the decision.
In a case decided shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,3 50 followed the
holding in La France. The case involved several allegations by both
preferred and common stockholders. The part of the case that is im-
portant here was the court's discussion of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
The court held that proof of fraud is a requirement in suits under Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. If, the court continued, conduct is action-
able under Section 11 of the Securities Act and, "there is the added
ingredient of fraud, then that conduct becomes actionable under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the Rule [Rule l0b-5]. 35 1 In a footnote,
the court agreed with the SEC's holding in La France that Rule lOb-5
was very much the same as Section 17 of the Securities Act, except that
it related to fraudulent purchases as well as fraudulent sales." 2 There
being no further analysis, this case agreed with La France in establish-
ing a broad generalization of fraud applicable to Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 53 was specific in its
statements on the broad approach to fraud in lOb-5. After determining
that there was a fraudulent scheme, the question was whether the issu-
ing corporation was a seller under Rule 10b-5. In discussing this the
court said, "It [Rule lOb-5] greatly expands the protection frequently so
hemmed in by the traditional concepts of common law misrepresenta-
tion and deceit. . . ,. 4 In a footnote, the court made reference to
348. Id at 381.
349. Id at 381 n.8.
350. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
351. Id at 787.
352. Id at 787 n.2.
353. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
354. Id at 201.
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what it claimed was an excellent commentary on Rule X-1OB-5.355 The
article cited by the court concluded:"Moreover, in sustaining these ac-
tions, they [the courts] have announced that Rule X-10B-5 imposes
standards of disclosure higher than those of the common law."3 6 Fi-
nally, in the court's continued discussion of Rule lOb-5, it noted:
"Quite obviously the broad purpose of this legislation was to keep the
channels of interstate commerce, the mail, and national security ex-
changes pure from fraudulent schemes, tricks, devices and all forms of
manipulation.357 This very broad statement about Rule lOb-5 obvi-
ously implied that it was intended to cover all forms of manipulation.
Thus, it seems inescapable that the court meant the intent of Rule lOb-
5 to cover fraud in a broad sense and not narrowly in a scienter sense.
The court further demonstrated the breadth of the intent of the Rule by
citing Kopald-Quinn & Co. v. United States358 and quoting verbatim:
"We think the construction thus urged for the Act [Securities Act] un-
duly narrows the language used in it, unduly limits its scope and ef-
fect." '359 What more can be said? The court, in effect, has concluded
that Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 in particular be interpreted in the
broadest manner in order to protect both the "public interest" and "in-
vestors." Further, it rejected the limitation of lOb-5 to common law
fraud, but suggested that a higher standard had been accepted by previ-
ous court decisions. The court concurred with these decisions and with
the "excellent comment" cited from the Yale Law Journal.
In a 1961 decision, Ellis v. Carter,360 the appellees argued that the
appellant must allege and prove genuine fraud and not a mere mis-
statement or omission for a valid action under subparagraph (2) of
Rule lOb-5. The court rebutted the appellee's argument:
This is in effect a challenge to the validity of subparagraph (2)
of the rule. It is predicated on the idea that a proscription of
material misstatements and half-truths without using fraud or
scienter language is not a permissible implementation of sec-
tion 10(b).
We disagree. Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of
"any manipulative device or contrivance" in contravention of
355. Id at 201 n.4 (citing to Comment, The ProspectsforRule X-1OB-5" An Emergency Remedy
for Defrauded Investors," 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950)).
356. Comment, supra note 355, at 1122.
357. Hooper, 282 F.2d at 202.
358. 101 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1939).
359. Id at 632.
360. 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
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rules and regulations as might be prescribed by the Commis-
sion. It would have been difficult to frame the authority to
prescribe regulations in broader terms. Had Congress in-
tended to limit this authority to regulations proscribing com-
mon-law fraud, it would probably have said so. We see no
reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word "any,"
indicating that the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances of whatever kind may be forbidden, to construe
the statute as if it read "any fraudulent" devices.36 '
Thus, the court's holding that terms broader than "any manipula-
tive device or contrivance" could not be used, clearly affirmed the posi-
tion that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were to be interpreted broadly
and proof of scienter was not a necessary element.
Shortly after Ellis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit de-
cided RoyalAir Properties, Inc. v. Smith.362 In that case, the court, said
"In an action brought under Section 10(b), common law fraud need not
be alleged or ultimately proved. '363 Moreover, the court went on to
say that all that is necessary is "[piroof of a material misstatement or an
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security to make out a prima facie case."3
This statement by the court specifically allowed for a negligence
standard and denied a scienter standard; "misstatement or omission of
a material fact" were clearly considered terms referring to negligent
acts.
The case of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 365 is one of
the most significant cases pertaining to the Securities Acts because of its
careful analysis of the intent of the Acts, the meaning of disclosure, and
the difference between common law fraud and equitable fraud. The
court, through Justice Goldberg, also made a classic analysis of New
Deal legislation.
The facts of the case were relatively simple. The defendants pub-
lished two investment advisory services, one of which was the subject
of the proceeding. The report was mailed to subscribers who paid an
annual subscription price. Between March 15, 1960, and November 7,
1960, the defendants purchased shares of a particular security shortly
361. Id at 274.
362. 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
363. Id at 213.
364. Id
365. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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before the advisory report recommended it for long-term investment.366
Each time this occurred, there was an increase in the market price and
in the volume of trading of the recommended security shortly after the
distribution of the report. Then, shortly thereafter, the defendants sold
their shares of these securities at a profit; however, no information
about these transactions was disclosed to their clients.
Based on these facts, the SEC requested a preliminary injunction
in order to effectuate the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.367 The in-
junction would have required the defendants to make full disclosure of
the purchase of the recommended securities "within a very short period
prior to the distribution of a recommendation ... 368 and of "[t]he
intent to sell and the sale of said securities . . . within a very short
period after distribution of said recommendations. '369
This case is extremely pertinent because, although it dealt with the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,370 this Act is very similar to Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and, the fact situation was analogous to the fact
situations that are usually dealt with in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
cases. Moreover, the court itself recognized the case's importance and
analyzed the Securities Acts.
The district court had denied a request for a preliminary injunc-
tion.37' It held that "the words 'fraud' and 'deceit' are used [in the
Investment Advisers Act] in their technical sense," 372 and that the
Commission needed to show the defendants' intent to injure clients or
the actual loss of money to clients. The court concluded: "To give
these subdivisions further effect would require a breadth of interpreta-
tion impermissible in a statute for wilful violations of which criminal
sanctions are provided. 373
366. Id at 183.
367. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80 b-I to -21 (1982).
368. 375 U.S. at 183. It should be noted that in Capital Gains, suit was brought pursuant to
§ 209(e) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1982), a provision similar to
§ 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, empower-
ing the SEC to seek an injunction for violations of the Act.
369. 375 U.S. at 183.
370. The SEC charged that the defendants had violated § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982), which contains language similar to Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any investment advisor, by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(I) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client,
(2) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative.
371. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
372. Id at 898.
373. Id at 899.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, af-
firmed the district court's decision by a 5 to 4 vote with a strong dis-
sent.374 The majority opinion agreed with the reasoning of the District
Court. The more elaborate dissenting opinion discussed the origina-
tion of the New Deal laws, their intent to alleviate problems in the
markets, and the intent that the laws be construed broadly.
The dissent stated that the securities laws were passed to change
the common law, which was premised on the maxim caveat emptor to
the new philosophy of "let the seller also beware. 3 75 According to the
dissent, the new securities statutes were not intended to follow the old
common law rule of deceit but were intended to be broadly interpreted
to deal with new financial community practices.376 Finally, the dissent
concluded:
Perhaps the worst feature is that it sanctions and indeed in-
dorses a low standard of business morality. . . .The form of
scalping here engaged in is a shocking business. . . .This
regulatory statute was explicitly aimed to protect the loyal in-
vestment adviser against the tipsters and touts and the less
desirable members of the profession generally. In all
probability, it will be those devoted fiduciaries who will be
hardest hit by this decision which levels all to one low
standard.377
The final decision was in the hands of the Supreme Court. The
major issue was whether Congress had intended fraud and deceit to be
interpreted in their narrow and technical sense or in a broad remedial
construction which would include nondisclosure of material facts. The
Court's opinion, written by Justice Goldberg, began with the premise
that all federal securities legislation had a fundamental purpose: to
substitute the philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor and thus, "to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry. 378  Justice Goldberg, then showed through the
Congressional committee reports and hearings, that the intent of Con-
gress was clearly a broad interpretation. Therefore, the solution was
not a derogation of common law fraud, but rather a "process by which
the courts have adapted the common law of fraud to commercial trans-
374. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
375. Id at 614.
376. Id
377. Id at 619-20. Scalping was the Wall Street name for the kind of practice that the SEC
was trying to enjoin in this case.
378. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
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actions of our society. 379
Intent and injury have always been essential for damages in suits
between parties in arm's length transactions, but this was an action for
an injunction to require a fiduciary to disclose his dealings to his cli-
ents. Common law fraud has changed and no longer requires all of its
elements be shown when all that is sought is equitable relief. The
Court quoted from Hanbury on Modern Equity: "[Eiquity regarded
[fraud]. . .as a conveniently comprehensive word for the expression
of a lapse from the high standard of conscientiousness that it exacted
from any party occupying a certain contractual or fiduciary relation
toward another party."38 From Story's Equity Jurisprudence, the
Court quoted: "Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity, prop-
erly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed,
and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscien-
tious advantage is taken of another."'3' After presenting these quotes,
Justice Goldberg concluded that Congress had to be aware of these
developments in the common law of fraud and therefore expected the
courts to take cognizance of them as they applied to the securities laws.
At the conclusion of the decision, it became obvious to Justice
Goldberg that the important issue was the element of intent in a fraud
action. Again emphasizing his point pertaining to the intent of the Se-
curities Acts, he stated: "Failure to disclose material facts must be
deemed fraud or deceit within its intended meaning, for, as the experi-
ence of the 1920's and 1930's amply reveals, the darkness and igno-
rance of commercial secrecy are the conditions upon which predatory
practices best thrive. '382 To force the SEC to show intent would "effec-
tively nullify the protective purposes of the statute. 38 3 Finally, Justice
Goldberg concluded by saying that the entire purpose of the statute is
misconceived if the argument becomes one of honest motive versus dis-
honest motive. The point of disclosure is to expose everything to the
light of day, an analogy from Dean Shulman's article, in which he said
that what is required is "a picture, not simply of the show window, but
of the entire store. . . not simply truth in the statements volunteered,
379. Id at 192.
380. Id at 193 (quoting HANBURY, MODERN EQuITy 643 (8th ed. 1962).
381. Id at 194 (quoting 1 STORY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 187).
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but disclosure." 384
Clearly, the opinion in this case is a very powerful statement about
the Securities Acts and their interpretation. Moreover, it focuses in on
the main issue of fraud, analyzes it, and concludes forcefully that intent
is indeed necessary to prove common law fraud, but when there is a
fiduciary relation with another, the equitable doctrine of disclosure
does not require a showing of intent.
Justice Harlan was the only dissenter in Capital Gains. His in-
terpretation of the majority opinion was enlightening when he said that
the court had "established [an] absolute rule of disclosure .... "386
Later in 1963, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in
Kohler v. Kohler Co. ,387 determined that scienter was not a necessary
element of fraud:
[T]he statute was meant to cover more than deliberately and
dishonestly misrepresenting or omitting material facts which
ordinarily are badges of fraud and deceit ....
[K]nowledge of the falsity or misleading character of a state-
ment and a bad faith intent to mislead or misrepresent are not
required to prove a violation of the statute upon which a civil
remedy for damages will lie.388
In Stevens v. Vowell,389 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
also followed the reasoning of Capital Gains: "It is not necessary to
allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under the statute
or rule. It is only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such
as the material misstatement of fact or the omission to state a material
fact."390
In 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ," another major decision addressing the
area of law discussed in Capital Gains. On November 12, 1963, an ex-
ploration group of Texas Gulf Sulpher Co. (TGS) completed drilling
the first hole in an area believed to contain important mineral deposits.
On the same day, visual evaluation of the drill core sample confirmed
384. Id at 201 (quoting to Shulman, Civil Liabilities and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227,
242 (1933).
385. 375 U.S. at 180 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
386. Id at 206.
387. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
388. Id at 637.
389. 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
390. Id at 379.
391. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane).
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their expectations.392 Before the information was disclosed to the pub-
lic, particular insiders of TGS purchased its common stock. Moreover,
during the same period of time, particular insiders either revealed in-
formation or recommended purchase of TGS stock to their friends and
relatives, who also purchased TGS stock and calls. On April 12, 1964,
TGS issued a press release announcing that a strike of at least twenty-
five million tons of ore had been made. However, on April 8, four days
before this announcement was made, TGS commented upon rumors
concerning the mineral discovery in another press release that the SEC
maintained was misleading and deceptive. 93
Shortly thereafter, the SEC initiated a civil action under Rule lOb-
5 against the TGS insiders who had purchased TGS stock without dis-
closing the results of the initial discoveries. The SEC also brought an
action against TGS for the misleading press release on April 12 and
requested injunctive relief and a decree of rescission of the insiders'
purchases of stock.
The lower court dismissed the complaint against TGS and all but
two of the individual defendants who had purchased TGS stock be-
tween April 9 and the press conference on April 16.394 These two de-
fendants appealed from the part of the decision holding that they had
violated Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and the SEC appealed from the
remainder of the decision. Pursuant to stipulation by the parties, the
question of appropriate remedies was deferred and only the question of
liability was at issue on appeal.395 The court of appeals held that the
other individual defendants who knew of the drilling results, as well as
the corporation, had violated Rule 1Ob-5, and remanded the case to the
district court for determination of the appropriate relief. 396
In the district court decision, the defendants asserted that the SEC
must establish the elements of common law fraud, but the appeals
court concluded that this was not the law and said that "recent deci-
sions, even in private suits, do not require proof of these elements in
actions charging violation of Rule lOb-5. 397 Then, the court examined
392. Id. at 843.
393. Id. at 845-46.
394. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
395. 401 F.2d 842.
396. Id at 864.
397. 258 F. Supp. at 277. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1962);
supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text; Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); supra
notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
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SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau39 8 and quoted at length from
that case. What is important to notice is that the court emphasized two
parts of the case. The first was when the Supreme Court said: "It
would defeat the manifest purpose of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 for us to hold, therefore, that Congress, in empowering the courts
to enjoin any practice which operates 'as fraud or deceit,' intended to
require proof of intent to injure and actual injury to clients. ' 399 The
second was when the court noted: "Congress intended the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation "en-
acted for the purpose of avoiding frauds" not technically and restric-
tively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.'54 ° ° The district
court then carefully developed the law: "To establish violations of Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the Commission must prove that the defend-
ants engaged in a 'course of business' which operated as a 'fraud or
deceit. . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' ,4o'
Finally, the court discussed fraud in terms of insiders and their
actions. Intent was not the issue, duty was. The court, quoting
Cochman v. Channing Corp.,402 said:
The Securities Exchange Act was enacted in part to afford
protection to the ordinary purchaser or eller of securities.
Fraud may be accomplished by false statements, a failure to
correct a misleading impression left by statements already
made, or, as in the instant case, by not stating anything at all
when there is a duty to come forward and speak.4 °3
Thus, the district court clearly established that scienter or intent
was not necessary in a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 case. Common
law fraud was not the criterion, but rather it was a duty that arose be-
tween the parties. Actions and relationships between the parties, not
intent, was the underlying element. In essence, the court was referring
to liability for negligence.
The analysis of the Court of Appeals4' dealt in part with the con-
cepts of scienter and fraud. First, the court asked if good faith was a
valid defense under Rule lOb-5 and answered it in the negative. The
398. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
399. 258 F. Supp. at 277 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at
192).
400. Id 258 F. Supp. at 277 (quoting 375 U.S. at 195) (emphasis added).
401. 258 F. Supp. at 278.
402. 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
403. 258 F. Supp. at 279 (quoting Cochman v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. at 243).
404. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc).
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analysis of the law was superb. The law was broad in order to protect
the investing public, the court noted, and thus "[i]n an enforcement
proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common law stan-
dard of deceptive conduct [was] modified in the interests of broader
protection for the investing public so that negligent insider conduct [be-
came] unlawful.4 °5 Then Judge Waterman, author of the court's opin-
ion, continued his analysis in a footnote by applying the reasoning of
an excellent law review article.40 6 He concluded the analysis with a
strong statement for a negligence standard for Rule 1Ob-5 by stating:
"This requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive
fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this
standard, a standard that promotes the deterrence objective of the
Rule. 407
The opinion also discussed the historical background of Section
10(b) and repeated much of the material already discussed above on
the legislative history of Section 10(b).40 The court's important state-
ment was a quote of Judge Learned Hand about the interpretation of
statutes found in Crawley v. United States:409
[U]nless they explicitly forbid it, the purpose of the statutory
provision is the best test of the meaning of the words chosen.
We are to put ourselves so far as we can in the position of the
legislature that uttered them, and decide whether or not it
would declare that the situation that has arisen is within what
it wishes to cover. Indeed, at times the purpose may be so
manifest as to override even the explicit words used.4 10
The court then discussed the concept of fraud directly, saying that if
intent or wrongful purpose was required, the defendants would not es-
cape liability if they seek an "advantage," unless "the advantage fails to
materialize to the degree contemplated, or cannot be demonstrated. 41 1
405. Id at 855.
406. Id at 855 n.21. That note provided:
Even at common law, the essentially private remedy of rescission which is sought here
does not require more than a showing of negligence and frequently even less than that,
see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 476, Comm. b (1932); and the common law con-
cept of constructive fraud still available to private plaintiffs, see Trussell Y. United Under.
writers, Lid, 288 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964), has been expanded from
recklessness, see Prosser, Torts, Section 102, pp. 715-17 (3rd ed. 1964), to include
nonreckless negligent misrepresentations or omissions, see Note, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1070,
1079.
407. Id at 855 (referring to the analysis in Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070, 1079 (1965)).
408. Id at 860.
409. 272 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1959).
410. 401 F.2d at 861 (quoting Crawley v. United States, 272 F.2d at 445).
411. 401 F.2d at 861.
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Moreover, and more important to the court, was that the investing pub-
lic would still be hurt, irrespective of the intent. The point was that
management had initiated the statements and others were hurt; there-
fore, someone should be liable. The court asserted that:
[The] investing public is hurt by the exposure to false or de-
ceptive statements irrespective of the purpose underlying their
issuance. It does not appear to be unfair to impose upon cor-
porate management a duty to ascertain the truth of any state-
ments the corporation releases to its shareholders or to the
investing public . 412
On the other hand, as in all negligence actions, if corporate manage-
ment could demonstrate diligence in ascertaining that the information
it published was true and disseminated in good faith, then Rule lOb-5
would be upheld.413 The court concluded that it was much better to
describe specifically what had happened, than to speculate on the basis
of unknown facts.
Surely the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur has made a provocative
statement about Section 10b and Rule lOb-5. After a detailed analysis
of case law and the legislative reasoning behind enactment of the law,
the court concluded that scienter is not necessary for Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5. Rather, a negligence standard was appropriate, because
those who initiated the action should be liable if they bought stock
before the information was publicly disseminated and could have, but
failed, to determine the truth of the statements made.
The holding strongly supports a negligence standard. The dissent,
written by Judge Moore, agreed with the lower court that the two who
bought stock before the information was publicly available should be
liable.41 4 It was with the press release that they disagreed. The dissent-
ers felt that the higher court should not reinterpret the facts presented
to the lower court.4"' Finally, they believed a negligence standard was
too broad.416
It is Judge Friendly's concurring opinion that has drawn much
comment.41 7 Although he agreed with the first part of the opinion, he
hesitated on the importance of the press release: "The consequences of
holding that negligence in the drafting of a press release. . . may im-
412. Id.
413. Id at 862.
414. Id at 870.
415. Id. at 878.
416. Id. at 871.
417. Id at 881.
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pose civil liability on the corporation are frightening."41 After discuss-
ing negligence, he agreed to concur provided it was understood that he
felt that the lower court's opinion could have been affirmed on this
issue. When the district court denied the injunction, the court acted on
the basis that no violation had occurred. However, a violation had oc-
curred in the press release and, thus, the case would be remanded to the
district court for a determination in accordance with the court of ap-
peals' opinion. Consequently, it was a concurring opinion made with
some reluctance, but a concurring opinion nonetheless. This reluctance
of Judge Friendly on the issue of negligence was perhaps prophetic of
things to come. Regardless, the conclusion is that the opinion by Cir-
cuit Judge Waterman in Texas GWufSulphur is an accurate negligence
interpretation of fraud.
The last major case is While v. Abrams41 9 from the Ninth Circuit.
This opinion was the culmination and synthesis of the opinions above.
The facts were simple yet, because of their nature, important. As main-
tained throughout this Article, the circumstances of 1Ob-5 cases often
relate to two parties who are in a position of trust. In addition, the
concept of intent is difficult to determine. Furthermore, one party
clearly acts on the basis of information given or not given by the other
party resulting in detrimental reliance. The facts in White are similar
to this pattern. Abrams was a long and trusted friend and advisor of
White, who had made a number of successful investments through
Abrams. Abrams solicited loans from private lenders for the Rich-
mond Corporations. White, on the basis of Abrams' recommendation,
bought a number of promissory notes and stock from the Richmond
Corporations, which later went bankrupt.420 White and others sued
under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, charging that Abrams had misrep-
resented certain facts. The counts alleged that Abrams represented that
he had investigated Richmond and found it financially sound, having
had large earnings and an ability to pay high interest on the loans.
Further, it was alleged that Abrams failed to disclose that he had re-
ceived a large commission and sold similar securities and loans to
others at higher rates of interest.42'
The lower court rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and substan-
418. Id at 864.
419. Id at 866.
420. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
421. Id. at 726-27.
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tial damages were awarded for violating Rule lOb-5.42 2 On appeal, the
defendant contended that the jury instructions dealing with the ques-
tion of material misrepresentations were erroneous and improper. The
following instruction was given to the jury:
If you find that the defendant made a material misrepresenta-
tion to plaintiffs in connection with the sale to plaintiffs of a
promissory note or share of stock, the law is that the defend-
ant has violated the Federal Securities law even ifyoufind that
the defendant didnot know the falsity of the misrepresentation
he made to the plaintiff.42
3
Judge Wallace, author of the opinion, emphasized that this state-
ment was not in conformity with security law since it assumed an abso-
lute standard of liability rather than a negligence or scienter
standard.424 In reversing and remanding, the court noted that the pur-
pose of security law is to qualify the rule of caveat emptor and not to
create a scheme of investor's insurance.
Thus, the major question posed was what criteria should be used
for liability under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. The court's answer
was that it should not be based on "easily defined and well-known the-
ories such as common law fraud, '42 5 but rather on "the totality of the
factual context" as measured by the duty imposed on the defendant.426
The proper analysis, then, was to focus on the duty of the defendant
and apply a flexible standard to take into account different situations.
The court adamantly rejected the scienter standard when it said:
"We believe that the cases and commentators demonstrate that any at-
tempt to limit the scope of duty in all lOb-5 cases by the use of one
standardfor state of mind or scienter is confusing and unworkable. Con-
sequently, we reject scienter or any other discussion of state of mind as a
necessary and separate element of a lOb-5 action."427
The court then tried to redefine the flexible duty standard by quot-
ing from Mann's law review article:
Instead of perpetrating the practice of discussing scienter and
negligence as absolutes, which are capable of being objec-
tively applied, more is gained by recognizing that there is a
sliding scale which determines what constitutes sufficient dili-
422. Id.
423. Id. at 728.
424. Id. (emphasis added).
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gent conduct to avoid lOb-5 liability, and that lOb-5 liability
is determinable only within the context of the vagaries of the
specific facts presented.428
Judge Wallace proposed that courts adopt a case-by-case analysis,
using the "sliding scale" or flexible duty standard. The court should
look at the goals of securities fraud legislation by considering several
important factors: (1) the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
(2) the defendant's access to the information as compared to the plain-
tiff's access; (3) the benefit the defendant derives from the relationship;
(4) the defendant's awareness of the plaintiffs reliance on their rela-
tionship; and, (5) the defendant's activity in initiating the transactions
in question.429 In this way the courts will develop the standards that
apply for each situation, remaining cognizant that areas will remain to
be handled due to unique and difficult aspects that may arise. Such is
the problem when dealing with the difficult areas of fraud and its many
facets. Unless it is approached in this way, there will not be a remedy
for plaintiffs who have been wronged since the common law remedy of
deceit is unable to deal with such modem situations.
In conclusion, White v. Abrams is the culmination of the thinking
on fraud and deceit pertaining to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. It saw
through the maze of decisions and their sometimes spurious reasoning
and zeroed in on the major problem-securitiesfraud is complex. It
cannot be handled simply by a scienter standard, because the old com-
mon law doctrines of fraud and deceit, which developed around trans-
actions involving land and particular intangibles of wealth, are no
longer suited to the sale of intangibles such as advice and securities
which have arisen in the modem world. Accordingly, legal doctrines
must be adapted in order to fit new merchandise and new forms of
wealth.430 The ultimate answer must not be a scienter standard4 31 but a
flexible standard of duty.4 32
428. Id. at 734.
429. Id. (emphasis added).
430. Id at 732 (quoting Mann, Rule Ob-5 Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the
Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1209 (1970)).
431. Id at 733-34.
432. Id at 734-36, 734 n.15. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
194 (1963). See also Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of Culpability Necessaryfor Violation
ofthe Federal Securities Law in Information Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 571
(1975); Note, Scienter and Rule 10-b5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969); Comment Negligent Mis-
representation Under Rule 10b-5, 32 CHIc. L. REv. 824 (1965).
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VIII. HOCHFELDER: A PARTIAL SCIENTER STANDARD
A. Majority Opinion
Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder433 was the first Supreme Court deci-
sion to challenge the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requirement of neg-
ligence. In that case, private investors who had been swindled in a
fraudulent scheme devised by Leston Nay, president of First Securities
Co. of Chicago, brought an action against the accounting firm of Ernst
and Ernst. For twenty-six years the plaintiffs had placed funds in es-
crow accounts which Nay had stated were capable of yielding a high
rate of return. The money intended for these accounts had gone in-
stead to Nay's own use. After Nay's suicide in 1968, the scheme was
discovered and an action was brought against the defendant.434 The
complaint alleged that Ernst and Ernst had negligently aided and abet-
ted Nay's violations of Rule 10b-5 in its failure to discover First Securi-
ties' "mail rule," which prohibited the opening of Nay's personal mail.
The plaintiffs maintained that the defendant's irregular practice of fail-
ing to list the "mail rule" in its annual audit of the company prevented
an investigation of Nay, which surely would have uncovered the fraud-
ulent escrow scheme perpetrated by Nay.
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.435 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case for trial.436 In delivering the opinion for the court, Chief Judge
Swygert said that the lower court's decision was to be reversed because
"it is our view there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute which
go to the very question of liability."437 Justice Swygert then proceeded
to the very heart of the question: whether Ernst and Ernst could be held
liable for aiding and abetting Nay's fraudulent scheme. The court had
already ruled on this in its recent decision in Hochfelder and Martin v.
Midwest Stock Exchange,4 38 in which the court held that a claim for
aiding and abetting based solely on inaction could be maintained
433. Up to this period in time, another line of lower federal court cases had taken a minority
position and adopted a less logical and reasonable position that since there was common law
fraud, scienter was necessary for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251
(4th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
434. Mann, supra note 430, at 1209; see also Comment, Scienter and Rule 10b-5: Development
of a New Standard, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 493 (1974).
435. 425 U.S. 185 reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
436. Id. at 189-190.
437. Id. at 191.
438. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
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under Rule lOb-5 if it were shown that, "the party charged with aiding
and abetting had knowledge of or, but for a breach of duty of inquiry,
should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that possessing such
knowledge the party failed to act due to an improper motive or breach
of a duty of disclosure. '439 The court then stated that the three ele-
ments quoted comprised a flexible duty standard which "should be am-
plified according to the peculiarities of each case.""'  Moreover, when
the defendant, through action or inaction, had facilitated fraud on
someone else, a claim for aiding and abetting could be made by
demonstrating:
(1) that the defendant had a duty of inquiry;
(2) the plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry;
(3) the defendant breached the duty of inquiry;
(4) that concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry, the
defendant breached a duty of disclosure; and
(5) there is a causal connection between the breach of duty
of inquiry and disclosure and the facilitation of the un-
derlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry and subsequent
disclosure would have led to the discovery of the under-
lying fraud or its prevention."
On the basis of the flexible duty standard, the court of appeals reversed
the district court holding that this was not an appropriate case for sum-
mary judgment. It is important to note that the court made a unani-
mous ruling and did not hesitate in presenting the law to the district
court as the flexible duty standard.
Following the decision by the court of appeals and other courts,
the Supreme Court made an unexpected decision in Ernst and Ernst v.
Hochfelder4 2 when it granted certiorari in order to resolve the question
of "whether a private cause of action for damages will lie under § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 4 3 The analysis of Justice Powell,
who authored the majority opinion, was in four parts.
1. Text of Section 10(b)
The analysis dwelled upon the vocabulary of Section 10(b). Jus-
tice Powell said that "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance,"
439. Id at 1104.
440. 503 F.2d 364, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
441. 503 F.2d at 1104; see also Hochfelder and Martin, 503 F.2d at 374.
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whether they are read in the "commonly accepted meaning" or as a
"term of art,"' 4 all suggested "intentional or willful misconduct." 445
Taken together, these words defined a "conduct quite different from
negligence."" 6
2. Legislative History of the Exchange Act
Justice Powell began with an admission that "the extensive history
of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' in-
tent,"447 but he stubbornly persisted that the evidence did not contra-
dict the above textual analysis of Section 10(b).448 He then discussed
the early draft of the Exchange Act, saying that Section 9(c), the prede-
cessor of Section 10(b), had undergone three changes before the final
version, finding that "neither the intended scope of § 10(b) nor the rea-
sons for the changes in its operative language are revealed explicitly in
the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which deals primarily with other
acts of the legislation."" 9 This statement was a revealing admission by
Justice Powell; however, he undauntingly continued: "There is no in-
dication, however, that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not
involving scienter."'45° Justice Powell then pointed out Thomas G.
Corcoran's statement that Section 10(b) "is a catch-all clause to prevent
manipulative devices. I do not think there is an objection to that kind
of clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices. 451 Justice Powell explained Corcoran's state-
ment by saying: "It is difficult to believe that any lawyer, legislative
draftsman, or legislator would use these words if the intent was to cre-
ate liability of or merely negligent acts or omissions.' 452 Justice Powell
was thus convinced that, although vague, the legislative history did not
indicate that Section 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not in-
volving scienter.
3. Statutory Scheme of Securities and Exchange Acts
Justice Powell explained that the SEC had argued that Congress
444. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).




449. Id at 201.
450. Id
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had been explicit when it required willful conduct, citing Section 9 of
the Exchange Act, but, since 10(b) was not expressly restricted by its
terms to willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be con-
strued to mean any more than negligent conduct.a 3
Justice Powell, however, felt that the structure of the Acts did not
support such a position and cited Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securi-
ties Act, which have express remedies not applicable under Section
10(b). ' 'a 4 Justice Powell concluded that these procedural limitations
indicate that:
The judicially created private damages remedy under
§ 10(b)-which has no comparable restrictions-cannot be
extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions
premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension would al-
low causes of action covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 to be
brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effec-
tiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on
these express actions.4a 5
Thus, Justice Powell concluded that because the Acts are comple-
mentary, and because there are explicit restrictions on the other sec-
tions in the Securities Act, a negligence action under 10(b) should not
be permitted because it will nullify the other acts. The nullification
would come about since all actions would be brought under Section
10(b) in order to avoid the restrictions of the other sections.
4. Rule lOb-5: Disallowance of Negligence Standard
The SEC contended that Rule lOb-5 was cast in such language
that standing alone it encompassed both intent and negligence. How-
ever, Powell and the Court felt that scienter was required for two rea-
sons. First, because of the history of the Rule when it was adopted,45 6
and second, because the Rule was adopted pursuant to the authority
granted to the SEC under Section 10(b). This rule-making power, Jus-
tice Powell maintained, was not power to make law and thus could not
override the power granted by Congress. 457 The conclusion reached
was that the history of Section 10(b) did not allow for negligence and,
therefore, Rule lOb-5 could not.
453. Id at 203.
454. Id at 207.
455. Id. at 207.
456. Id. at 209.
457. Id at 210.
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B. Dissenting Opinion
Justices Blackmun and Brennan dissented.458 Their dissent was
short but to the point. Justice Blackmun wrote that the ruling by the
majority was narrow and unjustified, stating: "Perhaps the Court is
right, but I doubt it."' 45 9 Going to the heart of the problem, he re-
marked, "[A]n investor can be victimized just as much by negligent
conduct as by positive deception, and . . . it is not logical to drive a
wedge between the two, saying that Congress clearly intended the one
but certainly not the other."46° He continued, saying that the language
of Rule lOb-5 was "clearly and succinctly, to extend beyond common-
law fraud, and to apply to negligent omission and commission. '46 1 This
was, Justice Blackmun believed, in accordance with Congress' intent,
that the Rule be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexi-
bly to effectuate its remedial purposes. 462
The dissent, in view of earlier discussions in this article, seems to
be correct. The majority opinion seems weak, at best. Interestingly,
since the Court in Hochfelder made a decision based on the private
action only and said nothing about an SEC injunctive suit, it is possible
to assume that the Court decided that scienter was necessary for a pri-
vate right of action, but not for a suit by the SEC for injunctive relief.
IX. ARTICLES AND CASES AFTER HOCHFELDER: A DENIAL OF
SCIENTER
Authors of law review articles written after the Hochfelder deci-
sion had a field day, primarily because the Hochfelder case decided
that scienter was necessary in a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 action
only in a private right of action, and because the Court's reasoning and
cases supporting the scienter argument were weak. Most of the articles
disagreed with Hochfelder and spent most of their analyses showing
that even if it were conceded that scienter was necessary for a private
action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, surely the court did not
mean that scienter was necessary for an SEC injunctive suit.4 63
458. The Court assumed that Milton Freeman's remarks showed that Rule lOb-5 was hastily
adopted and nothing in the events that led up to its drafting changed the impression that it was not
intended to require scienter. See supra note 335.
459. 425 U.S. at 213-14.
460. 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976) (Blackmun, J. & Brennan, J., dissenting).
461. Id at 216.
462. Id.
463. Id at 217.
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The reasoning was that injunctive action by the SEC is its most
effective remedy and the Hochfelder decision did not intend to dilute
SEC's effectiveness as an agency. A few articles went further and ar-
gued that even if scienter were necessary for both a private right and
the SEC injunctive action, it did not follow that gross negligence or
recklessness would be excluded. 64
It is interesting that neither the decisions nor the commentators
after Hochfelder followed the decision. SEC v. Bausch and Lomb,
InC. 465 was the first case to follow Hochfelder. Because Bausch and
Lomb was being adjudicated when the Hochfelder decision was
handed down, the district court felt compelled to follow what it thought
was decided in Hochfelder, even in regard to a suit for injunctive relief
by the SEC. The court said: "This court believes that the Hochfelder
holding must be read to impose a scienter requirement in this suit for
injunctive relief brought by the SEC. Although not obliged to reach
the question by the facts of that case, the Supreme Court used reason-
ing which appears to compel that result. 46 6 Armed with such thinking
that scienter was required for an injunctive action by the SEC, the dis-
trict court felt that the SEC failed to establish that the defendant had
acted with the requisite intent and, therefore, denied the injunction. A
few other cases467 followed Bausch and Lomb and agreed with the
holding in Hochfelder, but, for the most part, the Bausch and Lomb
reasoning was not followed.
In the first case which disagreed with the Hochfelder ruling, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in SEC v. World Radio Mission,
Inc. ,468 ordered a preliminary injunction to be issued against a reli-
464. Id (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
465. See Note, Scienter's Scope and.Application in Rule 10b-5 Actions: An Analysis in Light of
Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1977); Note, SEC Injunctive and Ancillary Relief under
Rule 10b-5. A Scienter Requirement? 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 872 (1977); Note, SEC InjunctiveActions."
A Negligence Standard under Rule 10b-5, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 763 (1977); Note, Scienter and
Injunctive Relief under Rule 10b-, 1I GA. L. REV. 879 (1977); Note, SEC Enforcement Actions to
Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Scienter Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. Ruv. 831
(1976-1977); Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) after
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (1977); Note, 20b-5-Scenter isRequiredIn a
Private Action under Rule lOb-5-Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder 96 S.C. 1375 (1976), 25 DEPAUL
U. L. RE. 962 (1975-1976).
466. See Note, Scienter's Scope andApplication in Rule 10b-5 Actions: An Analysis in Light of
Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925 (1977); Goldwasser, Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder. An
Anti-Landmark Decision, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 29 (1976-1977); Maher & Blasi, Lessons from
Ernst and Ernst-Enforcement Proceedings and the Uncommon Law of lOb-5, 82 DICK. L. REv. 1
(1977).
467. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
468. Id at 1240.
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gious organization and its leader in order to prevent violations of Sec-
tion 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In making a determination of the case, the
court stated that in an SEC enforcement case, if the conduct was "inju-
rious to the public, good faith, however much it may be a defense to a
private suit for past actions, . ..should make no difference. '469 The
court dismissed the contention that Hochfelder required a determina-
tion of scienter in an SEC injunction action under Section 17(a), be-
cause it said Section 17(a) is not affected by the ruling in Hochfelder.47 °
Although the court did not reach the issue of whether scienter must be
proved in an action based solely on Rule lOb-5, it strongly implied that
scienter need not be established when it said: "We do think it implausi-
ble to suppose that Congress intended to provide a mechanism for the
SEC to protect the public from the injurious schemes of those of evil
intent and yet leave the public prey to the safe conduct perpetrated by
the careless or reckless. '471 This language shows that the court felt
strongly about protecting the public from careless or reckless acts when
securities were involved.
In SEC v. Geotek,472 the District Court of the Northern District of
California specifically rejected the scienter requirement in Rule lOb-5
injunctive actions. The SEC sought an injunction based on Section
10(b) and Section 17(a), alleging that material misstatements and omis-
sions and been made in some basic documents. The court, after ana-
lyzing World Radio Mission, reasoned that the Hochfelder analysis did
not apply to the language of Section 17(a). Therefore, the court uti-
lized a negligence standard for 17(a) like the court had in WorldRadio
Mission. But the court went much further, saying: "We have decided to
apply the strict standard of negligence (i.e. ordinary care or due dili-
gence) as to all SEC claims against defendants."473 Although it is ques-
tionable whether intent influenced the court's decision in the case, the
court did establish a very strong negligence standard.
In SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp. 474 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit again made a distinction between a lOb-5
469. See SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977); SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp.
1250 (D.C. Cir. 1978); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
470. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
471. Id at 540 (citations omitted).
472. Id. See also id at 541 n.10 (discussing the implications of requiring scienter for § 10b on
§ 17a).
473. Id
474. 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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private action and an SEC injunctive suit. An injunction was issued
against an attorney for aiding and abetting violations of Section 5475 of
the Securities Act of 1933. The court rejected the appellant's main ar-
gument that Hochfelder required proof of scienter and reaffirmed the
court's position on negligence by saying: "[I]n SEC proceedings seek-
ing equitable relief, a cause of action may be predicated upon negli-
gence alone, and scienter is not required. 476 Moreover, the court
emphasized that "Hochfelder, which was a private suit for damages,
does not undermine our prior holdings. 477
X. AARON: A SCIENTER DECISION
A. Introduction
In Aaron v. SEC478 the Supreme Court chose to resolve the issue
left open in Hochfelder, holding that the SEC must also establish scien-
ter to obtain injunctive relief under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Jus-
tice Stewart's majority opinion relied wholly on the Hloclfelder
analysis. It is, in all candor, a very disappointing analysis.
Peter Aaron was a managerial employee of E. L. Aaron and Com-
pany, a registered broker-dealer. His responsibility was to oversee the
firm's personnel and maintain due diligence files for securities in which
the firm served as a market maker. One of the securities in which the
firm made a market was the common stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical
and Equipment Corp. (LAM). Two sales representatives, supervised
by Peter Aaron, repeatedly made false and misleading statements to
prospective purchasers in soliciting orders for LAM stock.4 79 An attor-
ney representing LAM communicated with the petitioner twice by
phone and notified him that the two sales representatives were making
false and misleading statements. Since Aaron maintained the due dili-
gence files, he had an additional reason to know that the statements
were untrue. Aaron assured the lawyer that the misrepresentations
would cease, but in fact he took no affirmative steps to prevent their
recurrence. Aaron's only response was to inform one of the sales repre-
sentatives of the attorney's complaint and direct the sales representative
to communicate with the attorney.480
475. Id at 726.
476. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
477. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982).
478. Id
479. Id (citations omitted).
480. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
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The SEC sought an injunction against Aaron and filed a complaint
in the district court. The Commission alleged that the petitioner had
violated and aided and abetted violations of three provisions-Section
17(a), Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.48 ' The district court granted in-
junctive relief.482 Although it was noted that negligence alone might
suffice to establish a violation, the district court concluded that the peti-
tioner's intentional failure to terminate the false and misleading state-
ments made by the two employees, knowing they were fraudulent, was
sufficient to establish scienter under the securities acts.48 3
B. Court of Appeals' Reasons for Negligence
The court of appeals affrmed the judgment48 4 but refused to follow the
district court's reasoning. Circuit Court Judge Timbers adamantly dis-
agreed with Hochfelder's scienter requirement, saying:
[WMe hold that the scienter requirement enunciated in
Hochfelder is not applicable to government enforcement ac-
tions brought under §§ 10(b) and 21(d) of the 1934 Act. Con-
sistent with the pre-Hochfelder decisions of this Court, we
continue to hold that allegations and proof of negligence
alone will suffice, for the reasons stated below.48 5
The circuit court then proceeded to discuss the reasoning in
Hochfelder and the suggestion by some that its reasoning should also
apply to SEC injunction actions. The court discussed the cases preced-
ing Hochfelder and concluded:
The Court's decision in Hochfelder in our view has not altered
the fact that different policy considerations should govern in
SEC enforcement actions, in contrast to private damage ac-
tions, under § 10(b). Indeed, the Court itself appears to have
recognized this when it expressly left open the question now
before us. 48
6
The court then examined the three factors that the Supreme Court
relied on in concluding that scienter was required in private damage
actions under 10(b). In discussing the first factor, the language of Sec-
tion 10(b), the court, contrary to the Supreme Court's decision, did not
believe that the language of the section alone was determinative of the
481. Id at 682.
482. Id at 683.
483. Id. at 683-84.
484. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,043 at 91,686-87.
485. Id.
486. 605 F.2d (2d Cir. 1979).
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issue given the diversity of judicial interpretations. 487
The court of appeals asserted that when statutory language is un-
clear, courts have ruled that legislative history is applicable.488 This
lead to a discussion of the second factor-legislative history of Section
10(b). The court noted that the Supreme Court had stated in
Hochfelder that the legislative history of 10(b) was "'bereft of any ex-
plicit explanation of Congress' intent.' ,489
Furthermore, in Hochfelder when the Court had examined re-
quirements for a private right of action under Section 10(b), it looked
to the common law of misrepresentation and deceit. But in defining
the requirements for an SEC injunction action based on Section 10(b),
the Court had looked to Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act.4 90 Legisla-
tive discussion of § 21(d) indicates that scienter was not intended to be
required in SEC injunction actions. 491
The third factor considered was the relation of Section 10(b) to
other statutory remedies. The court of appeals maintained that an ex-
amination of the statutory scheme showed that no comparable provi-
sions would be nullified by allowing SEC enforcement actions to be
predicated on a showing of negligence. In fact, a negligence standard
would "harmonize" the Exchange Act requirements with similar re-
quirements in the Securities Act.4 92
Finally, the court discussed the appellant's contention that
Hochfelder required a finding of scienter for SEC injunction actions
brought pursuant to Section 17(a). The court said that it followed from
its holding on Section 10(b) that "a fortiori scienter is not a requisite
element of a government enforcement action to enjoin violations of
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act."'493 Also, regarding Section 17(a), although a
few courts had ruled the other way, the court of appeals followed the
holding in SEC v. Coven ,49 which held unequivocally that scienter was
not required in an SEC injunction action under Section 17(a).495
It is refreshing to see the appellate court logically discuss the is-
sues. It would seem that the Supreme Court would answer the court's
487. Id at 619.
488. id at 621 (citing to Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194 n.12).
489. Aaron, 605 F.2d at 621.
490. Id (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201).
491. Aaron, 605 F.2d at 621-22.
492. Id. at 622 (footnote omitted).
493. Id. at 622-23 (footnote omitted).
494. Id at 623.
495. 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
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pointed arguments against an extension of the Hochfelder reasoning
from scienter for a private right under 10(b) to scienter for an SEC
injunction under 10(b). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not.
C. Supreme Court's Reaffirmation of Hochfelder
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court,
holding that the SEC must establish scienter in an injunction action.4 9 6
In reaching that result, Justice Stewart, adopted the reasoning in
Hochfelder without any reservations and without further analysis of
the reasoning. He was satisfied that the Hochfelder interpretation of
the statutory language and the legislative history of Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 positively governed whenever violation of those provisions
were alleged, "regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of
the relief sought. 497
In the Court's analysis, it accepted the conclusion that the diction-
ary definition or "plain meaning" of the words "manipulative," "de-
vice," and "contrivance" evidenced a Congressional intent to
"proscribe only 'knowing or intentional misconduct.' """ Again, as in
Hochfelder, the meaning of the word "deceptive" was not considered.
The Supreme Court instead concluded that the Hochfelder interpreta-
tion of the plain language of Section 10(b) was so clear that it governed
the standard of culpability issue and thus further inquiry was
unnecessary.499
Despite the arguments of the court of appeals, the Court, through
Justice Stewart adopted the Hochfelder interpretation of the history of
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. It even agreed with the Hochfelder rea-
soning that the legislative history, although bereft of any specific expla-
nation of Congress' intent, did not indicate that Congress was in favor
of conduct that did not involve scienter. Moreover, Justice Stewart ac-
cepted the quotation from the spokesman for the legislative drafters in
Hochfelder that said the section was" 'a catch-all clause to prevent ma-
nipulative devices.' ,0 Hochfelder concluded, and Stewart agreed,
that this description and the legislative history evidenced a purpose to
proscribe only conduct involving scienter.
Stewart also referred briefly to the Court's discussion in
496. Id at 1026-28.
497. 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).
498. Id at 691.
499. Id at 690 (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197-99).
500. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690 (quoting Hockfelder, 425 U.S. at 202).
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Hochfelder of the structure of the Securities acts. The Court recog-
nized that the provisions providing express civil remedies in a case in-
volving injunctive relief did not apply.5 0' But, in agreeing with the
Hochfelder reasoning, the Court did not deal with the central problem
of distinguishing between an implied private cause of action and an
SEC injunctive action. Moreover, the Court decided that the
Hochfelder interpretation directly applied to the facts in.Aaron because
the remedy expressly provided by Section 10(b) was involved, while
Hochfelder had only involved an implied cause of action. Justice Stew-
art continued the Court's reasoning and rejected the SEC's contention
that the difference between a private cause of action and an injunctive
action required restricting the Hochfelder holding to private actions.
In its argument, the SEC implored the court to follow the Capital
Gains502 decision. The SEC argued that Capital Gains emphasized the
distinction between law and equity, which was the key to a correct con-
struction of Section 10(b) in a suit for injunctive relief. The Court,
however, rejected this reasoning and found Hochfelder to be control-
ling. The Court agreed with the Hochfelder findings of legislative his-
tory for intent, in contrast to the Capital Gains finding of the lack of
need for intent. In addition, the Court agreed with Hochfelder's nar-
row reasoning which interpreted the words, "manipulative," "device,"
and "contrivance," as referring to intentional conduct. In contrast, the
interpretation in Capital Gains, looked to the particular practice in-
volved to see whether it was legal or equitable in order to determine if
intent or negligence was appropriate. Finally, Justice Stewart, for the
Court, argued that the Capital Gains fact situation involved a statutory
provision that regulated a special fiduciary relationship between an in-
vestment advisor and his client. 50 3 Such a situation, the Justice main-
tained, was not one that would have required intent to defraud in a
common law action for money damages. Section 10(b), however, un-
like the provision in Capital Gains, applied equally to both fiduciary
and nonfiduciary transactions in securities, so the situations were not
analogous."° Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the controlling
precedent was Hochfelder and not Capital Gains.
501. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 690 (citing Hochfelder 425 U.S. at 201-02).
502. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691 n.9.
503. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
504. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 694.
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D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, wrote
an extremely fine dissent. The dissent emphatically rejected the
Court's holding that the SEC must establish scienter in an injunction
action under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.5 °5
Justice Blackmun began by saying that the issues before the Court
were both "important and critical."5 °6He said that Sections 17(a) and
10(b) are the "primary antifraud provisions' of the Securities Acts, and
that they are the most important means by which the SEC, through
action for injunctive relief, seeks "protection against deception in the
marketplace. 5 o7
Then Justice Blackmun fired a very broad shot at the majority
opinion by noting how disappointing and drastic the result was:
[T]hey are the key weapons in the statutory arsenal for secur-
ing market integrity and investor confidence . . . . If the
Commission is denied the ability effectively to nip in the bud
the misrepresentations and deceptions that its investigations
have revealed, honest investors will be the ones who suffer.
Often they may find themselves stripped of their investments
through reliance on information that the Commission knew
was misleading but lacked the power to stop or contain.50
The dissenters emphatically rejected the majority's wholesale reli-
ance on Hochfelder because they believed there were "sound reasons
for distinguishing between private damages actions and public enforce-
ment actions under these statutes, ... 09 Justice Blackmun attacked
the reasoning in Hochfelder that emphasized the statutory language
and its "plain meaning." He said that the phrases, "device, scheme or
artifice to defraud," in Section 17(a)(1) and the phrases, "manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance," in Section 10(b), are said to con-
note "knowing or intentional misconduct."' 10 The Court in
Hochfelder, he continued, assumed that this incorporated a scienter re-
quirement which was historically found in fraud at common law.
The dissent found two flaws in this "wooden analysis." First,
there was a desire on the part of Congress to substitute the full disclo-
505. Id at 695-96.
506. Id at 703 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
507. Id at 704.
508. Id (statutory citations omitted).
509. Id
510. Id at 705.
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sure philosophy in place of caveat emptor. Given this broad desire, it is
difficult to read the language of Sections 17(a)(1) and 10(b) to include
misrepresentations that require scienter. If intent was desired, then the
word "willfully," which Congress used elsewhere in the securities laws,
was "conspicuously missing."' 51 ' Ultimately, Justice Blackmun con-
cluded that Congress wished to "identify a range of behavior, including
but not limited to intentional misconduct, and that they admit an inter-
pretation, in the context of Commission enforcement actions, that
reaches deceptive practices whether the common-law condition of sci-
enter is specifically present or not. ' 51 2 Moreover, Justice Blackmun
pointed out that the lower courts were hopelessly divided on these is-
sues, and thus reasonable minds could differ on the terminology Con-
gress used.
The second response was that the Supreme Court recognized in
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau513 that scienter was not re-
quired. Capital Gains specifically recognized the equitable pattern of
not requiring scienter. Justice Blackmun supported this line of think-
ing in Capital Gains by citing numerous commentators who had agreed
with the principle for "more than a century. '5 14
In addition, Justice Blackmun maintained that the significance of
the common law tradition was buttressed by the state precursors of the
federal securities laws. When the federal laws were being debated in
1933, many states had already enacted their own blue-sky laws, and
when Congress decided to deal with the problem it drew from the expe-
rience of the state statutes. The most prominent law was the Martin
Act of New York. 15 Significantly, in that Act, and other similar laws,
proof of scienter was not a prerequisite for relief. Justice Blackmun
finalized his position by expressing, "I am convinced that Congress was
aware of this tradition." 516
Justice Blackmun then made a separate argument. The Court's
decision, he said, failed to appreciate the structural interrelationship
among equitable remedies in the Exchange and the Securities Acts.
The pattern of both Acts was to grant to the SEC broad authority to
seek enforcement without scienter. In both Acts, "state of mind is
511. Id. at 706 (footnote omitted).
512. Id at 707.
513. See supra footnote 365 and accompanying text.
514. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
515. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-353 (Consol. 1921).
516. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 712.
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treated with some precision. Congress used terms such as 'knowing,'
'willful' and 'good faith,' when it wished to impose a state of mind re-
quirement."5" 7 Congressional omission of those terms in the statutes
authorizing the SEC to sue for injunctive relief was in sharp contrast to
their inclusion in the sections that allowed criminal prosecution. The
majority decision allowed the SEC to gain relief for some negligent act
under 17(a) of the Securities Act, but Rule lOb-5 was promulgated to
fill an important gap. Rule lOb-5 was meant to apply to both purchas-
ers and sellers under Section 10(b), whereas Section 17(a) applied only
to sellers. Therefore, Justice Blackmun contended that the SEC
promulgated Rule lOb-5 in order for it to operate in harmony with
Section 17(a). He supported that argument with a quotation from
United States v. Benjamin:' 18 "False and misleading statements about
securities 'can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent
than the chisel or the crowbar.' "519
Justice Blackmun conclude his dissent by noting that the statutory
language did not in any way compel the decision reached by the Court.
"[Consideration of] history, statutory structure, legislative purpose, and
policy all strongly favor an interpretation of § 17(a) and § 10(b) that
permits the Commission to seek injunctive relief without first having to
prove scienter."5' z Thus the minority opinion was a devastating attack
on the majority's reasoning.
E. Recklessness: A Continuing Issue
The Court in Aaron, like the Hochfelder decision did not decide if
recklessness constituted scienter for purposes of Section 10(b). Such a
refusal has left open the possibility that scienter might be flexibly con-
strued. Indeed, some courts after Hochfelder have interpreted the re-
quirement flexibly and found that recklessness is sufficient for
scienter.5 21 The Supreme Court's response to the issue of whether reck-
lessness will suffice for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is
unclear at this point, even though recklessness satisfied the requirement
517. Id at 713-714.
518. 328 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1964).
519. 446 U.S. at 716 (quoting United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 1964)).
520. 446 U.S. at 717.
521. See Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 403, n.44 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
939 (1979); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979);
Coleco Indus. Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978);
Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
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of scienter in actions for fraud at common law.522
Regardless of the outcome of the "recklessness" issue, the Aaron
decision remains a strict standard of culpability in SEC injunction ac-
tions. The only gratifying thing that can be said is that if a small crack
was left open, perhaps it will widen as the lower courts deal with the
issue. Eventually, it might force the Supreme Court to deal with the
issue and perhaps change the position it announced in Aaron.
XI. SECTION 14(a) AND RULE 14a-9: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AS A
BROAD STANDARD
A. Proxy Laws. Evolution of the Rules
Proxy laws in the federal system stem from an acknowledgement
by Congress that there was a need for protecting the stockholder but a
lack of recognition of what laws to pass to alleviate the need. Congres-
sional hearings that led to passage of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 identified the serious abuses and the need:
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should at-
tach to every security bought on a public exchange. Manage-
ments of properties owned by the investing public should not
be permitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corpo-
rate proxies, insiders having little or no substantial interest in
the properties they manage have often retained their control
without an adequate explanation of the management policies
they tend to pursue.523
Although Congress recognized the need, it was unable to specify in
Section 14(a) the standards by which the SEC would administer the
statute. Congress did realize, however, that those standards would
have to be technical and complex, and therefore broad powers were
granted to the SEC. The only statutory basis for federal regulation of
proxies is Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, which reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or
by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to per-
522. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). See also Cooper v. Schlesinger, 111 U.S. 148, 155
(1884); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931); 1 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 7.3 (1956).
523. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1934).
[Vol. 19:491
96
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss4/1
PROXIES AND THE MODERA CORPORA TION
mit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or au-
thorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to Section 12 of this title.524
The only standards to deduced from the statute are those that seem
fundamental or inherent in such terms as "public interest" and "protec-
tion of investors."
The proxy rules that developed had their genesis in early rules
promulgated by the SEC and have "naturally" changed as the agency
began to recognize changing needs. In other words, any bureaucracy,
as it functions, begins to develop more and more precise rules for its
constituency to follow. The rules promulgated under Section 14(a) had
been formed with one idea in mind-to assure that the shareholders of
a company are informed of the facts regarding resolutions to be voted
on at corporation shareholder meetings required by law. The informa-
tion is necessary, since generally there is no other way for the share-
holder to gather information about the issues in order to vote on them.
In short, proxy laws are based fundamentally on disclosure.
One set of commentators have noted that "[i]n recent years the
regulation of proxies has been probably the most dynamic phase of
Securities and Exchange Commission activity."525 One reason they
gave was that although much of the SEC work had become quite "reg-
ularized," many of the problems related to proxies were basically un-
resolved.526 Proxy rules have great significance because they do in fact
relate directly to the shareholders. Professor Loss has pointed out that
proxy rules are "very likely the most effective disclosure device in the
SEC scheme of things. 527
The SEC published its first set of proxy rules, known as the "LA
Rules," on September 24, 1935. These seven Rules were rudimentary
and experimental. As Chairman Purcell said in the House Hearings:
Now, of course, the Commission knew that these rules would
not give adequate information to stockholders. It adopted the
rules merely as a means of finding out what types of informa-
tion should be required in complying with the Congressional
direction and also in the interim to prohibit false information
from being circulated to stockholders. It anticipated that later
it would be able to adopt affirmative rules of the type Con-
524. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
525. CARY & EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 276 (5th ed. una-
bridged, 1980).
526. Id
527. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1027 (2d ed. 1961).
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gress had in mind.52 8
Because the "LA Rules" were inadequate, a new set of rules was
promulgated in 1938 and published as Regulation X-14.12 9 This regu-
lation and several amendments remained the law until the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1964.530
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the SEC promulgated
twelve new rules which are cited as Rules 14a-1 through 14a-12.1
3 1
Only Rule 14a-9 deals with fraud or misleading statements and is rele-
vant to this Article. That rule provides:
Rule 14a-9. False or Misleading Statements
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made
by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of
meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing
any statement which, at the time and in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not
false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in
any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has be-
come false or misleading.
(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other
soliciting material has been filed with or examined by the
Commission shall not be deemed a finding by the Commis-
sion that such material is accurate or complete or not false or
misleading, or that the Commission has passed upon the mer-
its of or approved any statement contained therein or any
matter to be acted upon by security holders. No representa-
tion contrary to the foregoing shall be made.
A note to Rule 14a-9 provides:
The following are some examples of what, depending upon
particular facts and circumstances may be misleading within
the meaning of this section:
528. SEC Proxy Rules, Hearings on H.R. 1493, 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1943).
529. L. Loss, supra note 527 at 527.
530. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (78 Stat.)
3013.
531. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14, 14a-1 to 240.14a-12 (1983).
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(a) Predictions as to specific future market values ["earnings
or dividends" has been eliminated].
(b) Material which directly or indirectly impugns character,
integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly
makes charges concerning improper, illegal or immoral con-
duct or associations, without factual foundation.
(c) Failure to so identify a proxy statement, form of proxy
and other soliciting material as to clearly distinguish it from
the soliciting material of any other person or persons solicit-
ing for the same meeting or subject matter.
(d) Claims made prior to a meeting regarding the results of
a solicitation.532
It should be specifically understood that an action may be brought
for any violation of the twelve proxy rules. "[A]ttempts to enjoin the
voting of proxies or to undo corporate action generally include allega-
tions of fraud in the solicitation of proxies. ' ' 131 Therefore the allegation
of fraud in the solicitation of proxies is generally inseparable as a part
of enforcement actions.
The proxy provisions do not include administrative stop orders.
The SEC must bring an injunction action in a federal district court in
order to stop the use of false and misleading material or any other
breach of the proxy rules. The SEC generally uses the administrative
procedures for processing proxy materials. Rule 14a-6(a),534 for exam-
ple, requires that material soliciting proxies must be filed with the SEC
in advance of distribution.
B. Legislative Intent
The central point in any discussion of proxies is that proxy laws
are intended to be different from the laws relating to new issues and
secondary trading of securities. The House of Representatives sponsors
stated that their bill 535 was grouped under six headings: "(a) control of
credits; (b) control of manipulative practices; (c) provision of adequate
and honest reports to securities holders by registered corporations; (d)
control of unfair practices of corporate insiders; (e) control of ex-
532. Id. § 240.14a-9.
533. H. BLUMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 13.17, 13-75 (1981).
534. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1983).
535. The bill that would eventually become the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 after appro-
priate discussion and compromise with the Senate Committee and a resulting joint bill that was
passed by the House and Senate.
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changes and over-the-counter markets; (f) administration." 6 The
House Report discussed proxy regulation under the heading "Control
of Unfair Practices by Corporate Insiders." ' 7 The Report made it
clear that solicitation proxies by corporate management involved a fi-
duciary duty between management and stockholders. Specifically the
House Report said:
A renewal of investors' confidence in the exchange markets
can be affected only by a clearer recognition upon the part of
the corporate managers of companies whose securities are
publicly held of their responsibilities as trustees for their cor-
porations. Men charged with the administration of other peo-
ple's money must not use inside information for their own
advantage. 3 s
After this preliminary remark, sponsors of the bill got to the heart
of their argument:
Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should at-
tach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.
Managements of properties owned by the investing public
should not be permitted to perpetuate themselves by misuse of
corporateproxies. . . . Insiders have at times solicited proxies
without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for
which theproxies are to be used and have used such proxies to
take from the stockholders for their own selfish advantage
valuable property rights.539
The Senate Report discussed intent with much the same idea:
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as
to the manner in which his interests are being served, it is es-
sential that he be enlightened not only as to the financial condi-
tions of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of
policy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings. Too
often proxies are solicited without explanation to the stock-
holder of the real nature of the questions for which authority
to cast his vote is sought."4
The Senate Report continued with a salient example of a case in which
the president of a corporation solicited proxies by means of a letter
"which purported to describe certain transactions concerning which
536. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
537. Id.
538. Id
539. Id at 13-14 (emphasis added).
540. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) (emphasis added).
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ratification by the shareholder was sought."' 54 ' The letter failed to
mention other important details. The solicitation was such a success
that not a single stockholder attended the stockholders' meeting in per-
son and the proxies were voted in favor of ratifying all of the acts and
proceedings taken by the directors and officers.5 42 This may be a good
example of fraud with intent, since there were insiders who perhaps
deliberately concealed from the shareholders the reasons for which
their proxies were being sought. On the other hand, such an example
may also illustrate a situation in which the insiders simply neglected to
inform the shareholders of the reasons for which their proxies were
being sought.
The same example of self-dealing by insiders was given in another
Senate report5 43 that had to do with practices on the stock exchange.
The report began with the first two sentences of the Senate report
quoted above 544 and then detailed a proxy solicitation by the American
Commercial Alcohol Corporation. The report finally made the follow-
ing statement about the proxy: "The letter to the stockholders and the
proxy requested the stockholders to ratify the acts of the very officers
and directors who were betraying them by participating secretly in the
underwriting agreement and pool operation, from which they obtained
substantial profit. '5 45 The report summarized proposed Section 14 and
concluded:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission will protect investors from promiscuous
solicitation of their proxies, on the one hand, by irresponsible
outsides seeking to wrest control of a corporation away from
honest and conscientious corporation officials; and, on the
other hand, by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to re-
tain control of the management by concealing and distorting
facts.546
The last statement, at first blush, would perhaps lead one to be-
lieve that the Senate was concerned with corporate officials who en-
gaged in proxy solicitation with a clear intent to deceive. Yet, although
the terms "unscrupulous," "concealing," and "distorting" seemed to
imply intent, if the Senate had wanted to indicate a conscious intent,
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1934).
544. See supra note 540 and accompanying text.
545. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. at 75.
546. Id. at 77.
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they would have done so. The Senate sought to alleviate the problem
of fraud against shareholders. Thus, why would the Senate, intent on
protecting the shareholder, impose the limiting concept of intent on
proxy solicitation when their overall purpose was to protect the
shareholder?
C. Negligence
The very fact that Congress was unable to pass a proxy statute that
was specific due to the complexities and technicalities of proxies, in
addition to the subsequent passage of a broad Section 14(a), has given
impetus to the observation that the proxy laws were intended to be
broad. Also, the fact that an "expert," the SEC, had to experiment with
the regulations in order to finally arrive at meaningful and workable
rules, would reinforce the point that proxy rules are complex. Al-
though the legislative committee hearings seemed to address the bla-
tant fraud that was occurring, none of the hearings referred to a denial
of a negligence standard. Thus, a negligence standard may easily be
inferred. Most importantly, however, in the argument for a negligence
standard was Congress' apparent lack of sophistication in developing
specific standards in light of the recognition that there was a definite
need for proxy laws. Additionally, on the basis of Chapter V in this
Article, it would seem unrealistic to assume that negligence was to be
excluded.
XII. CASE LAW SUPPORTING A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
A. Introduction: Private Right of Action
The number of cases and the development of case law concerned
with Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 is negligible in comparison to the
tremendous volume of case law on Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
However the paucity of cases does not mean that courts have not dealt
clearly with Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. Unfortunately the Supreme
Court has not ruled on any case concerning this area of securities law
and thus the relevant cases are from the district courts and circuit
courts of appeals.
In the important case of J .Z Case Co. v. Borak,4 t the Supreme
Court held that shareholders acting individually or derivatively can
bring an action to enforce the proxy rules. The Court stated that the
547. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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purpose of Section 14(a) was to "prevent management or others from
obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or
inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation. '5 48 Although neither the
language of the statute nor the legislative history made specific refer-
ence to a private right of action, the Court said that Section 14(a)'s
chief purposes were "the protection of investors, which certainly im-
plies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that
result," and "private enforcement of the proxy rules [providing] a nec-
essary supplement to Commission action. '5 49 Thus, Justice Clark,
speaking for the entire Court, felt that it was the Court's duty "to pro-




The first case to adopt negligence as the proper standard for a Sec-
tion 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 action was Richland v. Crandall,55 1 decided
in 1967. Basically, the lawsuit arose out of dissatisfaction on the part of
four stockholders of the George A. Fuller Company (Fuller) of New
Jersey, who owned approximately .1% of the issued stock. These four
were unhappy with the decision of their fellow stockholders, who
owned 70.6% of the issued shares, to sell the corporation as a going
concern and liquidate it in accordance with the incorporation laws of
New Jersey.552
Before the sale, the four plaintiffs began their suits against Fuller's
directors, principal officers, and BCLM, Inc., claiming violations of the
Exchange Act. The main point of the complaint was that the officers
and directors gained shareholder approval through false proxy material
in violation of Section 10(b) and 14(a).
Since this was one of the very first cases to be based on both Sec-
tion 10(b) and Section 14(a), it is noteworthy that the court's opinion
was as positive as it was. The court stated that: "The Section 10(b)
claim is apparently based on the theory that violation of Section 14(a)
may also constitute a violation of Section 10(b) if accompanied by a
548. Id at 431.
549. Id at 432.
550. Id at 433. See also, Comment, Private Rightsfrom Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational
Use of Borak, 63 Nw. L. Rev. 454 (1968).
551. 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
552. Id. at 541-42.
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purchase or sale of a security." '553 The court answered this statement
with the following opinion: "Since Section 14(a) deals specifically with
deceptive proxy material, it may well be that Section 10(b) of the Act
cannot be invoked by the plaintiffs." '554
This statement was footnoted with a positive and enlightening
statement on Section 10(b) and Section 14(a): "The only difference in
proof requirements would be that under the decisions in this Circuit
plaintiffs, in a suit under Section 10(b), must show an intent to defraud,
or at least guilty knowledge on part of the directors."555 The reason
was that Section 10(a) used language which is associated with intent to
defraud, specifically, "any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance," '556 while Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 do not contain this kind
of language. Their language pertains to a proxy that is "false or mis-
leading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statement therein not false
or misleading."' 57
After this summary, the district court delivered its most positive
statement on Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9:
Accordingly the Court is of the view, and so charged the jury
upon submitting to it the class action suit for deliberation,
that plaintiffs were required only to prove that the defendants
knew or should have known of the statements and material
facts, and the Court refused to charge that an intent to de-
fraud need be shown.55 8
Thus, the district court recognized quite emphatically in this first case
that Section 10(b) was intentionally different from Section 14(a), and
thus Section 10(b) required only a negligence standard.
The next case to focus on Section 14(a), Norle & Co. v. Hufflnes- 59
involved an action against the corporate directors, alleging a violation
of Section 14(a). The case was decided by the same court that had
rendered the Richland opinion. The court reiterated the point made in
the previous decision, albeit more in passing than as a major theme of
the case, since the court found that the defendants had actual knowl-
553. Id at 552.
554. Id at 552-53.
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edge of the misstatements and omissions. "Although actual knowledge
is not essential to the establishment of a claim based on Section 14(a) of
the Exchange Act. .. ."6o On appeal Section 14(a) was not discussed
since the lower court had found intent.
The third case pertinent to Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 was the
1970 decision of Berman v. Thompson.5 61 This case specifically denied
a good faith standard and strongly suggested a negligence standard.
"To relieve the defendants of liability because they may have exercised
good faith and honest business judgement in not disclosing this infor-
mation would not be a furtherance of the statutory policy of full disclo-
sure." 562Clearly, the court strongly felt that the shareholders were
entitled to disclosure of all of the material information, not just what
the directors wished to tell them. They concluded with the main point
that if the management does not give out information, it cannot expect
the shareholders to approve action based on that information. "If those
who direct the affairs of a corporation deem it in the best interests of
the corporation not to disclose certain information, then they may not
solicit shareholder approval of a transaction for which that information
is material. 563
C. Gerstle: The District Court Decision
The most important case in the judicial development of Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9 is Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 5" The facts of
the case, although long and involved, are important to fully understand
the decisions of the lower and higher courts. In Gerstle a class action
suit was brought by minority stockholders of General Outdoor Adver-
tising Co. (GOA), challenging its merger with defendant Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc. (Skogmo) on the ground that stockholder approval of the
merger had been obtained through a misleading proxy statement.
5 65
GOA, prior to the merger, had been the largest company in the
outdoor advertising business in the United States, as well as a leading
advertising concern in Canada and Mexico. Skogmo was engaged in
wholesale and retail merchandising of durable and soft goods through
subsidiaries, franchise dealers, and discount centers in the United
560. Id at 1109-1110.
561. 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Il. 1970).
562. Id at 1035.
563. Id
564. 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aft'dinpar, rev'd in part, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
565. 298 F. Supp. at 73.
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States and Canada. 66 Between April 1961 and March 1962, Skogmo
acquired 50.12% of GOA's common stock. Bertin C. Gamble, chair-
man of the board of directors and controlling stockholder of Skogmo,
was elected to GOA's board of directors in October 1961.567 By April
1962, two Skogmo vice-presidents and a former consultant to Skogmo
had been added to GOA's board, along with an officer, whom Gamble
had hired to take charge of the sale of advertising plants.
5 68
During 1961 and 1962, problems arose for the outdoor advertising
business. After an extensive study, the GOA officer in charge of sales
of plants recommended that GOA's advertising plants be sold, and
Gamble thereafter announced intentions to sell the less profitable ones.
The plant sales officer, however, continued to solicit offers for the sale
of all the plants, and by May 31, 1963, the date of the last plant sale
before the merger, twenty-five of GOA's plants had been sold. 69
Skogmo had been studying the merits of a merger with GOA, and
by May 1963 decided to seek a statutory merger whereby GOA stock-
holders would receive for each share of GOA stock a share of $40.00
par value preferred Skogmo stock paying dividends of $1.75 per annum
and convertible into common stock. Both boards formally approved
this plan on July 2, 1963.570
The proxy statement was mailed to shareholders on September 11,
1963, along with notice of a special meeting of stockholders to be held
on October 11, 1963. Approval of the merger was made at the October
meeting and became effective on October 17, 1963.57 1 After the merger
was approved, Skogmo again began to sell the plants, and by July 13,
1964, had contracts for the sale of all of the remaining plants in the
United States for a total price above GOA's net worth as evidenced in
the proxy statement. 72
Because the GOA plants could be sold at prices that were higher
than the value of the plants as a going concern, the minority stockhold-
ers' acceptance of the merger terms depended primarily on Skogmo's
plans for the plants that had not been sold at the date of the merger.
Therefore, the plaintiffs centered their claim on the proxy statement,
566. Id. at 74.
567. Id. at 75.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 77-78.
570. Id. at 83.
571. Id. at 84.
572. Id. at 84-89.
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asserting that it failed to disclose Skogmo's future plans about the re-
maining plants.
The proxy statement referred to certain indications that "demon-
strated that the market value of a substantial portion of the company's
plants was considerably in excess of book value." '573 The proxy state-
ment also looked at previous sales of GOA plants and then stated:
If the merger becomes effective, it is the intention of Gamble-
Skogmo, as the surviving corporation, to continue the busi-
ness of General Outdoor, including the policy of considering
offers for the sale to acceptable prospective purchasers of out-
door advertising branches or subsidiaries of General Outdoor
with the proceeds of any such sales, to the extent immediately
available, being used to further expand and diversify opera-
tions now being conducted or which might be acquired and
conducted by Gamble-Skogmo or its new, wholly-owned sub-
sidiary, GOA, Inc. There have been expressions of interest in
acquiring many of the remaining branches of General Out-
door and discussions have taken place in connection there-
with, but at the present time there are no agreements,
arrangements or understandings with respect to the sale of
any branch and no negotiations are presently being conducted
with respect to the sale of any branch.57 4
The plaintiffs sued Skogmo for an accounting subsequent to the
merger, alleging that the proxy statement contained violations of Sec-
tion 10(b), Rule lOb-5, Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. It found that the
proxy was inadequate for primarily two reasons. First, Skogmo had in
its possession expert appraisals of the GOA plants that had not been
sold, "which showed current liquidating values of these assets at figures
higher than the historical figures carried in the financial statements at-
tached to the proxy statement, . ,571 The district court agreed with
the SEC's amicus curiae brief that it was the duty of Skogmo to put the
appraised values of the unsold plants into the proxy statement. Second,
the court, having found that Skogmo intended to sell the unsold plants
soon after the merger, decided that such intention should have been
disclosed to the shareholders.
In arriving at its decision, the district court analyzed Section 14(a)
573. 478 F.2d at 1288.
574. Id
575. 298 F. Supp. at 103.
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and Rule 14a-9. First, it distinguished those items from Sections 17(a)
and 12(2) of the Securities Act, saying that the latter two sections are
"aimed at fraud resulting from misrepresentations by a seller to a buyer
in the sales of securities. '5 76 Also, the court analyzed Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, saying that they are "directed against such fraud in both
sales and purchases of securities."5 77 However, Section 14(a) and Rule
14a-9 "parallels" that of Rule lOb-5 and most of the precedants of Rule
lOb-5 are applicable to Rule 14a-9 . 78 The succinct and unquestioned
difference was that Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, "are limited to mis-
representations made in proxy material or in a statement addressed to a
body of stockholders. 5 79  Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 are general
fraud statutes, but Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 were created for a spe-
cific purpose-to protect the stockholders at their meetings so they can
make informed decisions. "Each stockholder has a right to insist that
neither he nor his fellow-stockholders be deceived when acting as a
body in casting their vote. '580
After the court distinguished Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 and
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it traced the case law and said there was
evidence for a scienter requirement and evidence for a negligence re-
quirement in a Rule lOb-5 action. The main thrust of the Court's argu-
ment was its distinction between Rule 1Ob-5 and Rule 14a-9. The court
affirmed that, "however, the basis for incorporating scienter into a Rule
lOb-5 action does not exist in a Rule 14a-9 suit."" 'Although the court
cited cases that supported such conclusions, the more forceful argu-
ment was that a literal reading of the Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9
failed to reveal a scienter requirement. The court asserted: "A literal
reading of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 failed to reveal any require-
ment for scienter. Negligence alone either in making a misrepresenta-
tion or in failing to disclose a material fact in connection with proxy
solicitation is sufficient to warrant recovery. '5 82
D. Gerstle: The Court of Appeals Decision
The district court's decision in Gerstle, was appealed to the Court
576. Id at 96.
577. Id
578. Id This writer disagrees with this statement. The precedents of Rule lob-5 are estab-
lished primarily for Rule lOb-5 and are not necessarily intended for Rule 14a-9.
579. Id
580. Id
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit.583 Judge Friendly, wrote the opin-
ion for the court. Judge Friendly has a reputation for being one of the
federal bench's most distinguished judges; his opinions are lucid, well-
reasoned, and authoritative-in short, no one better could have de-
cided the case. His hesitancy in the opinion made everyone realize that
there were those who felt that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should
require a scienter standard. Therefore his conclusions and analysis in
Gerstle are most important because he distinguished between 14(a) and
14a-9 and 10(b) and lOb-5 and arrived at a different standard.
The court of appeals upheld the district court's conclusion that
Skogmo had violated Rule 14a-9 when it did not adequately disclose its
intention to sell the unsold plants. However, the appellate court denied
the lower court's adoption of the SEC's position that Skogmo's non-
disclosure of the appraisal values of the remaining plants was illegal.
Judge Friendly stated:
Rule 14a-9 has long carried a note giving examples "of what
depending upon particular facts and circumstances, may be
misleading within the meaning of the rule;" the very first is
"(a) Predictions as to specific future market values, earnings
or dividends. . . ." [T]he policy embodied in the note to
Rule 14a-9 has consistently been enforced to bar disclosure of
asset appraisals as well as future market values, earnings, or
dividends.584
Judge Friendly's analysis in Gerstle of the fraud issue was very
important, as he expanded and developed the reasoning of the district
court. Judge Friendly asserted that there were four major reasons for
determining that Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 do not need a scienter
standard. First, Rule lOb-5 required more than negligence due to the
use of words denoting scienter-"any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance. '58 5 That was not the case for Section 14(a) which "con-
tains no such evil-sounding language.
586
Second, although the language of Rule 14a-9 closely paralleled the
language of Rule lOb-5, neither rule specifically states that scienter is a
requirement and the courts have held to the requirement of scienter for
Rule lOb-5 because there "is a concern that without some such require-
ment the Rule might be invalid as exceeding the Commission's author-
583. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
584. Id. at 1297.
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ity under Section 10(b) to regulate 'manipulative or deceptive
devices.' "587 In contrast, the scope of the rulemaking power given
under Section 14(a) "is broad, extending to all proxy regulation 'neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors' and not limited by any words connoting fraud or deception. '588
Third, it was unwise to require plaintiffs in cases like this to prove
scienter, because although in Rule lOb-5 cases an intent is desirable,
many corporate statements are issued without legal obligation to do so.
Such actions are commendable and desirable and the broad standard
of negligence would negate these voluntary and desirable dissemina-
tions of information. In contrast, in cases involving the proxy rules,
especially like the instant case, the "broad standard of culpability...
serve[s] to reinforce the high duty of care owed by a controlling corpo-
ration to minority shareholders" '589 when the proxy statement is pre-
pared in seeking the acquiescence of the shareholders. Judge Friendly
added in a footnote 90 that this was not a case involving the "hurly-
burly" of election contests, but a proxy statement in which the defend-
ant had had plenty of time to prepare.
Lastly, the fourth reason related directly to the nature of fraud in
the common law. In a tort liability case at common law, when a person
gave false information to someone else with the intent to influence the
transaction in which the originator of the information had a pecuniary
interest, the common law allowed for rescission and restitution and no
proof of scienter was necessary. Judge Friendly voiced this last point
forcefully, "It is unlikely that Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 contem-
plated less." 5 9 '
Judge Friendly made a calculated and insightful analysis of Sec-
tion 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. Since the Supreme Court has not ruled on
this issue, the Gerstle ruling by the court of appeals is still the accepted
interpretation of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.
E. Gould
The next case decided after Gerstle was Gould v. American Hawai-
ian Steamship Co. ,592 handed down in 1972. It is unnecessary to state
587. Id (citations omitted).
588. Id.
589. Id at 1300.
590. Id n.19 (quoting General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus. 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968)).
591. Id at 1300.
592. 351 F. Supp. 853 (1972).
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the facts other than to say that it was a proxy case in which Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9 were at issue. The court, in arriving at the deci-
sion cited Gerstle as the "only known cases dealing with § 14(a)." '93
The court basically agreed with the reasoning in Gerstle194 and held
that a negligence standard applied for a Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9
violation.
Gould was heard on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.5 95 The importance of the decision was its appearance after the
famous Hochfelder decision. The question arose, whether Hochfelder
and its requirement of scienter for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would
affect the reasoning of a court in a Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 case.
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that negligence was
the appropriate standard under Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, and cited
the same cases cited by the district court as previously discussed above.
The court concluded that unlike Sections 10(b) and 18, "which encom-
pass activity in numerous and diverse areas of securities markets and
corporate management, Section 14(a) is specially limited to materials
used in soliciting proxies."5 96 The court then cited Hochfelder as "con-
firming" such a view and then stated specifically that, in Hochfelder:
[T]he Supreme Court pointed out that the "operative lan-
guage and purpose" of each particular section of the Acts of
1933 and 1934 are important considerations in determining
the standard of liability for violations of the section in ques-
tion. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err
in applying the standard of due diligence to determine
Casey's liability in this case.5 97
Thus, the court of appeals agreed with the Hochfelder reasoning and
applied it to confirm that Section 10(b) and Rule 14a-9 differed from
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in requiring a negligence standard of lia-
bility rather than a scienter one.
F. Falstaff
One of the most recent cases concerning proxies and the standard
of proof is SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 59s The facts of the case were
rather intricate. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (Falstaff), an independent,
593. Id at 864.
594. Id
595. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
596. Id at 778.
597. Id
598. [1978 Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), T 96,583 (D.D.C. 1978).
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publicly owned brewer, suffered severe financial losses for several years
in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In 1974 Falstaff sold its San Fran-
cisco brewery to the General Brewing Corporation which was a com-
pany beneficially owned by Paul Kalmanovitz, a wealthy businessman.
It was agreed that General Brewing would continue to produce beer
under the Falstaff name.599
After the transaction, the management of Falstaff probed Kal-
manovitz to determine if he was interested in investing in Falstaff. On
March 10, 1975, Kalmanovitz entered into an agreement with Falstaff,
whereby he would invest ten million dollars in cash, and personally
guarantee another ten million dollars in loans. In return, Kalmanovitz
would receive preferred stock sufficient to give him a majority voting
interest in Falstaff and an option to purchase more stock °.6  Falstaff
immediately sent a proxy statement to its shareholders, who approved
of the transaction at an April 28 meeting 10'
After he had gained control of Falstaff, Kalmanovitz failed to re-
port his stock acquisition to the SEC for over a year. Further, Falstaff
failed to file certain required reports with the SEC and filed others that
the SEC thought were materially misleading.60 2
Then, in 1977, Falstaff issued a proxy statement to gain approval
for payment of dividends on Kalmanovitz's preferred stock in common
stock instead of cash. The SEC contended that this proxy misstated
specific material facts and left out others, and then instituted an action
to block the 1977 shareholders' meeting and to permanently enjoin Fal-
staff and Kalmanovitz from violating specific provisions of the Securi-
ties Acts.603
Three points in the court's ruling are relevant here. First, the 1975
proxy statement was false and misleading because it violated Section
14(a) and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9. Second the 1977 proxy statement was
materially deficient in several respects and thus a further violation of
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. Third, both defendants violated Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 through their errors in the 1975 and 1977 proxy
statements and in the 1975 and 1976 reports and through misstatements
in a November 1975 letter that Kalmanovitz sent to Falstaff stockhold-
599. Id. at 94,456.
600. Id. at 94,457-58.
601. Id. at 94,457.
602. Id.
603. Id. at 94,466.
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ers.6°Concluding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the de-
fendants would engage in further misconduct, the district court
enjoined them from violating those sections and rules in the future.
Although the parties were found to have violated Section 14(a)
and Rule 14a-9, nothing was specifically said in the entire decision
about a negligence or scienter standard as to Section 14(a) and Rule
14a-9. The court assumed that statements made in a previous proxy
which had become "false and misleading" had to be corrected by a
subsequent proxy or that subsequent proxy was also false and
misleading:
Section 14(a) and Rules 14a-9 and 12b-20 required that
the 1977 Proxy Statement correct statements made in the 1975
Proxy Statement which were or had become false or mislead-
ing, to wit, those statements referred to in Paragraphs 10
through 15a of these Conclusions of Law. The failure of the
1977 Proxy Statement to do so rendered its [sic] materially
false and misleading. 605
Further, because the 1977 proxy statement contained no disclosure of
Kalmanovitz's voting control of Falstaff, the district court concluded
that, "[t]he failure of the 1977 Proxy Statement to do so rendered it
materially false and misleading. 6 6
It is unfortunate that the district court did not specifically refer to
scienter and negligence, but it is obvious that it decided that both Sec-
tion 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 allow a negligence or scienter standard, or
both. The fraudulent actions of the defendants were intentional and
thus the scienter element was evident. Also, since misleading actions
connote negligence, the negligence element was present.
Falstaff was appealed to the Appeals Court of the District of Co-
lumbia circuit.607 Circuit Judge Tamm delivered the opinion for the
court, and unanimously affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Judge Tamm said nothing specifically about scienter or negligence in
relation to Section 14(a) or Rule 14a-9 in the opinion, but mentioned
that the counsel for the defendants "vigorously" tried to vacate the in-
junction against the defendant Kalmanovitz because he maintained
that the errors on his part were due to ignorance, and not bad faith.60 8
604. Id. at 94,467-70.
605. Id at 94,469 (citation omitted).
606. Id.
607. 629 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
608. Id. at 79-80.
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The court refused to deal with the issue at all and asserted: "Whether
actuated by bad faith or simple ignorance of the law, he violated the
law, and the pattern of past violations indicates that he is reasonably
likely to do so in the future. Judge Corcoran acted properly in en-
joining Kalmanovitz from future violations."609
Thus, both courts refused to deal with the issue of scienter in Sec-
tion 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. It is reasonable, then, to conclude that the
two courts argued for a negligence standard since the terms "bad faith"
or "simple ignorance" connote a negligence standard.
G. Adams
Another recent case on point is Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills,
Inc., decided by the District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee.6 0
Simply, the facts were that in April 1970, Chadbourn, Inc.
(Chadbourn), a North Carolina hosiery manufacturer, merged with
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. (Standard), a small publicly held manu-
facturer. The shareholders of Standard had agreed to the merger after
receiving a proxy statement describing the proposed plan. The share-
holders had also received a recommendation from Standard's manage-
ment favoring the merger. Finally, they had received financial
statements of Chadbourn prepared by Chadbourn's accountants, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell and Company (Peat, Marwick).6 '
About a year after the merger, Chadbourn's sales of hosiery
dropped drastically and unexpectedly, with large losses. Chadbourn
was unable to pay dividends on, or redeem, the preferred stock held by
former Standard shareholders as had been contemplated under the
merger agreement.6" 2 The shareholders brought suit against Peat,
Marwick, alleging that the proxy materials issued had contained false
or misleading statements in order to gain shareholder approval of the
merger.
First, the district court determined that in the standard proxy
statement mailed to shareholders, the incorrect term "common" was
used to describe the stock that was subject to a bank loan which re-
stricted the payment of dividends. The court found that Peat, Marwick
609. Id. at 80.
610. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 1 95,683 (E.D. Tenn. (1976).
611. Id. at 90,352-53.
612. Id. at 90,353.
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indisputably "had knowledge of the correct term well before the mail-
ing";61 3 that footnote 7(c) was incorrect in describing the dividend re-
strictions on "common" rather than "capital" stocks; and that Peat,
Marwick "did not inform Standard stockholders of the correction or
anyone else. 614
In dealing with Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, the court decided
that "the defendant [Peat] had full knowledge of the terms of the loan
agreement, the identure and the restrictions contained therein . ."65
Armed with this knowledge, Peat, Marwick deliberately chose to mis-
represent and delete facts that were significantly material to standard
shareholders.616 These actions, the court concluded, "deliberately
placed [Peat, Marwick] in the role of advocacy in not presenting a com-
plete and accurate picture. ' 6 7 Thus, the district court said that Peat,
Marwick's financial statements were not neutral, but "knowingly and
deliberately biased," and therefore aided and abetted the proxy solici-
tation.61 8 On this basis, Peat, Marwick was held liable to the share-
holder plaintiffs under "rule 14a-9 promulgated pursuant to § 14. 16 19
The district court refused to deal with the intent or negligence is-
sue. Because the court found deliberate action on the defendant's part,
it held the defendants liable under Rule 14a-9, based on intent. How-
ever, the court did not argue whether or not Rule 14a-9 should or
should not include negligence. The court never considered it as an
issue.
On appeal Adams was decided by Circuit Judges Weick, Engel
and Merritt, with Judge Merritt writing the opinion.62°Interestingly, at
the beginning of the opinion, Judge Merritt stated for the court: "The
primary issue is whether Peat is liable for a negligent error-the failure
to point out in the proxy statement sent to stockholders of the acquired
corporation that certain restrictions on the payment of dividends by the
acquiring corporation applied to preferred as well as common
stock." 621 At no time did the district court discuss negligence as it per-
tains to Rule 14a-9. Judge Merritt went on to maintain that the evi-
613. Id. at 90,355.
614. Id.
615. Id at 90,369.
616. Id
617. Id at 90,370.
618. Id.
619. Id
620. 623 F.2d 422 (1980).
621. Id at 424.
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dence suggested only a mistake and oversight on Peat, Marwick's part,
and not an intent to deceive.
Next, the issue of liability under Rule 14a-9 was discussed and the
court conclude that "scienter should be an element of liability in pri-
vate suits under proxy provisions as they apply to outside account-
ants." '622 The court declined "to decide the standard of liability for the
corporate issuer of proxy material." '623 Thus, this case only decided
whether Rule 14a-9 applied to outside accountants, not to anyone else.
The court noted several reasons for holding that outside account-
ants were liable under Rule 14a-9 only upon a showing of scienter, and
not negligence.
(1) Outside Accountants Are Different From Corporations.
The court, through Merritt, reasoned that the accountant, un-
like the corporation, does not benefit directly from the proxy vote
and is not in privity with the shareholders. Moreover, the court
asserted, since accountants prepare daily business financial state-
ments that are attached to proxies, the accountant's potential lia-
bility for minor mistakes would be great under a negligence
standard.624
(2) Rule 14a-9 Follows Rule lOb-5 and No Other Rules.
The court said that Rule 14a-9 was different from Section
12(2) of the Securities Act, which imposed liability for negligent
misrepresentation in a prospectus, because Rule 14a-9 did not re-
quire actual reliance on misrepresentation by the investor.625
However, it is like Rule lOb-5, because it substituted the less ex-
acting standard of materiality for reliance.626
(3) Legislative History of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.
Judge Merritt reviewed the Senate Report to the Exchange
Act, which cited an example from the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency Report.627 He concluded that this example evi-
denced scienter, and found another example from the Senate
622. Id at 428.
623. Id
624. Id
625. Id. at 428-29.
626. Ad at 429 (citation omitted).
627. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 75 (1934).
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Committee on Banking and Currency,62 8 which had used the
words, "unscrupulous," "concealing," and "distorting"-all of
which implied knowledge or scienter.629 After quoting other Con-
gressmen and a presidential aide of the era, Merritt concluded
that "The common denominator of all these depictions of the
problem is wrongdoing with some degree of knowledge, i e. scien-
ter . . "630
(4) Congressional Intent Regarding Subsequent Amendments Indi-
rectly Linked to 14(a).
Merritt then attempted to show that when Congress passed the
Williams Act of 1968631 governing tender offers, it expressed the desire
that "proxy statements and tender offers be governed by the same rules
and regulations. 632 In discussing the Williams bill, the court quoted
from Representative Williams of New Jersey and Senator Javits to
show that Section 14(a) and Section 14(e) were intended to be governed
by the same rules and logic. 6 3 3 Merritt concluded that Section 14(e)
has a scienter requirement and therefore Section 14(a) does also.
Merritt ended his decision by saying, "We conclude that 14(a) and
14(e) should be governed by the same standard of liability insofar as
accountants' liability is concerned, and that an action under 14(e) re-
quires proof of scienter." 634 Thus, the majority opinion of the circuit
court disagreed with the district court's opinion, and held that scienter
was the standard for Rule 14a-9. Therefore, since the majority felt that
Peat, Marwick had committed only a negligent act, it was not liable.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Weick was an extremely strong
and well written opinion. Weick disagreed on two counts and was so
disturbed by the majority's opinion that he did the unusual-he deliv-
ered two successive dissents.
In Judge Weick's first dissent,635 he disagreed with the majority
opinion's reviewing and overturning the facts as found by the district
court. Weick contended that it is not within the province of the appel-
628. Id.
629. Id at 77.
630. Adams, 623 F.2d at 430.
631. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
632. 4dams, 623 F.2d at 430.
633. Id. at 430-31.
634. Id at 431.
635. Id. at 436-46.
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late division to review the findings of a trial judge and state that they
are erroneous. The district court found, Weick noted, "that Peat had
acted 'willfully, with intent to "deceive" and "manipulate" and "reck-
less disregard of the truth,"' "636 and these findings of fact should have
been accepted by the appeals court. Weick concluded that the testi-
mony was taken before an experienced judge:
[Who had the opportunity to and did take testimony of wit-
nesses, observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to make
credibility assessments, we are not permitted to set aside his
factual findings unless we are satisfied and can demonstrate
that they are not supported by substantial evidence and are
clearly erroneous. 63
7
This majority opinion was made, concluded Weick, in regard to the
defendant's intent to defraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, and
therefore Judge Weick felt that he did not need to address the issues of
Peat's liability under Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.
In his second dissent,638 Weick said that the majority opinion was
wrong in its interpretation of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. In support-
ing his position, he maintained that unlike Section 10(b), neither Sec-
tion 14(a) nor Rule 14a-9 "use language which would even suggest a
requirement that the violator must act with scienter. ' 639 Weick sug-
gested that Section 14(a) allowed the SEC to prescribe rules relating to
proxies that are necessary and appropriate for the public interest and
that protect the investor. Moreover, Rule 14a-9, which was prescribed
by the SEC for that purpose, prohibits proxy solicitation that is "false
or misleading," which Weick asserted obviously meant more than a
scienter standard. Further, the SEC asserted, and Weick agreed, that
there was a violation of Rule 14a-9 because of Peat's false and mislead-
ing audit.' Finally, the majority, contended Weick, made "short
shrift" of the SEC's expertise, whereas they should have given greater
deference to the SEC's interpretation of the statute, since past cases
advocated that such deference be given to agency's contentions.64" '
636. Id at 437.
637. Id. at 437.
638. Id at 446-47.
639. Id at 447 (quoting SEC memoranda supporting its position for rehearing en banc at p. 6-
7).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
The economic society represented by the corporation has under-
gone a metamorphosis that can best be characterized by a change in
property relationship so drastic that the shareholder no longer controls
the corporation-instead the professional manager does. Because these
changes affected the fundamental structure and philosophy of the soci-
ety, a reform movement began in the 1890's by those who recognized
what was happening. Their warnings were finally heeded by the New
Deal, which passed the securities laws aimed at needed reforms.
In recent years, the secondary securities fraud area, Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, have received most of the publicity because it is the
first area in which litigation has begun. But that does not mean that the
proxy section, Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 of the securities laws, is not
important. The proxy section was not simply "thrown in," but was
carefully placed and kept short and general in nature, so that the SEC
could experiment and try to regain from the corporations some of the
rights taken from the shareholders.
The proxy laws constitute one of the most important parts of the
securities laws, but they have been the least well defined and developed
by the SEC and the courts. What the SEC does in the next few years
may well affect the individual and his rights in corporations in the fu-
ture. Conceivably, however, these matters may too big for the SEC and
may instead need to be dealt with by Congress. But as far as fraud is
an element in a Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 action is concerned, it
seems clear that the fundamental importance of the proxy, demands
that the law be as general as possible so that the shareholder who has
lost so much can have at least a modicum of expectation from the cor-
porate management. To impose a scienter standard is to deny this pos-
sibility. Moreover, as distinguished Judge Friendly said in the leading
Gerstle case, a proxy is different from other information dispensed by
the corporation since management has plenty of time to write it and
send it to shareholders. A scienter standard would be altogether too
confining and allow the SEC and the shareholder almost no recourse.
Thus, the courts have rightly concluded that proxy laws are unique and
should embody a negligence standard.
That the United States Supreme Court has imposed a scienter
standard on Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 seems unreasonable, espe-
cially since the legislative background and various cases have indicated
a negligence standard. Possibly the Supreme Court felt compelled to
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protect management with a scienter standard, because the information
dispersed in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases is often rushed, and,
time is of essence. In any case, the two laws--one dealing with proxy,
and the other with secondary stock fraud-are different and therefore
should not be treated the same.
Finally, it seems appropriate to conclude with the fundamental
idea that fraud is like a specter "haunting" this Article. Fraud today
must be looked at as a continuum between intent and negligence. It is
a product of certain basic forces and changes that have been operating
in our society for a long time, ever since the court of equity was first
formulated. If the concept of responsibility for one's actions without
necessary intent were only an expedient response to social pressures,
advocates, like Bucklo, who have adopted this concept so forcefully
would be less frustrated. Also the differences between the traditional
common law idea of necessary intent and the present-day idea of liabil-
ity for actions that cause harm to others, even though there is no intent,
would be less strongly expressed.
The concept of liability to individuals who have no way of protect-
ing themselves and yet, who are necessary in the scheme of equity mar-
kets has not become a very intense issue in the law only because of the
huge size of corporations and the power wielded by technological man-
agers and stock brokerage houses, to mention but a few factors. The
kind of responsibility that we are dealing with may, in fact, be a totally
new concept rather than something people are giving lip service to, in
order to calm "those out there" who are concerned and are being hurt.
There is much concern on the part of judges and plaintiffs. There
is enough evidence for us to be forced to look at the demand, as not
superficial and meaningless but a necessary response to real problems
and demands for liability for actions that harm even though actual in-
tent may not be probable in a court of law. The answer lies in the court
of equity, and Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 and Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 were promulgated to address this need through our courts. The
majority of courts have ruled for a negligence standard for both sets of
laws. Therefore, in the proxy laws the demand has been met, and
rightly so. But in the secondary securities fraud area the Supreme
Court has chosen to go the other way. This quotation from the distin-
guished Judge Benjamin Cardozo seems appropriate as a final
statement:
For the process by which law grows is above all a social pro-
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cess. The individual intellect is not as desolate as it seems.
The pressure that gives form to manners and morals gives
form in the end to law; to judge-made law often, and when
on occasion that fails, to law declared by statute. Initiative,
ingenuity, idealism will help. For a time the lack of them
may deflect and hinder. But the steady pressure goes on and
finds in the end the responsive mind.6 2
642. B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 136 (1928).
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